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Chapter 1
Introduction
Risk and uncertainty are relevant to many decisions. They are typically present when fu-
ture results depend on today's decisions and are not entirely forecastable. The prominence
of this presence may, however, depend on the type of decision that has to be taken. In
order to make the best decision at present a precise analysis of what may happen in the
future is needed. Decision theory is the field that investigates individuals' choice behavior,
and proposes models to describe this behavior.
The use and the applications of such models to other fields are well-established. In
medical care there is uncertainty about the final result of an intervention. When a diagnosis
is made, several ways of treatment can be implemented, and physicians have to choose
the best of those alternatives. Tliis choice can be difficult, especially when new ways of
treatment become available. In the case of life-threatening diseases, a mechanism which
makes it possible to choose the treatment that minimizes the risk of dying is called for. It
is not surprising that decision models have proved to be very useful here.
In economics, where money plays a central role, maximizing profits is the classical aim
of a firm. Before a good is produced, a precise analysis of the market need for this good
has to be made. Due to competition it is essential for profit maximization to produce
the good such that consumers are willing to choose for that good. Tools from individual
decision theory can help modelling consumer's choice behavior, in order to identify the
criteria that the good has to meet.
There are more examples that underscore the importance and the wide applicability of
individual decision theory. This monograph incorporates several models that contribute
to this discipline in various ways. The stream that I follow in the thesis starts with
the classical theories on expected utility and ends with developments of a more modern
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decision making model, namely, cumulative prospect theory. In this introductory chapter
I explain the underlying structure for individual decision under uncertainty and under
risk. Once these are established, in the following chapters we continue with models that
describe individual decision making more specifically.
Individual decision theory distinguishes between models for uncertainty and models for
risk. The basic concepts of decision under uncertainty are the set of states, the outcomes,
and the acts. The set of states is the complete collection of fully described situations that
can happen in the future. Exactly one such situation will happen, which is called the true
state. The decision maker, however, is not sure about which will be the true state, and
cannot enforce any state. This fact explains the notion of uncertainty.
An outcome is something that can affect the decision maker directly. It can be money,
a commodity bundle, a health situation, etc. Outcomes are always associated with states,
and the mechanism that assigns to each state a possible outcome is an act. The decision
maker is faced with choices between acts. When an act is chosen and future reveals the true
state, then the decision maker receives the outcome that is associated with the true state
by the chosen act. It is therefore important to make a well-considered choice. Decision
theory assumes that the decision maker has a pne/enence over the acts.
A clarifying example is the following: Suppose Ms. B, the decision maker, visits a horse
race, and she plans to bet some money in the next race. At the betting office she receives
the information that five horses will participate in that race. The names of the horses are
/ti, /i2i '*3, <^i> and /15. She decides to invest money only on one bet. There are two types of
tickets for sale, both at the price of $7.5. The first one offers $5 if horse /ii is the winner,
$10 if horse /12 wins, and $0, $15, and $8, respectively, if horse /13, /14, /15 wins. The second
ticket offers $10, $6, $12, $7, and $3 for horses /11,/12,/13,/k, and /15, respectively. Ms. B
carefully analyzes the situation and realizes that the collection of horses {/ij, /12, /13, /14, ^5}
is the set of states. Exactly one horse will win the race, indicating the true state, and she
is uncertain about which will be the winner. The amounts of money indicated by each
ticket minus the price which is paid for the ticket are the outcomes. The resulting acts,
that reveal for each horse the amount of money that will be gained if that horse wins the
race, negative amounts meaning losses, are / = (-2.5,2.5, -7.5,7.5,0.5) for the first ticket
and g = (2.5, —1.5,4.5, —0.5, —4.5) for the second ticket. Her experience motivates Ms. B
to choose for the first ticket, which indicates her preference between the acts / and 3.
The setup for decision under risk is somewhat different. A set of praes is given, and
a /otterj/ decides which prize the decision maker receives. In a lottery with each prize a
known chance of winning that prize is associated. On the entire collection of lotteries the
decision maker has a preference.
Consider, for example, a roulette wheel with three equal-sized fields, two colored red
and one blue. Prizes are the amounts of money that one can gain from a single spin of this
fair roulette wheel. Suppose, against a payment of S2.5 we can choose from the following
two possibilities. First, if the wheel stops at a field that is red one gets $3, and $0 if the
final field is blue. Second, if the final field is blue one gets $5, and $0 if it is red. The above
possibilities are the following lotteries: the first lottery gives a 2/3 chance of gaining $0.5
and a 1/3 chance of losing $2.5. The second lottery gives a 2/3 chance of losing $2.5 and
a 1/3 chance of gaining $2.5. The probabilities result from the fact that two of the fields
are red, the other is blue, and all fields are equal-sized, and the prizes in the lotteries are
net prizes.
The preceding examples illustrate the differences between decision under uncertainty
and decision under risk. For instance, in Anscombe & Aumaim (1963) an act is referred
to as "horse lottery", and a lottery -as introduced above- is referred to as "roulette
lottery." In this thesis, however, for decision under uncertainty, I use the setup with states,
outcomes, and acts similar to Savage (1954). For decision under risk we use the setup with
prizes and lotteries. To link risk and uncertainty, note that decision under risk can be
considered the special case of decision under uncertainty when objective probabilities for
the states are given beforehand.
We now discuss the goals to be optimized in decision situations. In health care it is
assumed that physicians strive to achieve the best health situation for a patient. An impor-
tant criterion is the quantity of life, that the patient can gain from a medical intervention.
Also, the quality of life of the patient is central and has to be at its highest possible level.
In economics, for a firm that produces certain goods, it is assumed that profit has to be
maximized. This indicates that the goal of a decision process is to reach an optimal choice
under the given circumstances. There are mathematical tools available that enable to deal
with optimization problems. However, the application of these tools to a decision process
requires in addition to the mathematical formulation of the decision problem, as intro-
duced above, the identification of a numerical function that captures all properties of the
preference relation. Such a function we call representing function or representation for the
preference relation. Often, certain properties, such as continuity, concavity, monotonicity
or differentiability, are associated with a representing function. It is the aim of decision
science to identify characteristics in terms of preferences such that representability by an
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appropriate function is sustained. In turn, the function should be representing only for
preferences with those special characteristics. Such results are compressed in a decision
model.
The classical model for decision under risk is eipected uiiWy. In this model lotteries
are evaluated in the following way. To each prize a uti/ify value is assigned, which in turn
is multiplied by the objective probability of receiving that prize in a given lottery. The
summation over all prizes, of the utilities multiplied by their probabilities, is the expected
utility of the lottery. Comparison of lotteries results in comparison of expected utility of
those lotteries. The decision maker prefers a first lottery to a second one, if the first lottery
lias a higher expected utility value than the second one.
For decision under uncertainty the classical approach is subjective eayecied ufi/ity. Un-
der this model - assuming here that the set of states is finite - an act is evaluated as
follows. A utility value is assigned to each outcome, and to each state a subjective prob-
ability indicates how likely the decision maker views that state to occur. For a given act
the utility of outcomes is multiplied by the probability of the state, and the summation,
over all states gives the subjective expected utility of the act. Similar to decision under
risk, a higher subjective expected utility value indicates a preference for the corresponding
act.
Both approaches above were considered to be rational decision making models. The
reason is that the preference axioms that are used to characterize (subjective) expected
utility are acceptable on their own and most people agree with them. However, the fact
that many people violate expected utility in their decisions, has led to severe criticisms on
the axioms. Experiments were conducted to undermine the expected utility theories, and
new models that are stable against those paradoxes had to be developed.
One conclusion from the experiments that indicate violation of expected utility was the
evidence that individuals tend to underestimate and/or overestimate probabilities. For
decision under risk nmA:-dependent uliiity is a model that is robust against the expected
utility paradoxes. For the evaluation of a lottery the rwifc-onterin^ of prizes is essential.
First, the prizes are ordered from best to worst, and a utility value is assigned to each
prize. Then, a probability transformation function associates decision weiy/ifcs (i.e. new
probabilities) to each prize, depending on the original probabilities and the ordering of
prizes. Finally, the summation over all prizes, of the utilities multiplied by their decision
weights, is the rank-dependent utility of the lottery.
For decision under uncertainty C/»ogue<-expec<ed uti/itj/ is the analog to rank dependent
utility. In this model the outcomes of an act are rank-ordered, implying a ranking of the
states. A capacity (i.e. a nonadditive probability measure on the set of states) determines
decision weights for each state, depending on the new ranking. The summation of the
utility value of an outcome multiplied by the decision weight of the state according to the
outcome, gives the Choquet-expected utility of the act.
Cumuiatine prospect </ieon/ generalizes rank-dependent utility (and similarly Choquet-
expected utility) in permitting a different treatment for gains than for losses. It is therefore
the sign-dependent generalization of RDU (CEU). The prize that has utility equal to zero
is called the status <puo. It separates pains (i.e. prizes preferred to the status quo) from
iosses (i.e. prizes dispreferred to the status quo). A lottery, then, can be decomposed
into a gain-part and a loss-part-. The gain-part is defined as the original lottery with all
losses replaced by the status quo. Similarly, the loss-part is the original lottery with all
gains replaced by the status quo. The cumulative prospect theory value of a lottery can be
viewed as the sum of two rank-dependent utility values, the first measuring the loss-part
and the second one measuring the gain part. The probability transformation for gains can
be different from the one for losses, and the shape of utility can reveal loss aversion.
This thesis contributes to classical as well as to modern developments on individual
decision making. In Chapter 2 the classical foundations of expected utility provided by
Ramsey (1931), de Finetti (1931, 1937), von Neumann & Morgenstern (1944), Anscombe
& Aumann (1963), and others are considered. The aim is to provide a unifying idea of
the mentioned models. These models have in common that a cardinal utility index for
outcomes (prizes), independent of the states and probabilities, can be derived. In the
second chapter it is shown that this property of utility can be considered to lie at the basis
of most expected utility models.
Chapter 3 presents a model that extends Savage's (1954) subjective expected utility
to state dependent expected utility, and jointly generalizes the Debreu (1960)/Gorman
(1968) characterization of additive decomposable functionals and separability to infinite
dimensions. The representing functional for the preference is defined similarly to the
Lebesgue-integral. However, in the absence of an underlying probability measure, the
functional extends integrals in a natural way. The results are applied to risk attitude
analysis and to Bayesian updating of new information.
Chapters 4 and 5 focus on Cumulative Prospect Theory. Risk properties in terms of
preferences are incorporated to derive models with a specific form of utility. In Chapter
4, for decision under risk, a preference characterization with power utility is given. It is
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demonstrated that in the presence of weak ordering, continuity and stochastic dominance,
constant proportional risk aversion together with comonotonic independence are sufficient
for a preference characterization by a cumulative prospect theory functional. Consequently,
the mentioned preference conditions inherit all that is necessary for the separation of
decision weights and utility, and sign-dependence.
Then, in Chapter 5 the findings from Chapter 4 are extended for decision under un-
certainty. In addition to cumulative prospect theory models with power utility, constant
absolute risk aversion is considered implying linear or exponential utility. Also models with
additive or multiplicative utility and multilinear utility are formulated for multiattribute
decision making.
In Chapter 6, techniques from cooperative game theory are applied to multiattribute
utility, resulting in characterizations of Shapley (1953)-type values for multi-choice games.
There is given a finite set of attributes, each of which can be present on a finite number
of levels. A health state is described by indicating for each attribute exactly one level. A
situation assigns to each possible health state a utility value. In Chapter 6 we provide a
mechanism that measures the contributions of each level for reaching the perfect health
state, i.e. the state where each attribute has maximal level. Such mechanisms can reveal
important insights in health care, where the identification of criteria that determine quality
of life is a central issue.
All chapters are written in article form and therefore are self-containing, so that some
notation and definitions are repeated. However, this layout has the advantage that the
reader can start this thesis at any preferred chapter. Proofs are usually placed in the
appendix of that chapter.
The results incorporated in this thesis were first formulated in the following research
papers: Chapter 2 refers to Wakker & Zank (1998a), Chapter 3 to Wakker & Zank (1999),
Chapter 4 to Wakker & Zank (1998b), Chapter 5 to Zank (1998), and Chapter 6 refers to
Peters & Zank (1999).
Chapter 2
A Unified Derivation of Classical
Subjective Expected Utility Models
through Cardinal Utility
2.1 Introduction
A characteristic property of expected utility is the separation of probabilities, describing
the uncertainty of a decision maker regarding a state space, and utilities, describing the
value of outcomes. This separation is reflected in existing preference axiomatizations,
that can be classified into two groups accordingly. First, there are the likelihood-oriented
axiomatizations, in which the central property of subjective expected utility is pro/>a6i/K<ic
5op/iw<tca<ion (i.e., uncertainty is expressed in terms of probabilities). A ricli structure is
imposed on the relevant uncertainties and preference axioms are based on that structure.
This approach can be used in decision under risk, where probabilities are already given
(von Neumann & Morgenstern, 1944). Also Savage's (1954) approach, which does not
assume probabilities given, is likelihood oriented. His postulate P4 allows the derivation
of probabilities. Utilities are then derived similarly to von Neumann &: Morgenstern (1944).
The second group of axiomatizations is utility-oriented and is the subject of tliis chap-
ter. Here a rich structure is imposed on the outcome set and preference axioms are based
on that structure. The central property of subjective expected utility now is caniinaMy o/
j/, i.e., a meaningful ordering of utility differences (Vickrey, 1945). The approaches of
"The results in this chapter were first formulated in Wakker & Zank (1998a)
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Ramsey (1931), de Finetti (1931, 1937), and Anscombe & Aumann (1963) can be classified
in this group. In this chapter it will be shown that all these models can be derived from
one unifying principle, ensuring the existence of cardinal utility, invariant across different
states of nature or context. Probability then results from the utility-exchange rate between
different states.
In a formal manner, the unifying principle can also be introduced in von Neumann
ik Morgenstern's (1944) likelihood-oriented axiomatization. A corresponding derivation of
their model will thus be provided. The remaining classical axiomatization, Savage's (1954),
can be derived in a similar fashion if the results of qualitative probability theory (Fishburn,
1986) can be used; this idea is not elaborated here. Hence Savage's axiomatization is not
covered in this chapter. Derivations of subjective expected utility (SEU) that were directly
based on the unifying principle have been presented by Wakker (1984, 1989b, 1993a) and
Wakker & Tversky (1993). The principle was used in experimental measurements of utility
by Wakker & Deneffc (1996), Bouzit & Gleyscs (1996), Fennema & van Assen (1997),
Abdellaoui (1998), and Bleichrodt & Pinto (1998). It can already be recognized in Krantz
et al.'s (1971) "standard sequence invariance."
Nonexpected utility models can be characterized by appropriate weakenings of the uni-
fying principle. For example, Wakker (1989a; 1989b, Chapter VI) used a "comonotonic"
weakening to characterize Schmeidler's (1989) Choquet expected utility. Wakker (1994)
used a similar comonotonic weakening for risk to characterize Quiggin's (1981) rank-
dependent utility. In these models, there is no complete separation of decision weight
and utility because the decision weight of an event depends on the rank-ordering of the
associated outcome. The invariant ordering of utility-differences is therefore not gener-
ally valid but only under special circumstances ("comonotonicity"). Nonexpected utility
models will not be discussed in this chapter.
Section 2.2 presents the basic method for deriving expected utility from utility tradeoffs,
invariant across states of nature. In subsequent sections, it is demonstrated that the
utility tradeoffs can be recognized in the classical axiomatizations of SEU, i.e., de Finetti's
(1937) in Section 2.3, Anscombe & Aumann's (1963) in Section 2.4, von Neumann &
Morgenstern's (1944) in Section 2.5, and Ramsey's (1931) in Section 2.6. Section 2.7 briefly
demonstrates that utility tradeoffs can also be recognized in recent SEU axiomatizations.
The Appendix to this chapter presents proofs not given in the main text. For each SEU
axiomatization discussed, it is first shown how the unifying principle can be recognized in
the axioms used and then how the principle can serve to provide alternative derivations.
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2.2 The Subjective Expected Utility Model
Throughout this chapter the following notation is used. F denotes the set of outcomes and
5 : = { l , . . . , n} ,n€ /7Visa finite set of states (o/ nature) where exactly one state is true
and the others are not true. A decision maker does not know for sure which state is the
true state. Subsets of 5 are ewnls. An act / is a mapping from S to F, assigning the
outcome / ( j ) (or /,• for short) to each state j . /^ is the outcome obtained by the decision
maker if he chose / and the true state is j . For an event £ , /go denotes the act that
assigns outcome /, to each state i € £ and outcome <^  to each state j £ £ . Similarly, for
state i and outcome a, a , / is (/ with / , replaced by a).
^ denotes the preference relation of the decision maker on F", the set of acts. A
function V nepnesents ^ if V : F" —» 5? and / =^ <7 <*=> V(/) ^  ^(g). If a representing
function exists, then ^ is a weofc order, i.e., it is complete (/ £= 3 or <? =^ / for all / ,5)
and transitive. As usual, strict preference >- denotes the asymmetric part of ^  and ~ the
symmetric part, and =<: and -< denote reversed preferences. We call =^ u/eaA; pre/erence.
Outcomes are often identified with constant acts. Thus, the preference relation :?= generates
a preference relation, also denoted by £=, over the outcomes.
•Subjective expected utiiiiy (SE£/) holds if there exist probabilities p i , . . . ,Pn (nonnega-
tive and summing to one) and a uti/itj/ /unction £/ : F —• ZR such that / 1—» $^"_, p> (/(/>)
represents =^. The utility function f/ will be cardinal in all results in this chapter, meaning
that it can be replaced by another utility function [/' if and only if there exist real r and
positive o- such that [/* = T + <r(7.
In all main results the following monotonicitj/ will be assumed: / =^ 3 whenever /^ > o^
for all j , where the preference between / and g is strict if the preference between / , and &
is strict for at least one j . This condition rules out null states, i.e., impossible states that
have probability 0. Ruling those out simplifies some subsequent definitions and notation,
but is not a restriction because null events do not affect preference.
In this section, F is assumed to be a convex subset of 77?" and F and F" are endowed
with the Euclidean topology. Here the term Zinear is used as equivalent to the mathemat-
ical term affine, i.e., linearity of a function need not imply that it assigns 0 to the origin.
=^ is continuous if the sets {/€F"|/ >- 0} and {/eF" | / ^ g} are open for all acts o. Next
the preference condition is defined that captures cardinal utility and its invariance across
different states, and that will be used later to derive the other expected utility models. As
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a preparation, the following notation is defined for outcomes a,/3,7,<5€F:
a/3 :*=* 70"
if there exist acts / , o€ F" and a state i such that [c^/ £= /3<g and 7 , / =$ 6,g]. Note that,
at this stage, no properties of =^* can be claimed yet. Under SEU, some can be derived
from Equation (2.1) hereafter. We similarly write
a/3 V* 76
if there exist acts / , o€F" and a state j such that [a^/ =^ /^p and 7^/ -< 0^5]. Substitution
of SEU elementarily shows the following implications:
(2.1)
a/3 >- ' 7<5 => £/(a) - t/(/3) > 1/(7) - £/(«).
Thus, the * relations capture orderings of utility differences. Now invariance of cardinal
utility across states, the characteristic condition of SEU, is expressed in observable and
testable terms, i.e., in terms of a preference condition. £= satisfies iradeo/f consistency if
there do not exist outcomes a,/?,7,6 such that a/3 >-* 76 and 76 >* a/3. By (2.1), it
immediately follows that tradeoff consistency is a necessary condition for SEU. Wakker
(1984, 1989b) proved that it is also sufficient in the utility-oriented approach to SEU:
THEOREM 2.1 Let F 6e o convex subset o/IR'" and n ^ 2. For t/ie iinan/ re/aiion ^ on
F" t/ie /o//otwng two statements are
ZioZds, wit/i continuous utt/ztj/ and positive protati/ities.
is a monotonic continuous weaA: order f/iat satisyies tradeo^ consistencu.
furt/ier, uh/ity in ^ is cardinal and t/ie proftafti/ities are unigue/y determined w/ienever
U is not constant. D
In the notation a/3 >* 76, the state i and the acts / , o are suppressed. That reflects the
characteristic property of SEU, that the revelations of the * relations, and the belonging
utility difference orderings, have a meaning independent of states and context. Indeed,
Equation (2.1) shows that the belonging ordering of utility differences always follows,
independently of the specific nature of i, / , (/. In nonexpected utility models with cardinal
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utility, such as Schmeidler's (1989) Choquet expected utility, restrictions must be imposed
on revelations a/9 =^* 7(5. For instance, in Choquet expected utility, the revelation a/? ^* 76
is only valid if a "comonotonicity" restriction is verified (Wakker, 1989b, Chapter VI;
Wakker & Tversky, 1993) to preclude distortions due to "rank-dependence."
The theorem has been adapted to arbitrary (infinite) state spaces by Wakker (1993a).
The purpose of the present chapter is to demonstrate as clearly as possible a common
aspect of the SEU models, hence the technical complications of infinite models will not be
discussed. The remainder of the chapter shows how classical derivations of SEU can be
derived from Theorem 2.1.
2.3 de Finetti's Approach
An early result, with the real numbers as outcome set, has been provided by de Finetti
(1931, 1937). In his model, the tradeoff consistency condition for the binary relation
is replaced by additivity and monotonicity with respect to the natural ordering on ZR,
conditions that jointly imply tradeoff consistency as will be shown in Observation 2.3.
The restrictive nature of the additivity condition appears from the implied linearity of
utility. Wakker's (1984) work (Theorem 2.1 in this chapter) originated as an attempt to
generalize de Finetti's result to nonlinear utility.
In this section, F = ZR. Strong monotonicity means monotonicity with respect to the
natural ordering on ZR, i.e., / >- <? whenever /j ^ <?j for all j and /j > (?j for some j . > is
adrfitire if [/ :>= p] =>• [/ + /i > a + /i] for all acts / , g, /i€ ZR". Now a version of de Finetti's
theorem is given.
THEOREM 2.2 77ie /of/owing two statements one «/uivaien< /or t/ie binary re/ation =^ on
iR".
^ TViere earist positive proiafci/ities p i , . . . ,Pn suc/i f/iat / 1—> £^"^, pj/j represents =^.
(«j 77ie 6inan/ refation =^ is a stronp/j/ monotonic, additive, continuous u>eaJfc onfer on
ZR". D
Although de Finetti presented his result in different terms, Theorem 2.2 captures the
essence. Let us briefly compare the terms used here to de Finetti's. His term "Dutch
book" comes down to additivity and strong monotonicity, and his assumption that a fair
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price exists for each act comes down to completeness of preference and continuity. He did
not assume the entire domain 5?" but his results can be seen to hold on any linear subset.
The following observation shows that tradeoff consistency follows from de Finetti's
conditions and is the central step in this section.
OBSERVATION 2.3 Lei > 6e a stron^/y monoiorac and additive weafc order on iR". TTien
ii satas/ies <radeoj(f consistency.
PROOF. Assume strong monotonicity, additivity, and weak ordering. For contradiction,
assume a violation of tradeoff consistency. That is, there exist outcomes a,/3,7,6 £ iR
such that Q/9 fc=* 76 and 76" >-* a/?. By definition this means that for a state i and acts
/ , g e iR" we have
a, / > /3,5 and 7 , / < «#, (2.2)
and for a state j and acts u, u> € iR" we have
7^v £= tfjiw and a,-v -< /S^ -iw. (2.3)
The preferences in (2.2) and additivity imply
(a - /?),(/ - <?) > 0 and (7 - <$),(/ - .9) * 0,
which because of transitivity and monotonicity implies that a - /? > 7 - <5. The preferences
in (2.3) and additivity imply
(7 - 6)j(t> - w) > 0 and (a - /?)j(u - m ) x O
which because of transitivity and monotonicity implies that 7 — <5 > a — /3.
Contradictory inequalities between a - /? and 7 - 6 have been derived. Thus, tradeoff
consistency cannot be violated. •
By means of Observation 2.3, the theorem of de Finetti can be derived from Theorem
2.1. The implication (i) => (ii) is obvious. Next, (ii) is assumed and (i) is derived. The
result is trivial for n = 1, hence n ^ 2 is assumed. All conditions of Statement (ii) in
Theorem 2.1 are satisfied, hence SEU holds for =^ with [/ continuous and probabilities
positive. {/ is strictly increasing because of strong monotonicity. All that remains to be
shown is linearity of [/ (so that (/ can be the identity). That follows from additivity and
is elaborated in the Appendix to this chapter.
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2.4 Anscombe & Aumann's Approach
Another classical result for decision under uncertainty has been provided by Anscombe
& Aumann (1963). Their results are adapted here to the notation of this chapter, and
formulated in the modern version in which there is no prior mixing of acts. Differences
are discussed at the end of this section. Let us note here that, whereas Anscombe and
Aumann base their proof on the von Neumann-Morgenstern expected utility derivation,
our proof does not invoke that derivation.
Let X = { i i , . . . , ! „} be a finite set of prizes. F denotes the set of lotteries, i.e.,
the set of all probability distributions (0.1, x i ; . . . ; g^i ^m) assigning probability ^ to prize
i , for all i = l , . . . ,m (53iii <?i = 1, q, ^ 0 for all i = l , . . . ,m) . F is the m — 1
dimensional probability simplex; it is a convex subset, of .0?"". We shall deal with linear
(i.e., affine) functions t/ from F to 2R. A probability distribution (gi.Xj;... ; ? „ , ! „ ) is a
convex combination $3™=i <7,(l,x,) of the degenerate probability distributions (l,x<) and,
for linear £/, its [/ value is therefore £™, <?,£/(l,x.) = £ " j g,u(x.) with u(x) = C/(l,i)
for all outcomes x. The latter sum can be interpreted as an expected utiiity /orm, hence
linear utility can be identified with expected utility on F.
5 := { 1 , . . . ,n} is again a finite state space and F" is the set of acts / : S —» F,
/ : i —* / 0 ) = />• On F" a binary relation, denoted by >, is assumed. Mixing on F" is
defined pointwise, i.e., [A/ +(1 - A)g](s) = A/(s) + (1 - A)#(s) for all s € S and 0 ^  A ^ 1.
The binary relation =^ satisfies WVA/-mdependence if, for all / , 3, /i € F" and all 0 < A <
1, we have [/ fc= ff] «> [A/ + (1 - A)ft fc= A$ + (1 - A)/i). Following Fishburn (1970, 1982),
the continuity condition of Jensen (1967) is used: ^ is ./-continuous if, for all acts / >- 5,
and / ieF" there exist A,/i€(0,1) such that A/i + (1 - A)/ v 5 and / >- /^/i + (1 - /j)g. J-
continuity is weaker than continuity (i.e., Euclidean continuity as defined in Section 2.2).
However, in the presence of vNM-independence and monotonicity, J-continuity implies
continuity for a weak order on F", as the next lemma shows.
LEMMA 2.4 Let =^ 6e a monotonic, ./-continuous, and i;./VAf-mdependent weafc onier on
F". T/ien =^ is continuous on F". D
The proof of Lemma 2.4 is given in the Appendix to this chapter.
The approach of this section is in fact a two-stage model, where in the first stage the
uncertainty concerning the true state of nature is resolved and in the second stage the
resulting lottery over prizes is played. A "folding-back" maximization is adopted, with
14 CHAPTER 2. SEU THROUGH CARDINAL UTILITY
expected utility in the second stage. In a mathematical sense that comes down to linear
utility over the outcomes. Tliis linearity greatly simplifies mathematical derivations, hence
the popularity of this approach. It has been used in many classical papers (Anscombe
& Aumann, 1963; Pollak, 1967; Keeney & Raiffa, 1976; Fishburn, 1970, 1982 and the
references therein). Schmeidler (1989) used this approach for his famous introduction of
Choquet expected utility. Numerous other papers on nonexpected utility have used the
approach likewise (Dreze, 1987; Gilboa & Schmeidler, 1989; Hazen, 1989; Klibanoff, 1995;
etc.). These papers still assume folding back and expected utility (thus linear utility) in
the second stage, but consider deviations from expected utility in the first. A method
for further simplifying the mathematics and avoiding the complications of the two-stage
approach was described by Sarin & Wakker (1997) for Anscombe & Aumann's (1963) SEU
and by Sarin & Wakker (1992) for Schmeidler's (1989) Choquet expected utility. The
following observation is central in this section. The observation is similar to Observation
2.3 because it also derives tradeoff consistency from a linearity assumption.
OBSERVATION 2.5 Let £= 6e a u/VM-mdepemfen£ monofomc weafc order on F". T/ien trade-
o^ conststencj/ /io/ds.
PROOF. Assume that > satisfies the conditions in the Observation but assume, for con-
tradiction, that it violates tradeoff consistency. Thus, there exist outcomes a, /3,7, <5 S F
such that a/? £=" 76 and 76 >-* a/3. By definition of the relations V* and >*, this means
that for a state i and acts / , 0 € F" we have
«,/ ^ ftff (2.4)
and
7, / * «tf, (2.5)
and for a state j and acts r, w € F" we have
7,t> *= <5jW (2.6)
and
a_,i> x /9jiu. (2.7)
vNM-independence and equations (2.4), (2.5), (2.6), and (2.7), respectively, imply
^(a . / ) + ^ , S ) ^ ( f t f f ) + ^ . f f ) - (2-8)
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^(ftff) + ^ ( 7 J H ^(ftff) + ^ i S ) , (2-9)
^(7^) + ^ ( / 3 ^ ) ^ ^ ( ^ ) + ^ (/?,«;), and (2.10)
^ ( M ) + i(a,-t.) x !&«,) + I (^« ; ) . (2.11)
Equations (2.8) and (2.9) and transitivity imply
^ ^ ^ ^(7,/) (2-12)
and equations (2.10) and (2.11) and transitivity imply
^(7>«) + ^ « 0 x i(«,«,) + i(Q,-«). (2.13)
Equation (2.12) implies, because of monotonicity, that ^ Q + 56 ^ i/?+ ^7, equation (2.13)
implies that | Q + |<5 < |/? + 57, i.e., a contradiction results. Thus, > cannot violate
tradeoff consistency. •
Next, the Anscombe & Aumann (1963) representation theorem is derived. Actually,
Anscombe &: Aumann considered general, possibly infinite, prize sets A' and assumed that
r was the set of simp/e (finitely supported) lotteries on X. Here it is assumed that X is
finite for simplicity of the presentation. The extension of the following theorem to general
sets X is easily obtained and is presented in Proposition 2.14 in the Appendix to this
chapter. Another deviation is that Anscombe & Aumann assume that also lotteries over
acts are available. Their Assumption 2 guarantees that lotteries over acts can be captured
by lotteries over prizes, i.e., that their setup can be reduced to the setup used here.
THEOREM 2.6 Lei F 6e t/ie set 0/ proiafcite?/ distributions over a /mite sd 0/prizes and
Ze£ n ^ 2. 77ie /oWotmnj too statements are eoizina/enf /or t/ie fetnart/ re/ation =^ on F":
(%) S£t/ /10/ds, un</i utiZitj/ {/ linear ('i.e., [/ is an expected uti/ity /jmctiona/^ and a//
profca6i/i<ies posiiine.
('iij T/ie iinan/ re/a<ion > is a weaA: order, it satis/ies monoionicitt/, D^VM-independence,
and J-coniinui<i/.
PROOF. Obviously, Statement (i) implies Statement (ii), therefore Statement (ii) is as-
sumed and Statement (i) is derived. By Lemma 2.4 and Observation 2.5, Statement (ii)
in Theorem 2.1 is implied by Statement (ii) in Theorem 2.6. Hence, there exists an SEU
representation with continuous utility [/. Linearity of 1/ is derived in the Appendix to this
chapter. •
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2.5 von Neumann & Morgenstern's Approach
The third approach, analyzed here, is the representation theorem of von Neumann & Mor-
genstern (1944). In their SEU model, probabilities are given in advance and only utilities
are derived from the preference relation. The von Neumann & Morgenstern representation
theorem can be considered the version of Theorem 2.6 for n = 1. The proof of Theorem
2.6 cannot be invoked for n = 1, hence the case is treated separately. The case n = 1
can be derived as a corollary from the case n = 2 and that is the approach which is given
here. Thus, whereas Anscombe and Aumann derived their result from the von Neumann-
Morgenstern result, here the order is reversed and the von Neumann-Morgenstern result
is derived from Anscombe and Aumann's.
THEOREM 2.7 Let =^ 6e a ftinan/ 7Te/ation on t/ie set F o/simp/e proftaftiWi/ distributions
over a fpossiMj/ in/mite,) set X o/ prizes. TTie /of/owing two statements are eguit;a/ent:
(%) fc= can 6e represented 6y expected uti/itj/ ('i.e., a /inear f/j.
fit) ^ is a tiiea/r order t/iot satis/ies uNAf-independence and J-continuiti/.
PROOF. The implication (i) => (ii) is elementary, hence (ii) is assumed and (i) is derived.
Theorem 2.6 and its extension to general prize sets X, i.e., Proposition 2.14 in the Ap-
pendix to this chapter, are used to deduce Statement (i). Let f be defined as follows:
f :={(/,, /Ol/i./aer}.
On F the binary relation > is defined for /,<; € F as:
? - - 1 , 1 , 1 1
/ fc= 0 <=> 2 ^ ' •*" 2 ^ ^ 2 ^ ' "*" 2 ^ '
where / := (/i,/2) and (? := (31,^2) for /i,/2,<7i,<72 € F are interpreted as acts in a two-
states Anscombe & Aumann model with f = F^. It follows from elementary substitution
that ^ inherits all properties from =^ described in Statement (ii) of Theorem 2.7. In
addition, monotonicity of ^  follows from vNM-independence. (The following four prefer-
ences are all equivalent: (/, /)^=(ff,s); / =^ 3; | / + |/i > |o + ^/i; (/,/i)>(3,/i); similarly,
( h , / ) ^ (/*,<?) can be derived. The equivalences for weak preferences immediately imply
the equivalences for strict preferences.)
Therefore, the assumptions in Statement (ii) of Theorem 2.6 are satisfied and SEU
holds for outcome set F, preference relation >, probabilities pi,p2 and linear utility t7
(invoke Proposition 2.14 if X is infinite). The expected utility model in Statement (i)
follows from restriction to the constant acts in f. It can. but need not, be seen that
Pi = | = Pa- •
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2.6 Ramsey's Approach:
The Equiprobable State Case
An appealing axiomatization of subjective expected utility is possible if all states are
equally likely. In that case, essentially, Savage's sure-thing principle alone characterizes
subjective expected utility. Because the result is an almost trivial corollary of additive
representation theorems, it has not received much attention in the literature. It has been
used as a tool in more complex results by Blackorby, Davidson, & Donaldson (1977) and
Chew & Epstein (1989). Let us now present the result.
£= satisfies the sure-t/img princip/e if c^/ =^ c<</ implies c',/ ^ = c[o for all states i, "com-
mon" outcomes c, c*, and acts / , g. That is, the preference between two acts is independent
of a common outcome (e.g., c), hence remains invariant if that common outcome is re-
placed by another common outcome (such as c'). Then preference is obviously independent
of any number of common outcomes, by repeated application of the principle. The sure-
thing principle was used by Debreu (1960) and Krantz et al. (1971) to characterize additive
representations. That is, as soon as there are three or more states, then under the usual
conditions (weak ordering, continuity, monotonicity) the sure-thing principle is necessary
and sufficient for additive representability through 5D"=i ^ ( / j ) - That representation is re-
duced to the equally-likely subjective expected utility representation X]>=i n^(/>) ^y ^
following exchan<?ea6i/itt/ condition: / ~ 5 whenever <? is obtained from / by permuting
the outcomes. Let us state the result formally.
THEOREM 2.8 Let > 6e a frinarj/ re/ation on F", rwt/i n ^ 3 and F a convex subset 0/
*. TTie /o/fowino tiuo statements are eouiua/ent.
(%) There exists a continuous uti/tty (/ : F —• ffl such tnat £= is represented fry
fiij !?= is a monotonic continuous lueaA: order that satis/zes the sure-t/iino princip/e and
in fij is cardina/. D
The derivation of Theorem 2.8 from existing additive representation theorems Ls elemen-
tary, hence no separate proof is needed. Nevertheless, next it is demonstrated informally
how exchangeability and the sure-thing principle imply a version of tradeoff consistency.
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Lemma 2.9 is derived from preference conditions without invoking the additive represen-
tation. Following Lemma 2.9, a proof of Theorem 2.8 is suggested. The purpose of this
analysis is to demonstrate once more the unity of expected utility models, comprising
cardinal utility that is invariant across all states.
LEMMA 2.9 Le<, /or- n ^ 3, =^ 6e a weafc order on F" tfiat 5atis/ies i/ie sure-t/iin<; princi-
ple and Grc/wmgeaiiiitj/. 77ien </ie tfiree pne/erences (z,a,C3,. . . ,c«) =<: (t/,/3,C3,... ,Cn),
( i , 7 , C 3 , . . . , C n ) ^= ( i / , ( 5 , C 3 , . . . , C n ) , a n d ( Q , V , C 3 , . . . , C n ) ^= ( / 3 , w , C 3 , . . . , c ^
pre/enence ( 7 , v, C3, . . . , € „ ) * = (6, tu, C 3 , . . . , c^).
PROOF. The outcomes for states 4 , . . . , n are fixed and are suppressed. The sure-thing
principle and exchangeability are used throughout the proof without explicit mentioning.
The first antecedent preference in the lemma implies (1, a, <5) =$ (y, /?, (5), the second implies
(y, /?, 6) =$ (x,/?, 7). Because of transitivity, (z,a,6) =^! (i,/3,7), hence (/?, w,7) > (a,i>,(5).
The third antecedent preference implies (a,ii,(5) :> (/?, w,(5). Transitivity now implies
(/3,11,7) =^ (/3,UJ, 6). From this, finally, the consequent preference in the lemma follows. D
Let us sketch, informally, how Lemma 2.9 can be used to prove Theorem 2.8. First,
the sure-thing principle in Theorem 2.8 implies an additive representation X3"=i V^(xj).
Lemma 2.9 implies that V\ and V2 order utility differences the same way. Due to ex-
changeability, V) and Vj order utility differences the same way for all j . That implies an
expected utility representation SJ=iPj^(^i)- Exchangeability implies that all probabili-
ties pj are £.
Next the case of n = 2 with equally likely states 1 and 2 is treated. The preceding
analysis essentially used n > 3, not only for invoking the additive representation but also
in its derivation of tradeoff consistency in Lemma 2.9. The case n = 2 is of historical
interest because it underlies Ramsey's (1931) expected utility derivation, with 1 and 2 the
"ethically neutral" events. The way of deriving a strength of preference relation >**, used
by Ramsey and many after him (e.g., d'Aspremont &; Gevers, 1990, see Section 2.7), is
through
a/? * . "7« if (<*,«)* (0,7)- (214)
This method requires equal likelihood of the two states. It implies a/3 ^=' 76 because of
(a, 6) ^ (/?, 7) and (7,6) =^  (6,7) (implied by equal likelihood and hence exchangeability).
Weak ordering of ^=", studied in the next lemma, was used by d'Aspremont & Gevers
(1990).
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LEMMA 2.10 Let =^ 6c an exc/iangeaWe weaA: order on F^. I / > " , rfe^ned in f2.7^j, is a
u>eajfc order on F^, then it agrees wt/i £=* and tradeo^ corwtstencj/ /io/<is.
PROOF. Because of exchangeability, >~**, defined by a/3 >-** 7$ if (a, 6) V (/3, 7), is the
asymmetric part of ^ ** (not (7,/3) > (^,a) implies not 76 fc=" a/3).
Assume a/3 =^* 7<5, say (/z,a) fc= (i/,/3) and (^,7) =5! (i/,6). Then, using (a,jt) fc= (/?•"),
we have a/3 =^** ^ /i ^ =" 76. Transitivity of =^** implies Q/3 > " 7<5. We already saw above
the lemma that a/? ^** 7<5 implies a/3 =^* 7(5. Hence =^* and >** are identical.
Similarly, a/3 >-* 76 implies a/3 ^** 76. a/3 >* 76 and 76 V" a/3 would now imply
a/3 >*' 76 and 76 ^** a/3, contradicting weak ordering of ^ **. Hence tradeoff consistency
must hold. •
COROLLARY 2.11 Le< > be a 6inarj/ re/aiion on F^, w/iere F is a convex swfcset o/2R™.
TAe /oZ/owing two statements are eguiua/ent.
^ 77iere ea^sts a continuous ufiZttj/ /unction [/ suc/i </iat (a,^) •-» 5
represents pre/efience.
('iij =^ is an exc/janoea6/e continuous iweafc orrfer anrf ^** is a/so a uieat order.
PROOF, (i) ^ (ii) is elementary. Now assume Statement (ii). If both states are null then £/
is constant and the corollary follows. If one state is nonnull then so is, by exchangeability,
the other, and that is what we assume henceforth. According to Lemma 2.10, (ii) implies
tradeoff consistency, hence subjective expected utility (monotonicity in Theorem 2.1 is
only needed to imply positive probabilities and it is not needed for the subjective expected
utility representation). Because of exchangeability, the states arc equally-likely and have
probability i . •
2.7 Modern SEU Derivations
This section briefly discusses some recent derivations of SEU. First, a "bisymmetry axiom"
is discussed for two states; that is, n = 2 is assumed for now. Acts are sometimes denoted
as pairs (x,a), etc. We assume F = Z7? and continuity and strong monotonicity. Then for
each act / there exists a unique certainty eguira/ent CE( / ) , i.e., an outcome equivalent
to / . Bisymmetrj/ holds if
C£(CE(x,a),C£(/3,y)) =
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Substitution of SEU shows that the condition is necessary, because both the left- and
right-hand sides have utility
P?f/(i) + Pifttf (a) + Pifttf (0) + Pjtf (»)•
Pfanzagl (1968) and Krantz et al. (1971, Theorem 6.10) show that bisymmetry, together
with some other axioms, implies SEU. The following lemma shows how the bisymmetry
axiom implies invariant cardinal utility across different states.
LEMMA 2.12 Le< F = 2R and n = 2. Assume t/iat :?= is a continuous s t rong monoionic
uiedfc oTt/er. Assume ( i , a ) =$ (y,/3), (1,7) *= (y,<5), <*"d (a.v) &= (/9,u')- ^Aen 6isumme«ry
tmp/tes tAot (7,f) =^ (5, in).
PROOF. ££(1 ,7) ^ CE(y, 6) and C£(Q, !> ) > C£(/3,iu) imply, because of monotonic-
ity, that C£(C£(z ,7) ,C£(a , r ) ) ^ C£(C£(y,<5),C£(/3,u;)). Applying bisymmetry to
both sides of the inequality yields C£(CE(z,a) ,CE(7,")) S* CE(CE(y,/?),C£(<5,u>)).
Because C £ ( i , a ) < C£(j/,/?), monotonicity implies C£(7,u) ^ CE(6,ui), i.e., (7,?;) =^
(«,«»). D
The lemma shows an alternative way for deriving SEU from bisymmetry. First, an
additive representation is derived (see, e.g., Krantz et al., 1971, Section 6.10.1). Next,
Lemma 2.12 shows that utility differences are ordered the same way across different states.
That implies SEU.
Many variations of the bisymmetry condition, and extensions to more than two states,
have been presented in the literature. In such cases Lemma 2.12 can be applied to
each two-dimensional subspace to show that additive value functions in an additive rep-
resentation are linearly related. An example is Miinnich, Maksa. & Mokken (1997).
Often, "comonotonic" restrictions of such axioms have been used to characterize rank-
dependent generalizations of SEU (Quiggin, 1981, Axiom 4 and Quiggin & Wakker, 1994,
Axiom 4; Chew, 1989, "weak commutativity"; Nakamura, 1990, 1992, 1995, "weak multi-
symmetry"). Its most appealing interpretation refers to multi-stage resolutions of uncer-
tainty (Luce, 1988, Equations 22 and 23; Segal, 1993a, "order indifference"; Luce, 1998,
"event commutativity"). An appealing variation on bisymmetry was used by Gul (1992,
Assumption 2) and Chew & Kami (1994, "act independence"). A complete logical analy-
sis of these specific axioms and their relations to our axioms is beyond the scope of this
analysis.
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Finally, d'Aspremont & Gevers (1990) is discussed. They use two eguai/y-/z£e/j/ states
1,2 to derive subjective expected utility. That is, they assume that (a,/0, z, . . . ,z) ~
(/3, a, 2 , . . . , z) for all outcomes a, /3,2. They derive a strength of preference relation ^'*
similarly as in (2.14), i.e., a/? fc=" 76 if (a,(5,2,... ,2) :j= (/3,7,2,... ,2) for some outcome
2. They introduce a new preference condition, di/ference-sca/e neuhw/iiy , a condition that
is equivalent to constant absolute risk aversion in the special case of real outcomes with
lineai" utility: Let / , <?, /',<?' be four acts. Then / £= 5 o / ' =^ p' whenever, for some state
<> /(*)/( ') ~ " /'(«)/'(<) and s(s)/(«) ~ " s'(s)/'(i) for all states s. A detailed analysis of
the logical relations between their condition and tradeoff consistency would take too much
space, therefore only an illustrating example is presented.
EXAMPLE 2.13
Assume a preference relation =^ on iR", weak ordering, continuity, strong monotonicity, the
sure-thing principle, equally likely states 1 and 2, difference-scale neutrality, and n = 3.
Assume
(z , i , a )Mz ,y , /9 ) (215)
and
(2,1,7) «(*,V,«), (2-16)
hence a/9 :?=* 76. Assume that 2',x', j/',/?' can be found such that
07 ~ " 22' ~ " 11' ~ " 2/y' ~ " /?/?. (2.17)
We show that a/3 > " 76.
By Debreu (1960), there exists an additive representation 5ZJ=i ^i(^j)- Due to equal-
likelihood of 1 and 2, V| = V2 may be assumed. By substitution in the definition of
>**, it follows that differences of (Vi =)V2 represent ^=". Because of difference-scale
neutrality, (2.15) together with (2.17) imply (z',z',7) > ( z ' , ^ , ^ ) . As (2.17) implies
V^(i') - V2(y') = V^(x) - Vi(j/), the additive representation implies (z , i ,7) =^ (2,5/,/?).
That, (2.16), transitivity, and strong monotonicity imply /? ^ <5. By (2.17), 07 ~ "
/?/? =^** /36, i.e., a/3 >** 7<5. A similar reasoning with strict preference in (2.16) shows that
a/3 >-* 76 implies a/3 >-** 7<5.
These reasonings show how ^=' and >-* revelations for state 3 correspond to >"* and
>-*", hence to Vi differences when (2.17) can be satisfied; (2.17) can always be satisfied
"locally." Therefore, such =^" and >-* revelations cannot contain inconsistencies, and utility
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differences for state 3 must be the same as for the first two states, first locally, then as
a consequence also globally. In other words, the additive representation is a subjective
expected utility representation.
For more than three states, similar reasonings can be applied to any state j for j ^ 3,
by keeping the outcomes for other states than 1,2, j fixed. D
2.8 Appendix: Proofs to Chapter 2
DERIVING LINEARITY OF UTILITY IN THEOREM 2.2: Assume Statement (ii) and hence,
as derived in the text, assume SEU with continuous utility U and positive probabilities.
It is proved here that additivity of > implies linearity of U.
Consider an indifference Qi/ ~ /?i<?. Adding up (e, 0 , . . . , 0) for t € IR implies
(a + e, /2, . . . , /„) ~ 03 + e,S2i--->ffn)
because of additivity. Substitution of SEU in both indifferences implies
I/(a + e) - 1/(0+ e) = I / (a ) -£ / (£) . (2.18)
This holds for all a,/? for which / and <? can be found such that Q J / ~ /J^. That is, for
each z € IR an open neighborhood can be found in which the equality (2.18) holds. This
implies local linearity of U, thus global linearity. U can be taken equal to the identity. D
PROOF OF LEMMA 2.4. In order to prove that £= is continuous on F" it has to be shown
that the sets
g X ft} and
are open in F" for each /i€F".
The set of prizes X = { i i , . . . , ^ } is finite. We prove openness of A := {g € F" |g -< /i}.
Take any <?e A, hence # x /i. Because the set of prizes is finite, there exists a "best" prize
y € X, i.e., $/ :>= x for each prize i . Because of J-continuity, there exists a 0 < /LZ < 1 such
that /ij/ + (1 - /*)<7 -< /t. Because of monotonicity, j / =^ / for every act / . By repeated
application of vNM-independence, for each 0 ^ // ^ ^ we have /i >- /zy + (1 - /i)p >
p'j/ + (1 - M')<? =^ M'/ + (1 - A*')ff- Hence, if 5 € A, then we have an open neighborhood
{/' e F" : / ' = / i ' / + (1 - j/)<7 for some 0 s£ // < /i and / e F"} of 3 in A. This implies
that A is an open subset of F". Similarly, {<; € F"|<? X ft} is an open subset of F". =^ is
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continuous. D
DERIVING LINEARITY OF UTILITY IN THEOREM 2.6: First the following implication
is derived:
'(—^—)ifl => (—7r—)i/~0iS- (2-19)
Assume, for contradiction, that
"i/~ ( ^ ) t f and/3,s >-£±£),/. (2-20)
Taking ^/^ mixtures of the left-hand sides and of the right-hand sides we get, by repeated
application of vNM-independence and transitivity,
a + /3 / + <? .<* + /?.
2 2 2  2~ '
contradicting reflexivity. Similarly, (2.20) with X instead of X also implies a contradiction
of rerlexivity. Hence (2.19) must hold true.
(2.19) implies, for 2 = 2±2, QZ ^» 2/? and az =«* z/3 hence, by (2.1),
which is equivalent to
£ ^ ^ (2-21)
Because of continuity of 1/ in the SEU model, for each 7 in the convex set F there exists
an open neighborhood in which, for each a and /?, / and 3 can be found to imply the first
indifference in (2.19). (2.21) follows in the open neighborhood of 7, hence the continuous
£/ is linear there. If it is locally linear, then it is globally linear. D
PROPOSITION 2.14 T/ieoTTem 2.6 can be modt/ied 6y letting A' 6e in/intte and F t/»e set 0/
a// stmp/e pnoftaftiWj/ dtstriiuiioTis ouer X.
PROOF. If all prizes are equivalent then, because of monotonicity, the theorem is trivial;
{/ then is constant. Next suppose there are two prizes a,/? such that Q X /3. Set £/(/?) =
0, £/(<*) = 1. Consider any finite subset y of X containing a and /?. If we restrict attention
to prizes from V, then Theorem 2.6 can be invoked, giving an SEU model with probabilities
p j and utility I/*'. We may set f/^(/3) = 0 and J/^(a) = 1. For another finite subset Z
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of X containing a and /?, we get an SEU model with probabilities p^ and utility [/^
with, again, t/^(/3) = 0 and £/^(a) = 1. Now consider the finite set K U Z. Because
of uniqueness, the two SEU models coincide when attention is restricted to prizes from
V n Z . That is, any two such SEU models coincide on overlapping domain. Therefore
the superscripts y, Z can be dropped and probabilities pj and utility £/ result such that
SEU represents preferences when restricted to any finite subset of prizes. That suffices to
describe all preferences between acts involving only simple lotteries over prizes. D
Chapter 3
State Dependent Expected Utility
for Savage's State Space
3.1 Introduction
Separability is one of the most important tools available for simplifying complex opti-
mization, where several criteria have to be aggregated into one overall goal. Under some
technical conditions, separability amounts to additive decomposability (Debreu, 1960; Gor-
man, 1968), and it has been used in many areas. Examples are decision under uncertainty
(Savage, 1954), consumer theory (Barten & Bohm, 1982), interpersonal aggregation (Flem-
ing, 1952; Harsanyi, 1955; Broome, 1991), dynamic optimization (Strotz, 1956; Koopmans,
1972), and many other areas (Krantz et al., 1971; Keeney & Raiffa, 1976). Debreu's the-
orem, as well as its many variations, only consider finitely many criteria. In many areas,
the restriction to finitely many criteria is undesirable. It is often desirable to deal with
infinitely many states of nature in decision under uncertainty, infinitely many persons in
group aggregation, etc.
Whereas most preference representations in the literature are routinely extended from
finite to infinite dimensions, no such extension has as yet been established for Debreu's
result. Providing such an extension, for the special case of real-valued outcomes and
monotonic preferences, is the purpose of this chapter. The development, of this new func-
tional, additively decomposable on infinite-dimensional spaces, is similar to the definition
of integrals and is also derived from approximations through step functions from above
and below. -
"The results in this chapter were first formulated in Wakker & Zank (1999)
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The research of this chapter started with the search for a state-dependent generalization
of Savage's (1954) expected utility, and a characterization thereof entirely in terms of
endogeneous preference conditions. Probability is then no longer identifiable and the result
is an additively decomposable functional. The state-dependent generalization of Savage
(1954) is presented in Theorem 3.11. In view of this application, the main text of this
chapter is formulated for the context of decision under uncertainty. It could also have been
formulated for interpersonal or intertemporal or other aggregations.
The outline of this chapter is as follows. Section 3.2 surveys related literature on state-
dependent expected utility. It also points out that this analysis only deals with cardinal
state dependence. Ordinal state independence is preserved because utility for money is as-
sumed increasing in every state. For economic applications, this restriction seems natural.
Section 3.3 discusses the absence of a general state-dependent expected utility functional
in the literature thus far. In Section 3.4, elementary results are described for finite dimen-
sions. State-dependent utility then coincides with additive conjoint measurement. Section
3.5 describes the difficulties for infinite state spaces. In particular, Example 3.4 motivates
the specific form of the functional and shows why a completely general additive functional
for infinite state spaces is not adopted here. Section 3.6 describes some natural preference
conditions for state-dependent expected utility. The new functional is derived from these
preference conditions. Section 3.7 demonstrates that the functional can be written as an
integral if a countable additivity condition is added. Section 3.8 describes applications
of the new functional to updating, the characterizations of risk attitudes, and the elicita-
tion of probability. Section 3.9 summarizes and concludes. Sections 3.10 and 3.11 present
mathematical modifications, and Appendices A-E, finally, present proofs.
3.2 State-Dependent Expected Utility
The most famous result in decision under uncertainty was provided by Savage (1954),
who presented preference conditions for subjective expected utility. Savage assumed that
outcomes have a meaning and value independent of the state of nature with which they are
associated. In several applications, however, it is undesirable to disentangle the value of an
outcome from the associated state. An example is health insurance, in which the value of
money is dependent on sickness or health. Other examples are described by Karni (1985)
and Dreze (1987, Chapter 8). Therefore, several papers have dealt with state-dependent
generalizations of Savage's model, where the utility of an outcome is permitted to depend
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on the state of nature with which it is associated.
A central issue in state-dependent expected utility is the nonidentifiability of proba-
bility. If utility can depend on the state of nature in any way, then probabilities are no
longer uniquely determined. For identifying probability, most papers in the literature add
exogeneous assumptions, invoking information other than observable choice. Examples are
influence of the decision maker on probabilities and states and "idempotent" acts (Dreze,
1961; 1987 Chapter 2), preferences between acts conditioned on different events (Luce &
Krantz, 1971; Fishburn, 1973). hypothetical probabilities of states set by an experimentor
(Kami, Schmeidler, & Vind, 1983), lotteries with known probabilities over state-dependent
outcomes belonging to different states (LaValle & Fishburn, 1991, Section 5), preferences
and utilities conditional on null states (Rubin, 1949, 1987), and availability of some state-
independent outcomes (Kami, 1993a, 1993b).
This chapter focuses on a stage prior to the identifiability of probability. A general
state-dependent extension of Savage's (1954) expected utility form is presented that is
based solely on choice making and exhibits the characteristic inseparability of probability
and utility. The aim is therefore not to "resolve" the inseparability of probability and util-
ity, but rather to accept it and incorporate it into a decision-model. Such an inseparability
has been recommended by Kreps (1988, Formula 7.13), and appears in Fishburn (1970,
Theorem 13.1), Rubin (1987), and Nau (1995). It has, however, not yet been presented for
Savage's infinite-state model. It must be kept in mind that, without a given probability
measure, no integration operation is available to define the functional form. A result on
state-dependent utility for infinite state spaces that does not invoke an integral is Rubin
(1987). (A similar result for finite state spaces is Theorem 13.1 in Fishburn, 1970.)
The paper in the literature closest to this work is Grodal & Mertens (1976), where
probability and utility are also inseparable. They assume that an underlying countably
additive measure on the state space is given a priori, with respect to which an absolute
continuity condition is imposed. Thus, their functional can still be written as an integral
form, contrary to Theorem 3.11 below. In Theorem 3.12 below, their result is extended
by deriving the countably additive measure endogeneously, i.e., entirely from preference.
To be precise here, note that in this analysis also an additional restriction is assumed.
It concerns, however, the most common and relevant special case for economic science:
Monetary outcomes are assumed and monotonicity and continuity. These conditions are
entirely defined in terms of preferences. They imply state independence in an "ordinal"
sense, i.e., outcomes are ordered the same way for different states of nature. Therefore,
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the analysis of this chapter only addresses state dependence of utility in a cardinal sense.
Example 3.4 describes a case of ordinal state dependence and indicates some of its unwar-
ranted implications which further motivate the restriction to ordinal state independence.
There is another reason for the absence of a general state-dependent extension of
Savage's expected utility in the literature. Many studies have restricted attention to linear
utility. Whereas linearity sometimes refers to riskless outcomes themselves (Chateauneuf,
1991; Nau, 1995), it mostly refers to probabilistic mixing (Dreze, 1961, 1987; Fishburn,
1970, Theorem 13.1; Fishburn, 1973; Kami, Schmeidler, & Vind, 1983; Kami, 1985, 1993a;
Rubin, 1987; LaValle & Fishburn, 1991), in line with Anscombe & Aumann (1963). Under
linear utility, the distinction between ordinal and cardinal state independence disappears:
a linear function is an ordinal (increasing) transform of another linear function, if and
only if it is a cardinal (linear) transform. Hence, if two linear state-dependent utility
functions are ordinally equivalent, they are also cardinally equivalent. This explains how
Anscombe & Aumann (1963) could obtain state-independence by only imposing an ordinal
state-independence axiom (Assumption 1 there).
In Savage's model, there is no linear utility and P3 implies only ordinal, not cardinal,
state independence. As pointed out by Kami (1993b, p. 433), it is primarily P4 (likelihood
ordering; the only axiom violated in Theorem 3.11) which implies cardinal state indepen-
dence. A partial weakening of Savage's P4, leading to a partial degree of state dependence,
is studied by Kami & Schmeidler (1993). Wakker (1987) adapted Kami, Schmeidler, fc
Vind's approach (1983) to continuous, as opposed to linear, utility. In his model, ordinal
and cardinal state independence were distinguished.
In a mathematical sense, the analysis here is related to Chew & Wakker (1996) and
uses similar tools. There, an "outcome-dependent" capacity (nonadditive measure) was
introduced that generalizes existing rank-dependent nonexpected utility theories by drop-
ping the separation of utility and nonadditive probability. Similar rank-dependent forms
appeared in Green & Jullien (1988), Quiggin (1989), and Segal (1993b) for decision under
risk.
An alternative extension of additive conjoint measurement to infinite product sets
was studied by Vind (1990). His functional shares with the functional presented here
the additivity property. It need not satisfy pointwise monotonicity and thus need not be
constructable from limits of simple acts; this is illustrated in Example 3.4. His assumptions
on domain are more restrictive than those considered here. For details see Section 3.10,
Observation 3.15 (g) and the subsequent discussion.
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The main characterizing preference condition in this model is the sure-thing principle.
Other than that, only common preference axioms (weak ordering, monotonicity, continu-
ity) are used. The results of this chapter can, therefore, be considered a counterpart to
Machina & Schmeidler (1992): They studied Savage's model in which, of the two critical
expected-utility axioms, P4 (ensuring likelihood ordering) was kept and P2 (the sure-
thing principle) was dropped. Under a strenghtening of P4, they then obtained a model
for "probabilistic sophistication" that followed Savage in expressing uncertainties in terms
of probabilities but, due to the dropping of P2, did not order probability distributions
according to expected utility. Machina & Schmeidler's result was generalized by Epstein
& Le Breton (1993), who used a weaker strengthening of Savage's P4 than Machina &
Schmeidler in order to obtain an appealing interpretation as dynamic consistency. As
compared to these works, here Savage's P2 is maintained and P4 is dropped. In other
words, the existence of subjective probabilities and a likelihood ordering is abandoned.
The preceding duality has a remarkable implication for updating, elaborated in Section
3.8. Machina & Schmeidler (1992) preserve the probability calculus of Bayesian updating
in a nonexpected utility framework where updated preferences then depend on what would
have happened outside the conditioning event. In this model, updating also results as a
natural generalization of the traditional updating of expected utility, but the only point
where it deviates is in the abandoning of prior probability. It preserves independence of
updated preferences from counterfactual events, which is a foundation of the likelihood
principle (Poirier, 1988). According to the likelihood principle, the optimal estimate of an
unknown parameter or the optimal decision to reject or accept a hypothesis is, given an
observed value of a statistic, independent of what one would have done given other values
of the statistic. The likelihood principle is central in Bayesian statistics and is preserved
in the present approach. In summary, the result presented here suggests a central role for
the sure-thing principle and a lesser role for prior probabilities in the normative debate on
Bayesian updating. Prior probabilities simplify Bayesian updating but are not essential.
3.3 Absence of General State-Dependent Expected
Utility in the Literature
To explain the absence, hitherto, of a general state-dependent extension of Savage's model,
assume first, contrary to Savage's model, that the state space is finite. In this case, general
state-dependent expected utility is well-understood. Assume that the state space S is
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{s i , . . . , Sn}. Let / be an act, assigning outcome /(s^) e iR to each state s .^ The expected
utility formula of / is given in Table 1, Formula (al),
Expected utility
State-dependent expected utility
Additive decomposability
finite dimensions
£ P>tf(/fo)) (al)
J=I
i:w(«j)) (»3)
general (infinite) dimensions
/^/7(/( , ) )dP (bl)
/<,/7,(/(6))dP (b2)
? (b3)
TABLE 1. Existing and non-existing functional
where Pj is the probability of state s^  and (/ denotes utility. A first version of the state-
dependent generalization is given in Formula (a2), where the subscript in f/j indicates
state-dependence. Any alternative state-dependent representation
with PjfT, = <fr W, for all j represents the same preferences and thus is empirically indistin-
guishable from the original representation. Hence only the products p^t/j are meaningful
and it is preferable to rewrite the functional as in Formula (a3) where Vy = p^f/j for all
j . This summation provides the state-dependent generalization of expected utility. As
pointed out by Kreps (1988, Formula 7.13), state-dependent expected utility therefore is a
special case of "additive conjoint measurement," axiomatized by Debreu (1960), Gorman
(1968), Krantz, Luce, Suppes, & Tversky (1971), and others. The factoring out of proba-
bility pj and utility [/, as in (a2) has little significance, i.e., probability is not identifiable
under state-dependent expected utility. This point has often been discussed (Dreze, 1961,
1987; Kami, 1985, 1993a, 1993b, 1996; Rubin, 1987; Kadane & Winkler, 1988; Schervish,
Seidenfeld, & Kadane, 1990; Kami &: Schmeidler, 1993; Nau, 1995). An empirical method
for eliciting the product of probability and state-dependent utility has been described by
Wakker & Deneffe (1996, end of Section 4).
State-dependent utility is more complicated for infinite state spaces. For these spaces,
expected utility reads as in (bl) in the table, where P denotes the probability distribution
over S. State-dependent utility at first reads as (b2). Again, the same basic indeterminacy
of probability and utility exists as in the finite state case, and alternative representations
(3.2)
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can be chosen that represent the same preferences. For instance, let £? have any positive
density with respect to P, then divide £/j by that density to obtain Wj. As for finite state
spaces, one would like to drop the meaningless factorization into P and {/«. However, a
functional to drop the factorization from (b2) is not readily available in the literature,
hence the question mark at (b3) in the table. Here, the analogy with finite state spaces
stops.
Introducing the extension of an additively decomposable functional for infinitely many
states, i.e., filling in Formula (b3), is the first task. The extension is not very difficult given
ordinal state independence, and is defined by enclosure from above and below by simple
acts, completely analogous to the definition of integrals. The absence in the literature of
the required functional, and the desirability of developing it, was pointed out by Hiibner
& Suck (1993, p. 631 and Concluding remarks). For related comments restricted to finite
state spaces, see Fishburn (1970, Chapter 12).
3.4 Definitions and Preliminary Results
5 is a state space that can be finite or infinite. It is endowed with an aipeira .4 of subsets,
that is, .4 contains the universal event 5, the complement A" relative to 5 of each of its
elements A, and, finally, the union A U B of each pair of elements A, S. Subsets of 5
contained in A are called events. For any partition of 5 or of any subevent of 5, it is
always assumed without further mentioning that its elements are events. The outcome
space is 2R. (Connected topological outcome spaces are discussed in Section 3.11.) An act
is a bounded function from 5 to the outcome space that is mea$ura6/e, i.e., the inverse
of every interval is an event. .F denotes the set of all acts. Note that, without further
mentioning, acts will be assumed to be bounded throughout this chapter. A technique for
dealing with unbounded acts is described by Wakker (1993a).
For act / and event A, /^ denotes the restriction of / to A. For acts / , p, and event
A, /,i<7 (abbreviating /A<7/I«) denotes the act that agrees with / on A and with o on A'.
Constant acts are sometimes identified with their associated outcomes. We may thus write,
for outcome x, / ^ i for the act that agrees with act / on event A and is constant x on A';
the notation x^/ is similar. For event A, 1^ denotes the indicator function of A. For a
finite partition {Aj , . . . , A«} of S, $3"_i Xj 1^ denotes the act assigning Xj to each s € Aj,
for each j . Such an act, taking only finitely many values, is a szmp/e act. . P denotes the
set of all simple acts.
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The pre/erence re/atton is a binary relation =^ on ^". It is a weafc order if it is comp/ete
(/ :?= g or 3 =^ / for all acts /,g) and transitive. The notation >-, ~, =<:, and X is standard,
i.e., / x # if / *= ^ and not g &= / , / ~ g if / =^ 3 and 5 =^ / , / < g if g > / , and / x 3
if g >- / . If there exists a nepresen/mg function V (i.e., V is a real-valued function on the
set of acts F such that / *= g «=> V(/) ^ V'(g) for all acts /,g), then > is necessarily a
weak order. Let us now summarize the structural assumptions made in the main body of
this paper.
ASSUMPTION 3.1 fStructurai Assumption^. Acts are founded measurafc/e maps ,/rom t/ie
state space S <o t/ie outcome space 7R. T/ie pre/erence negation =^ is a 6inan/ re/ation on
t/ie se< F 0/ acts. •
Simple acts play an important role in this analysis and several intermediate results will
be formulated for simple acts. We will also see that several preference conditions can be
restricted to simple acts. Together with some technical conditions, they then imply the
corresponding conditions for the nonsimple acts. Event A is nu// if /^g ~ g for all simple
acts / and 5. Strict monotonicity holds if 1 ^ / >- J/A/ for all nonnull events A, simple acts
/ , and outcomes x > j / .
The main condition of interest in this analysis is Savage's (1954) su7ie-t/im<? princip/e.
It requires
c/ / :?= c/p o c';/ $= c',5
for all acts c, c*, / , g, and events / . The sure-t/iing principle Zio/ds on .P* if the condition is
only imposed on all simple acts c, c*, / , g. The condition is known under various names, such
as (strong) separability in consumer choice theory (Barten & Bohm, 1982), preferential
independence in multiattribute utility theory (Keeney &: Raiffa, 1976), and (con)joint
independence in conjoint measurement theory (Krantz et al., 1971).
If S is finite, say S = {si , . . . ,s , ,}, then .F can be identified with 2R" through the
bijective mapping / —• ( /(s i) , . . . , /(s,,)). Continuity of > then means that, for each act
/ , {g : g > / } and {g : g =?: /} are closed subsets of 2R" with respect to the Euclidean
topology. Debreu (1960) proved the following result, formulated here for the context of
decision under uncertainty.
THEOREM 3.2 fDeoreu, ^560; stafe-depenrfent erpecfed utitti/ /or finite state spaces,). Let
the Structural Assumption 3./ /10/d and /et S = {sj , . . . ,s,,}, w/iere at ieast t/iree states are
nonnu//. T/ien t/ie /o/Zou«n<? two statements are eyuiva/ent:
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fij 77iere eitsi continuous functions VJ : 17? —> J7?, j = l , . . . , n , t/iat are strictZy in-
creasing /or o/Z nonnu/2 states and constant /or ai/ nuZZ states, and suc/i t/iat £= is
represented 6j/
is a continuous strictZy monotonic weaA: order t/iat satis/ies t/»e sure-t/wna principle.
TAe /oZ/owino uniaueness /io/ds /or (%): W(/) = X)"=i Wj(/(*'j)) repnesents > i/ and
onZy i/ t/iere exist reaZ numbers Ti , . . . , r,, and a positive o" suc/i t/iat Wj = r^ + ffV} /or a//
j , imp/t/ino t/iat IV = r + crV /or T = Ti + • • • + T«. D
Strictly speaking, the uniqueness result in Theorem 3.2 may be considered slightly
stronger than Debreu's (1960) because continuity of IV has not been presupposed but
instead follows as a consequence (Wakker, 1988). This generalized uniqueness result is
used in what follows. The case of exactly one nonnull state is trivial; then there is no
uncertainty. For two states of nature, an additional condition must be added in Statement
(ii), for instance, the "hexagon condition" or the "Thomsen condition" (Kami & Safra,
1998).
To obtain a (state-independent) expected utility representation in Statement (i), and
thus a finite-state version of Savage's (1954) result, the conditions in Statement (ii) must be
strengthened. Such strengthenings have been provided by Grodal (1978), Wakker (1984,
1989b), Nakamura (1990), and Gul (1992). An essential intuitive step in attaining such
a separation of probability and utility is an identification, in at least a cardinal sense, of
outcomes contingent on different states of nature. For further discussion and a clarifying
example of this point, see Kami (1996).
3.5 Complications for Infinite State Spaces
Following Savage (1954), now a nonatomicity condition is introduced, that implies infinity
of S. An event A is an atom if, for every subevent B of A, either B or A\B is null.
It is assumed that S contains no atoms. This assumption is somewhat weaker than the
"atomless" condition (see Section 3.10) commonly adopted in the literature, but suffices
for the purposes of this analysis.
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A major complication in the extension to infinite state spaces concerns the topological
restrictions to be imposed. Continuity with respect to the product topology is too restric-
tive for the purposes of this chapter. Therefore a "finite-dimensional" simp/e-continuity
condition is imposed on .F* which requires that, for each finite partition {Ai , . . . , An} of S,
the preference relation over the finite-dimensional subspace of acts of the form 5Z"_j z_, 1A,
is continuous. That is, for every ( i , , . . . , ! „ ) e IR", {(j/i,... ,y«) € IR" : £"=i 2/jU, =^
E"=i *i W and {(yi,. . . , y j e IR" : E"=i %1>», =* E"=i *jl/t,} should be closed subsets
ofIR".
PROPOSITION 3.3 Assume f/iat S contains no atoms and tftat !?= is a simpZe-continuous
strict/y monotonic wea/c order' t/tat satis/zes t/ie sure-t/iing przncip/e on .F*. 7Vzen /or eac/i
event A t/iene exists a continuous and eit/ier sirictZy increasing or constant /unction K4 :
JR —• ZR suc/i t/iat =^ is represented on ^ 6y
T/ie /o//ounn<? unioueness /to/ds: H^(53"^, x^l^J = E^=i WAJ(I>) represents =^ on .P* i/
and on/y i/ t/iere eiist reaZ num&ers T^ /or eac/i event A a7td a positive a suc/i t/iat VK/i =
T I^ + crV,4 /or a// A, wftere T^UB = T>I + TB /or a// disjoint events A, 5 and U^ = Ts + ffV.
D
The uniqueness result, up to multiplication by a positive "scale" factor er and addition
of a signed bounded finitely additive measure r is a characteristic of state-dependent utility,
and will return in later theorems.
Proposition 3.3 can be interpreted as a state-dependent extension of Savage's (1954)
result for simple acts. Next the extension to nonsimple acts is considered. It turns out
that, in the presence of weak ordering and the sure-thing principle, the technical condi-
tions in the proposition, i.e., strict monotonicity and simple-continuity, do not suffice to
ensure the desired representation. Loosely speaking, the sure-thing principle and strict
monotonicity only impose restrictions within finite-dimensional subspaces of .F. Different
finite-dimensional subspaces of J" that share only the origin can be entirely unrelated.
These claims are illustrated by the following example.
EXAMPLE 3.4
Assume that 5 = [0,1], is endowed with the regular Borel c-algebra (the smallest <r-
algebra containing all intervals) and the Lebesgue measure (assigning to each interval its
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length). The functional V that represents > is linear. On F* , V is expected value. First
a description is given of the extension of V from F* to some, but not all, nonsimple acts,
for three different versions of the example. Then it is explained how V can be extended
to all nonsimple acts for each of the three versions. Finally, the example is discussed.
(VERSION A) For /(a) = s + 1,V(/) = - 1 .
(VERSION B) Consider the partition TT = {[0,1/n), [ l /n ,2 /n ) , . . . , [1 - 1/n, 1), [1]}. Let
F* contain all acts that are 0 at all points j / n and are linear on each interval of the
partition. F* is a linear space that intersects F* only at the origin (the constant 0 act).
Let P* be any arbitrary probability measure on [0,1] and I/* any continuous function from
ffi to ZR such that £7*(0) = 0; 17* need not be increasing. Let V be expected utility with
respect to P* and 17* on F*.
(VERSION C) Let F* and F** be two linear subspaces of F such that the linear space
spanned by any two of F*,F* and F " intersects the third only at the origin. Let P* and
P** be arbitrary probability measures on [0,1] and [7" and {7** any continuous functions
from 2R to 5? such that t/*(0) = 0 = C/**(0). Let V be expected utility with respect to P*
and 17* on .F", and expected utility with respect to P** and £7** on F " .
In each of the three versions we can extend V to a linear functional on all of F by the
Hahn-Banach extension theorem (Dunford & Schwartz, 1958). Linearity of V implies the
sure-thing principle because
- (V(c,0)
Therefore, V(c//) - V(c/g) and V(cJ/) - V(cy0) have the same sign and the preference
between c / / and c/g is the same as between c, / and c^ . Because V(z,i/) - V(y,j/) =
(i — y)V(l/\) > 0 for i > j / and A nonnull, strict monotonicity also holds for the nonsimple
acts.
A phenomenon occurs in (A) that is unwarranted from a decision theoretical viewpoint:
/(A) > 0 for all states s, but still V(/) < 0 and / is strictly less preferred than 0.
Another unwarranted phenomenon occurs in both (B) and (c): the restriction of V (and,
correspondingly, of >) to several subparts of its domain are completely unrelated. All
three cases (A),(B), and (c) illustrate that V on F* does not restrict V to other parts of
its domain to a satisfactory degree. D
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A natural condition for preference functional V in decision under uncertainty, violated
in (A) of the example, is pointoise monotonicity: if/(A) ^ y(s) for all s, then V(/) ^ V(g).
Similarly, poin<i«se T7ionotonici<j/ for =^ requires that / =^ g if/(s) ^ y(s) for all s (compare
Rubin, 1987, Axiom 0).
Next the extension of additivity is provided. A functional V : .F —» iR is additive/j/
decomposable over disjoint events, or additive for short, if for each event A there exists a
functional K4 on the set of restrictions /,, of acts / to /I such that for each finite partition
{i4l , . . . ,An}0fS,
(/*,). (3.3)
It is important to note that V^(//() does not depend on the partitioning of A^  and neither
on the part of / outside of A. Linear functional are additive (define ^(/^t) = V(/^0)).
Also, the expected utility functional (Formula (bl) in Table 1) is additive (define V^ =
J"^  t/(/(s))dP). Additive functionate were previously studied by Vind (1990).
Additivity of V immediately implies that the functionals V/i are also additive in the
sense that VBUC(/BUC) = VB( /B)+VC(/C) for all disjoint events B, C. The following lemma
shows that additivity on .F* is in agreement with the functional described in Proposition
3.3 (that imposes (3.3) only when the / ^ are constant).
LEMMA 3.5 V : .F* —» ./R is additive z/ and oniy </ </iere exists, /or eacft event A, a
/unction V; : ffl - ffi suc/i t/ia( V(E"=i i j l ^ ) = E"=i KJ,(^")- °
Because of its importance, the following observation is displayed and its, elementary,
proof is presented in the main text.
OBSERVATION 3.6 // =^ can 6e represented 6?/ an additive /wnctionai t/ien it satis/ies t/ie
sure-t/iinp princip/e.
PROOF. Writing R ("relevant") for the complement of event / ("irrelevant"), we get
and
Dropping the terms V}(c/) in the first equality and the terms Vj(c'j) in the second, the
same right-hand sides result. Hence the left-hand sides are also equal. Then they surely
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have the same sign, and this implies that the preference between c// and c/3 is the same
as between c^/ and c^ . D
Additivity does not preclude the phenomena described in Example 3.4 because the
representing functional there was linear and thus additive. For infinite-dimensional exten-
sions of additive conjoint measurement, there may be interest in general functional, as
in Example 3.4, that do not satisfy a pointwise monotonicity condition (Streufert, 1995).
For economic applications of decision under uncertainty with monetary outcomes, how-
ever, there may be little empirical interest in such general functionals. Therefore, the next
section follows a different route, avoiding the complications of Example 3.4.
3.6 State-Dependent Expected Utility for
Infinite State Spaces
In this extension of state-dependent expected utility to all acts in F , the empirically most
important conditions of additivity and the sure-thing principle will not be extended to all
of F from the start, but will initially only be imposed explicitly on F*. Instead, continuity
will be extended to all of F . This ensures that the functional V can be extended from F"
to F in the same way as integrals: Each nonsimple act is enclosed between dominating
and dominated simple acts that converge to that act in supnorm. Because of continuity,
the value of the nonsimple act is the limit of the values of the converging simple acts.
Thus, V is a "natural" extension of integrals. A crucial implication of supnorm continuity,
underlying this procedure, is pointwise monotonicity (Lemma 3.9). We subsequently find,
as a "bonus," that additivity and the sure-thing principle, imposed only on F", do hold
on all of F after all. Thus, a satisfactory version of state-dependent expected utility has
been obtained.
Under the supnorm, the distance between two acts / , g is sup,gs|/(«) - ff(*)l- V >s
supnorro-continuous if {/ € F : V(/) ^ A} and {/ € F : V(/) $ A} are supnorm-closed
for all A 6 IR. Similarly, > is supnorm-conhnuoits if, for all acts / , the sets {g € F : g :?= / }
and {g 6 F : g =^  / } are supnorm-closed. It is well-known that supnorm-continuity is
equivalent to the common continuity on ZR", and thus supnorm-continuity implies simple-
continuity. That supnorm-continuity is not overly restrictive may be further accentuated
by its equivalence to continuity of utility under expected utility and also under the more
general Choquet expected utility, introduced by Schmeidler (1989). This equivalence was
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demonstrated by Chew & Wakker (1996, Observation 2); it should be kept in mind here
that the acts here are assumed to be bounded.
A number of steps in the derivation of the main result, Theorem 3.11, are made explicit
in the text. These steps make it clear that the state-dependent expected utility functional
proposed here generalizes integrals in a natural manner. Henceforth, up to Theorem 3.11,
it is assumed that:
ASSUMPTION 3.7 £ contains no atoms and =^ is a strict/y monotonic supnorm-continuotts
weaA; order t/iat satts/ies t/ie sure-i/wn<7 princip/e on JF*. D
This assumption implies that Proposition 3.3 can be applied, yielding an additive
representing functional V on P . The functional V is first extended to all of .F, through
"certainty equivalents." Next, the required conditions are derived for V. 7 6 iR is a
certainty eatmia/ent for act / if 7 ~ / .
LEMMA 3.8 t/nder Assumption 5.7, t/iere exists a certainty eguivatent /or eac/i act / . D
Because of strict monotonicity (applied to the constant acts), there exists at most one
certainty equivalent for each act. We extend the functional V of Proposition 3.3 to the
nonsimple acts by defining V(/) = V(7) where 7 is the certainty equivalent of / . This
functional obviously represents preferences and, as shown in Lemma 3.19 in Appendix A,
is continuous. It obviously agrees with the definition on .F*. An important observation is
the following.
LEMMA 3.9 (/nder Assumption 5.7, t/ie /unctiona/ V as jttst de/ined saiis/ies pointiuise
monofonicitj/. O
Because of this lemma, the V value of a nonsimple act / results from K values of simple
acts in a similar fashion as an integral value of / would. This can be seen as follows. It is
well-known that there exist two sequences of simple acts a* and fr' (a abbreviating "above"
and /> "below") such that
/(s) + 1/j ^ o*(s) ^ o>+'(«) £ /(s) ^ &*'(*) ^ &»'(«) ^ /(s) - 1/j
for all s and j (see Figure 3.1). Then, because of pointwise monotonicity, V(/) is enclosed
increasingly tightly by V(b') ^ V(/) ^ V(a-*). Because of supnorm-continuity (Lemma
3.19), V(b') and V(a^) indeed converge to V(/). The definition of the functional is similar
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0+2)//
0+1)//
Figure 3.1: Enclosing / from above and below by simple acts a* and />^ .
to the construction of the Lebesgue integral. It does not invoke any structure on the state
space other than measure-theoretical and in this sense is more general than the Riemann
integral.
It will next be demonstrated that V inherits additivity on J" from additivity on ^"'.
By Observation 3.6, this also ensures the sure-thing principle for all acts.
LEMMA 3.10 (/nder Assumption 5.7, V as just constructed satis/ies
At this point, the main theorem of this paper can be given.
THEOREM 3.11 ('State-dependent extension o/ Savage, 2P5^j. Let t/ie Structural Assump-
tion 3.2 /io/d and assume t/iat S contains no atoms. T/ien t/te /of/ounno two statements
are eouiva/ent:
fij > is represented 6u a /unctionaZ V : ^ —> 17? t/iat satis/ies fij addititnti/, i.e., t/iere
exist /unctiona/s V^ denned on t/ie restrictions o/ acts to A suc/i t/iat
/or eac/i ^nite partition {Ai, . . . , An} o/ S; ^ supnonzi-continuitu; ^ /or eac/i A,
V/i(x) (/or outcome/constant act xj is eitfter constant or strictij/ jncreasmp in x.
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(^ ii^  !j= satis/ies: f/j toeaJfc ordering; f2j strict monotonicity; ^ supnorm-continuity; ( ^
the sure-thing princip/e.
Furthermore, ^ imp/ies pointuase monof onicity 0/ V and i^z^  imp/ies pointwise monotonic-
iiy 0/ ^=. /n ^ , V^(x) is continuous in 1 /or eac/i A.
T/ie /o/Zounnj uniguertess /io/ds /or ^ : TV is additive (W(/) = S^=i^4,(/>tj) /*""
any /inite partition {A], . . . , An} 0/ SJ and represents > i/ and on/y i/ f/iere exist rea/
numbers T^ /or each event A and a positive CT SUC/I t/iat M'Oi = r^ + aV^ /or a// A, vj/iere
= T^ + rg /or a// disjoint events A, B and W = r s 4- crV. •
The theorem provides a state-dependent extension of Savage's expected utility. It
does not provide a separation of probability and (state-dependent) utility, but instead it
provides a decision-model where these factors are inextricably joined together.
3.7 Deriving an Integral Form under Countable
Additivity
This section demonstrates that the new functional can be written as an integral with
respect to a countably additive measure /i, under a stronger continuity condition. The
result is given here for its mathematical convenience, not for its empirical content. The
convenience results because the well-known integration techniques can now be invoked.
The measure /i and the accompanying state dependent utility function C/j are, however,
only mathematical devices and do not represent additional empirical content. All rele-
vant empirical information is contained in the general additively decomposable functional,
without any measure /z or utility (7, specified.
It is assumed in this section that the algebra .4 is a u-a^eftra on 5, i.e., it is closed
under countable (instead of just finite) unions. Note that, in the special case of Theorem
3.11 where the functional V can be decomposed into a probability measure P and a utility
function t/, the axioms presented here only imply finite additivity of P. The following
continuity condition reinforces supnorm continuity to the effect of also implying countable
additivity.
> satisfies pointunse continuity if a sequence of "uniformly bounded acts that converge
pointwise to an act also converge preference-wise to that act." A sequence of acts /•*' is
uni/orni/y bounded if there exist outcomes 1, y such that 1 ^  /•'(s) ^ y for all j and s, and
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it converges pointtwse to / if linij_oo / ' (s) = /(«) for all s. It converges pre/erence-twse to
/ if, for each act #, 5 >- / implies the existence of a J € 27V such that g >- Z' for all j > J
and g -< / implies the existence of a J € Z7V such that g -< p for all j > J. Pointtwse
continuity of the functional V is defined likewise: If a sequence of uniformly bounded
acts converge pointwise, then their V value also converges to the V value of their limit.
Pointwise continuity implies supnorm continuity (Lemma 3.20) and countable additivity
(Lemma 3.22). It is weaker than (i.e., implied by) continuity of the state-dependent utility
functions l/^  in (i) in the theorem (Lemma 3.27), hence is not overly restrictive.
THEOREM 3.12 f5<a£e-depen<ien£ expected utiZitj/ under countab/e arfrfittvityj. Let the
5tructura/ Assumption 5. i /10/d and assume f/iat 5 contains no atoms. T/ien the /o//oiwing
tioo statements are eguivatent:
fij 77iere exists a countaftiy additive measure /i o n S and /or eac/i state s a strict/y
incneasing fstate-dependent uti/itt/j /unction {/, : ZR —» iK suc/i t/iat > is represented
63/ t/ie pointiwse continuous integnai
=^ satis/ies.- ('ij weaA: ordering; ^ strict monotonicitj/; ^5j pointunse continuity;
t/ie sure-tning principle.
unioueness noZds /or (%): /i, (f/j,),gs can te rep/aced 6j/ /x", (f//),gs t/ and
on/y i//x and /z* /lave t/ie same nui/ events and £/,* = T(S) + <r6(s)f/, /or a// s except on a
/i nuiZ event, w/iere T is a measura6/e /unction /rom 5 to JJ, a is a positive constant, and
6 is t/ie Tiadon-Miodym density /unction 0/ /x twt/i respect to ^*. D
The integral in (i) is well-defined and real-valued for each act / . It is crucial for the
uniqueness result regarding /x that each state-dependent utility is required to be strictly
increasing. This excludes the case in which /i(A) > 0 but A is null because of constant
utility at A. Hence, ^ identifies null events (Lemma 3.26). Statement (i) obviously implies
pointwise monotonicity of V, and Statement (ii) of =^, as in Theorem 3.11. Theorem 3.12
deviates from Grodal & Mertens' (1976) result mainly because the measure /x is not given
a priori but is determined endogeneously, completely in terms of preferences.
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3.8 Applications
This section presents some applications of Theorem 3.11. First it is demonstrated, on the
basis of suggestions by Kami, Schmeidler, &: Vind (1983) and Kami (1996), that updating
through adjusted likelihoods ratios, the corner stone of Bayesian statistics, is still possible.
Thus, Bayesian updating is extended from expected utility to state-dependent expected
utility.
As a preparation, the classical updating from Bayesian statistics, which will be gen-
eralized hereafter, is described within the expected utility model. Let / i—» j£[/(/(s))<iP
represent the prior preferences over acts, for a subjective probability measure P and a
(subjective) utility function £/. Assume that we observe a value X of some "statistic."
The probability (density) for this observation is different for different states of nature, i.e.,
it is a function of the state of nature. This function is the /ifce/i/iood /unctaon.
To avoid some technical complications, the likelihood function is assumed to take only
finitely many values and is further assumed to be constant on each element Aj of a partition
{Ai,. . . ,A,,}. In other words, the observation of X helps to distinguish between the
"hypotheses" Ai,...,A,,; conditional on any Aj, however, the observation X does not
provide further information. Say the likelihood of the observation is Aj for each Aj. Then,
after the observation the probability for any Aj is changed by a factor proportional to Aj
according to the formula of Bayes. The updated preference relation, denoted >, can be
represented by / H-» V]"_, Aj f. [/(/(s))dP; note here that normalization is not necessary
for the representation of preferences.
The previously-discussed method for updating preference is first extended to state-
dependent utility when prior probabilities are known. Let the prior preferences be repre-
sented by / »-• Jg t/j(/(s))dP. With prior probability P given, we can still apply Bayes'
formula in the classical manner, and posterior preferences are represented by
/ M V A J t/,(/(s))dP. (3.4)
This manner of updating can be inferred from Kami, Schmeidler, & Vind (1983, Lemma);
see also Kami (1996, Section 3.3), Kami & Schmeidler (1993), and Nau (1995, Section 7).
Kami, Sclimeidler, & Vind also demonstrate that an alternative equivalent state-dependent
representation / H-» /$ Wj(/(s))dQ for prior preference can be similarly updated into
(3.5)
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This updated form represents the same posterior preferences as the updated form in (3.4).
In other words, alternative representations for state-dependent expected utility remain in-
distinguishable under updating. From this observation, only one further step is required
to extend the updating to the new functional in which there is no factorization into proba-
bility and utility. If prior preferences are represented by an additive functional V(/), then
updated preferences are represented by
Normalization can be obtained by letting the functional assign value 0 to the act that is
constant 0 and value 1 to the act that is constant 1. The sure-thing principle is at the
heart of this updating method, and prior probabilities play no role.
The updating method presented here, is characterized for state-dependent expected
utility with a subjective likelihood function. Likelihood is not objective and given a priori
but is determined in terms of the decision maker's preferences. A topic for future research
is under what conditions such subjective likelihoods coincide with objective likelihoods if
the latter are available.
The preference relation £= again designates "prior" preferences, relevant before the
receipt of information. Posterior preferences are indicated by a wiggle. Thus, ~, >-, ^ ,
and x relate to posterior preferences and are derived from ^ as the related symbols arc from
>. An observation is in/o777Mj<it;e with respect to a partition {Ai , . . . , An} if, for each j ,
either A^  is a null event for :j= ("impossible a posteriori"), or / ^ c =^ g^c if and only if / ^ c
=^ <?,i,c, for all acts /,<?,c. This means that the information does not distinguish between
subevents of any A_,. In other words, given any Aj nothing changes. The information
only concerns the mutual likelihoods ratios of the different events ("hypotheses") A_> in
the partition. A case in which the condition is satisfied is when, given A ,^ the true state
of nature in Aj is determined by a random mechanism (such as repeated coin tosses)
unrelated to the observation.
THEOREM 3.13 Assume t/wi t/ie prior pre/erences one denoted 6y !?= and t/iat pre/erences
are updated info =^ a/ter some o6ser-ya<ion. Assume t/iaf 6ot/i pre/erence re/ations satis/y
t/ie conditions and statements o/ TTieorem 5 J i (Tor f/ie same state and act space/ 77ien
the /o/Zowino two statements are eguiiia/ent /or a partition {Ai, . . . , An} o/ t/te state space:
fij 77iere exist nonneaatiwe numbers Aj suc/i t/iat t/ie representation o/ T/ieorem 5. H
/or >, and / i—> £^"=i -\;V^(/.^) represents t/ie updated pre/erences >.
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fiij TAe ofcservation is in/o777iatit;e unfA n&spec< to the partition {Ai, . . . , A,,}. n
This theorem demonstrates that Bayesian updating is possible even if a convenient
decomposition V,^  = P(Aj)(/ is not available. Prior probability, the target of much
criticism, apparently is not crucial for Bayesian updating.
Next a study of risk attitudes is provided. For finite state spaces, similar result were
presented by Miyamoto & Wakker (1996). Constant risA: at/ersion holds if / ~ x -£>
/ + e ~ i + £, for all acts / , outcomes x, and positive £.
THEOREM 3.14 Assume tnat tne conditions and statements o/ T/ieorem 5.ii ZioZd. Tnerc
constant risfc aversion /io/ds if and onfy i/ expected uti/it?/ /io/ds and £/(x) = a + 6e" /or
some constants a,6,c twt/i 6c > 0, or f/(x) = a -I- 6x /or some constants a, 6 twt/i 6 > 0. •
Similar results can be proved for positive outcomes and proportional ("relative") risk
aversion. They follow from Theorem 3.14 through the replacement of all outcomes by
their logarithms. Here a conjecture is formulated: Theorem 3.14, with state-dependent
utility assumed but state-independent utility implied (and, of course, more general utility
functions), holds true if one weakens constant risk aversion to decreasing risk aversion.
That conjecture can be proved if Wakker (1989b, Conjecture VII.6.10) is true.
Theorem 3.14 and the results subsequently suggested are negative for state-dependent
expected utility because common assumptions regarding risk attitude are simply not possi-
ble under state dependence. The model necessarily reduces to expected utility. Apparently,
the common conditions for risk attitude need to be redefined for state-dependent utility.
Alternative definitions were proposed by Kami (1983).
Finally an idea of Karni (1993a, 1993b) for identifying probability is discussed. Assume
that acts a, 6 are given and suppose that, on the basis of prior assumptions, the state-
dependent utility of 6 must be 0 and the state-dependent utility of a must be 1, for all states.
Then probabilities are directly identified in Theorem 3.11 through P(A) = ^*-v-(6)^ *°*
each event A. Note that the information on utilities of a and fc is not derived from preference
but is exogeneous. The identification of subjective probability just described is related to
the method of Dreze (1987, Section 2.8.3), where moral hazard and "idempotent" acts are
used to identify constant-valuation acts, Karni (1993a, 1993b, 1997), where the range (thus
the highest and lowest value) of utility across different states is assumed identical, Nau &
McCardle (1991) and Nau (1995), where avoidance of arbitrage implies the existence of
"risk-neutral probabilities" whidi are defined relative to the market currency, the method
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of Kami & Schmeidler (1993), where the assumption is reduced to a differential form,
i.e., the utility of 0 is 0 for all states and has the same derivative at 0 for all states, the
method of Maher (1993, Chapter 8) where two outcomes with state-independent utility
are assumed, and, finally, Klibanoff (1995), who justifies the assumption of equally-valued
outcomes in a dynamic setup with opportunity sets as outcomes.
The derivation of a state-dependent utility function from the preceding assumptions
is a topic for future research. It requires measure-theoretical axioms regarding the role of
null events and adaptation of the Radon-Nikodym theorem to finitely additive measures,
subjects that, are outside the scope of this chapter.
If only two outcomes are given instead of a continuum as in this analysis, then the
additively decomposable functional reduces to a finitely additive measure. For that case,
many advanced results have been obtained (Fishburn 1986, 1992).
This analysis has used the framework of decision under uncertainty, in which the func-
tional represents state-dependent expected utility. The functional can be used in other
areas as well. In dynamic optimization (Strotz, 1956; Koopmans, 1972), it generalizes
discounted utility by allowing utility to depend on time. In welfare theory, it permits
utilitarianism where utility depends on the individual (Harsanyi, 1955), but no lotteries
over income need be invoked. It thus extends Fleming (1952), an appealing but not very
well-known predecessor of Harsanyi (1955) and Debreu (1960), to infinite populations.
3.9 Conclusion
This chapter has presented the following new results.
(1) Additive utility theory (Debreu, 1960; Krantz et al., 1971) has been extended to infinite
dimension.
(2) By means of (1), a state-dependent extension of Savage's (1954) expected utility has
been obtained. Additional restrictions such as assumptions outside the decision theoretical
domain or a measure on the state space, are not invoked.
(3) By means of (2), it has been argued that the sure-thing principle, rather than prior
probability, is at the heart of Bayesian statistics.
(0) The extension of Debreu's (1960) additive utility requires an additional innovation
that should precede Step (1): The appropriate functional has to be introduced. It gener-
alizes integration naturally, with pointwise monotonicity excluding anomalies. With this
functional available, state-dependent utility can be studied without invoking additional
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structure outside the realm of decision theory.
3.10 Extensions and Further Comments
In this section, mathematical extensions of the presented theorems are provided.
OBSERVATION 3.15 77ie /o//ounn<? additions and modi/ications are possiWe in T/ieonem
fo) The sure-t/imo princip/e in ( ^ o/ Statement fu,) need on/y 6e imposed on .F*.
/'fij T/ie V^s in ft) are supnorm-continuous.
fcj /n ft), additivity o/ V need on/j/ 6e imposed on .F* and t/ien imp/ies additivity on a//
o /F .
fdj // ft) or «^T^  Aoids, t/ien /or a ntd/ et/ent A, 5 ^ / ~ h^/ /or aM acts /,g,/i ('inciudinp
t/»e nonst'mp/e
7/ i^i^  /lo/ds, </ien strict monotonicity /to/ds on a/Z o / F , i.e., x ^ / >- y^/ w/ieneuer
i > y and A is nonnu//, aiso i/ i/ie acts are nonsimp/e.
nonatomicity condition can fte weaA;ened 6y on/y reguiring t/ie existence 0/ t/iree
disjoint nonnui/ events.
(jj T/ie domain 0/ pre/erence need not 6e t/ie entire set .F 6uf can 6e any set bettyeen F
and .F* suc/i t/iat, /or eac/i e/ement / and event A, a/so /,tO is contained. •
The results in (a), (c), (d), and (e) illustrate conditions that, when only imposed on
the simple acts, extend to the nonsimple acts. In particular, the result in (d) shows that
the definition of null events, which is used here and which only concerns simple acts, is
equivalent to the common definitions of null events that concern all acts.
The generalization in (f) covers not only the finite case considered in Theorem 3.2 but
also infinite state spaces with atoms. In the main result of this analysis the nonatomic case
is chosen because it is closest to Savage's model, the model that has received most attention
in the literature. In Savage's (1954) expected utility model, a somewhat stronger condition
was implied, i.e., that the finitely additive probability measure should be atom/ess: for each
event A and each 0 < x < P(A) there should exist a subevent B of A with P(£?) = x. If P
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is countably additive, that condition is equivalent to the nonatomicity condition assumed
here.
The domain restriction described in (g) generalizes the requirement of Grodal & Mertens
(1976) and Vind (1990) that the domain be an "independent mixture" and contain all con-
stant acts, which in particular generates all simple acts. Their connectedness condition
implies (by Vind's Theorem III. 1.1) the simple-continuity and boundedness conditions used
here (by Vind's Remark following Corollary V.3.4). The extension of the results presented
here to nonreal outcomes is described in Section 3.11.
3.11 Connected Topological Outcome Spaces
This section demonstrates how the outcome set can be generalized to any connected topo-
logical space. This generalization is similar to Appendix 2 in Wakker (1994) and Appendix
B in Chew & Wakker (1996). Also Grodal & Mertens (1976) consider outcomes more gen-
eral than monetary. In their approach, the outcome set should be a separable metric space
and connectedness is imposed directly on the preference topology.
5Z"=i ^>^j still denotes the simple act assigning outcome i^ to A; for each j . The
natural ordering ^ on outcomes is replaced by the preference relation =^ restricted to the
constant acts, for instance in the definitions of strict and pointwise monotonicity and in the
definition of strictly increasing functions. Consequently, equalities i = y are sometimes
replaced by equivalences i ~ j / . / from S to the outcome set is bounded if there exist
outcomes z,y such that [Vs 6 S : i ^ / (s ) =$ y]. This definition of bounded can be
somewhat more restrictive than the common term bounded, for instance if the outcome
set is ]0,1 [. MeasuraiiWy now requires that the inverse of each "preference interval" is an
event. A pne/erence interim/ is a subset of the outcome set that contains, for each z =<! 2,
also each element y such that x =<: y =<: z. Our measurability condition is ensured, in the
presence of continuity of ;>, by measurability with respect to any algebra containing the
topology on the outcome set. If 5 is endowed with a cr-algebra, then it suffices that all
inverses under / of {x : x ;>= y} and {x : x =3: y} are events. / from S to the outcome set
is an act if it is bounded and measurable.
Certainty equivalents need no longer be uniquely determined. Throughout the follow-
ing analysis, it will never matter which of several certainty equivalents is chosen. Supnorm-
continuity cannot be defined in this general setting. The implications of supnorm-continuity,
used in the analysis, must therefore be imposed explicitly. First, simple-continuity is re-
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quired, which is similarly defined as in the main text (endowing each finite product of
outcome spaces with the product topology). Second, pointwise monotonicity is required.
Third, the existence of a certainty equivalent is imposed for each act. Fourth and finally,
a "simple-act denseness" condition is imposed to guarantee that the V-value of an act is
indeed the infimum of the V'-values of pointwise dominating simple acts, as well as the
supremum of pointwise dominated simple acts: Simp/e-act denseness holds if, for all acts
/ >- /i, there exists a simple act a such that / >- a >- /i, where a dominates /i pointwise,
and a simple act 6 such that / >- fc >- /i where 6 is pointwise dominated by / . The same
condition is defined correspondingly for the representing functional V.
THEOREM 3.16 Let t/ie Structural Assumption 5.i /iofd, twin t/ie/oWounno modi/ications:
T/ie outcome set need not 6e /R but can 6e any connected topo/ogica/ space. Assume t/iaf
S contains no atoms. T/ien t/ie /blowing two statements are eouitiaient:
^ =^ is represented 6y a/unctiona/ V : J" —» ffi t/iat is additive, i.e., t/iere exist ,/unc-
tionais V^  de/ined on t/ie restrictions o/ acts to A sucn f/iat
/or eac/i/inite partition {Ai, . . . , An} o/S. For eac/i A, V^z) ^/or outcome/constant
act i j is continuous in x and eitner constant or strict/j/ increasino in x, and V
satis/ies pointwise monotonicity and simp/e-act denseness.
(^ ii^  =^ is a strict/y monotonic weaA: order t/iat satisfies pointwise monotonicity, simp/e-
continuity, t/ie existence-o/-certainty-eouit)a/ent condition, simp/e-act denseness, and
tne sure-t/iing princip/e.
T/ie uniqueness /or fij is t/ie same as in 77teorem 5.ii. 77ie modi^cafions o/ Oftserua-
tton 3.i5, except f6j, aiso /ioid true/or t/iis t/ieorem ('in (^ oj, /et any nonmaxima/ outcome
/3 p/ay t/ie noie o/ zero^. D
The similar adaptation of Theorem 3.12 is more easily formulated because pointwise
continuity can still be defined. The result refers to the order topology on the outcome set,
and additionally needs topological separability.
THEOREM 3.17 T/ieorem 5.J2 aiso noids true /or jenerai outcome sets uritn a connected
separaWe order topo/ooy. •
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Ordinal state independence is entailed by strict monotonicity and pointwise monotonic-
ity. It is argued in the main text that in the case of monetary outcomes there is little
interest in violations of ordinal state independence. This is different for general outcomes.
If outcomes are commodity bundles, for instance, then ordinal state dependence may be
economically meaningful (Kami 1993a, Section 4.2). The extension of the present repre-
sentation to that case, in a way that avoids the generality of Example 3.4, is a topic for
future research.
3.12 Appendix A: Proofs of Results in Sections 3.1-
3.6
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 3.3. A partition of S is esseniia/ if it contains at least three
nonnull events. Note that any refinement of an essential partition is again essential because
a partition of a nonnull event must itself contain at least one nonnull event. Obviously,
an essential partition exists because of nonatomicity. To any essential partition 7r =
{Ai,. . . , An}, we can apply Theorem 3.2 to obtain a continuous additive representation
E " = i ^ l ^ ^ E"=iK4,(*j)- For all essential partitions TT, we can set V£(0) = 0 for
all A; and $2>=i V^ J (1) = 1. (Dependence of n. on TT is not expressed in the notation.)
By considering, for any two essential partitions, the common refinement, it now follows
from the uniqueness result of Theorem 3.2 that the additive representations of different
essential partitions coincide on common domain. This also implies that, for each event A,
the function V£ is the same for every essential partition 7r: V^(z) is the value of il/» in
any (other) essential partition that contains A or a number of events Aj whose union is A.
Hence, we can drop the superscript 7r in V^ J and write V,». 5Z"=i *>*», *~* S"=i K4,(z>)
represents =^, first only for simple acts that are measurable with respect to a same essential
partition of S, next for all simple acts because for each pair of simple acts there is an
essential partition with respect to which both acts are measurable.
By Theorem 3.2, all functions V4 are continuous. Obviously, if A is null, then V,j
is constant. If A is nonnull, then strict monotonicity of =^ implies that V^ is strictly
increasing.
For the uniqueness result, it is obvious that any W as described can be substituted for
V. Next, it is assumed that W is additively decomposable as described and represents >.
By Wakker (1988), W and each iy^ are continuous. We can replace each V^ by Vx - V^(0)
and each W^ by W',j - VF (^O), that is, it can be assumed that VA(0) = 0 = VV^ (O) for each
50 CHAPTER 3. SAVAGE'S STATE SPACE
event A. We can divide each K4 by V(l) and each U^ by W(l), i.e., it can be assumed
that V(l) = 1 = W(l). It can be inferred from the proof that Wy, = V/i for all events A.
In particular, W = V. For completeness, explicit expressions are given for the parameters
<7 and T that result from the preceding operations and that imply additivity of r:
PROOF OF LEMMA 3.5. Additivity of V immediately implies the form described in
the lemma. We now assume the form in the lemma and derive additivity. In order to
do so, the definition of V^ is extended from the acts that are constant on A to arbitrary,
nonconstant, restrictions of simple acts to A. For any simple act / and event A, there
exist a partition {J3i,..., £„,} of A such that / is constant and is equal to, say, /,-, on each
Bj. Define Vx(/U) = E j l i ^B,(/»)- VA extends V; to nonconstant simple acts on A. •
PROOF OF LEMMA 3.8. First an immediate corollary of the representation in Propo-
sition 3.3 is noted.
COROLLARY 3.18 On F*, V and ^ satis/j/ pointmse monofomaiy. 7
Take any / € .F. Because all acts are bounded in this analysis, there exist outcomes x, y
such that x ^ /(s) ^ y for all states s. Note that there is no monotonicity assumption to
guarantee that x £= / ^ y. Instead, we derive these preferences from supnorm-continuity
in conjunction with strict monotonicity. It is well-known that F* is supnorm dense in F ,
and that we can find sequences of simple acts <^  and /i-* such that both sequences converge
in supnorm to / and g-'(s) ^ <7^(s) ^ / (s) > /i-'+^s) ^ /^'(s) for all states s. We can
"truncate" every <^  at the outcomes above x and every W at the outcomes below y, i.e.,
it can be assumed that x ^ < (^s) ^ ^ (s ) ^ 2/ for all states s. According to Corollary
3.18, x !^  <^  fc= /i-' > y for all j . As a consequence of supnorm-continuity, x !?= / > y
follows. Consequently, the sets {z € i7? : z =^ / } and {z € 2R : 2 =^  / } are nonempty.
They are closed by supnorm-continuity. Because of connectedness of iR, their intersection
must contain at least one element. (Because of strict monotonicity, the intersection can
contain at most one element.) The element in that intersection is the certainty equivalent
of/. D
LEMMA 3.19 V, rfe/ined a/fer Lemma 5.S, safas/ies supnorm-conlmutty.
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PROOF. Consider {/ € .F : V(/) ^ a} for some real a. It will be shown that the
set is closed. That is obvious if a is larger or smaller than any value in V(.F). In the
other case, there exists a constant act /i such that V(/z) = a because, by Lemma 3.8,
V(.F) = V(2R) and the latter is connected by continuity (Proposition 3.3). Now {/ € F :
V(/) ^ Q} = {/ € .F : / =^ / / } , which is closed because of continuity of ^ . Similarly,
{/ 6 .F : K(/) ^ Q} is closed. Continuity of V follows. . •
PROOF OF LEMMA 3.9. Pointwise monotonicity on .F* follows from Proposition 3.3.
Assume /(s) ^ <?(s) for all s, for two general (possibly nonsimple) acts /,<?. It is proved
that / )?= 3. Take a sequence a-* of simple acts converging pointwise from above to / such
that /(s) + 1/j ^ a^(s) ^ a^ ' ( s ) ^ /(s) for all s and j . Similarly, take a sequence fr> of
simple acts converging pointwise from below to g, i.e., 3(5) ^ fr*"*"'(s) ^  f (s) ^ g(s) — 1/j
for all s and j . We have a->(s) ^ fr'(s) for all states 5, therefore, because of pointwise
monotonicity on .F* as previously established, V(a^) ^ V(fr') for all j . Because of supnorm-
continuity, V(/) = lim V(a>) and V(s) = limV(fc'), therefore V(/) ^ V(ff). D
PROOF OF LEMMA 3.10. Assume that K4 is defined on the restrictions of all simple acts
to A (as V4* in Lemma 3.5). Thus, V is additive on .F'. Note that V(/) - V(0) =
E"=I(VA^(/>IJ) - V^(0^)) for all simple acts / and partitions {Aj , . . . , An}. Therefore,
we can define Wyi = V4 - VA(O^) for all events A and restrictions of simple acts to A, and
W = V — V(0) for all acts including the nonsimple ones. Then W inherits all the relevant
properties of V, in particular additivity on F*, and in addition W and all W'^ s assign 0 to
the act that is constant 0. The definition of W.a is extended to restrictions of nonsimple
acts by defining VV'^ (/^ ) = IV(/^O) for ail acts / . Note that this definition agrees with
the original one on .F*. It is shown that with these definitions, VT also satisfies additivity
for the nonsimple acts. Let / be an arbitrary nonsimple act, {A), . . . , An} an arbitrary
finite partition of S, and /•* a sequence of simple acts converging to / in supremurn norm.
Taking limits for j —> 00, and explaining the equalities later,
«=1 t = l 1=1
1=1 1=1
Here the first equality follows from supnorm-continuity of W, the second from additivity
of W on .F*, the third mainly from boundedness of acts, the fourth from the definition of
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W,4,, the fifth because /^ .O converges to /^,0 in supnorm (implied by convergence of / '
to / ) and W is supnorm-continuous, and the final equality by definition of W^,. Thus,
additivity of W has been established. Finally, additivity of V is established. We already
have V = W + V(0) for all acts and V^ = W* + V^(O^) for all simple acts. Define V,,
similarly for all nonsimple acts. Additivity of V now follows from additivity of W. Q
PROOF OF THEOREM 3.11. The implication (i) => (ii) is elementary (the sure-thing
principle follows from Observation 3.6). Next suppose (ii) holds; (i) is derived. Supnorm-
continuity of :$= implies simple-continuity because for each n the supnorm topology coin-
cides with the Euclidean topology on ZR". Therefore, the representation in Proposition 3.3
is obtained, with each V^(x) continuous in x. By Lemma 3.5, V is additive on F*. V is
extended to all of F as described after Lemma 3.8. It represents the preference relation, is
supnorm-continuous by Lemma 3.19, and is additive by Lemma 3.10. V^ is constant if A is
null and, because of strict monotonicity, V/i(x) is strictly increasing in outcomes/constant
acts x if A is nonnull. This proves the implication (ii) => (i). By Lemma 3.9, V in (i) satis-
fies pointwise monotonicity. If (ii) holds, then (i) holds with V pointwise monotonic, which
implies that =^ is pointwise monotonic. Continuity of V^(x) is ensured by Proposition 3.3
and its uniquiness result.
Finally, the uniqueness result is discussed, which is similar to the result of Propo-
sition 3.3, the main exception being that the functions V^ and W^ apply not only to
outcomes/constant acts on A but also to nonconstant restrictions of acts to A. The proof
is similar to the proof of the uniqueness result in Proposition 3.3. Note that, once the nor-
malized functional V and W agree on all simple acts, they also agree on the nonsimple
acts through their certainty equivalents. •
3.13 Appendix B: Proofs of Results in Section 3.7
PROOF OF THEOREM 3.12. For a countably additive measure, the integral of a positive
function over a nonnull set is positive. Further, if the integral of one function over every
nonnull set dominates the integral of a second function, then the first function dominates
the second almost everywhere. These two facts are applied on a number of occasions
without further mention.
We first assume Statement (i) and prove Statement (ii). Weak ordering is immediate
and the sure-thing principle follows from additivity of the representation, as in Observation
3.6. For strict monotonicity, assume that x > y and that A is not null. The latter implies,
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by the integral representation, that /j(i4) > 0 must hold. For each s € J4, £/J(X) > ^(j/)-
Because of countable additivity, /^ t/j(x)d/x-/^ £/,(y)d/i > 0. This implies that i ^ / >- t//*/
for all acts / , in particular those which are simple. Strict monotonicity holds. Finally, it
is well-known that continuity of a representing function implies the same continuity of =^.
Statement (ii) has been proved.
In the rest of this proof, Statement (ii) is assumed and (i) and the uniqueness results
are derived.
LEMMA 3.20 > satw/ies s«pnor7n continuity.
PROOF. If a sequence of acts converges to a limiting act in supnorm, then it also convergas
pointwise. The boundedness of all acts in this analysis and therefore of the limiting act in
particular, as well as the supnorm convergence of the sequence, imply that the sequence
is uniformly bounded. By pointwise continuity, the sequence of acts converges preference-
wise, which is what supnorm continuity requires. V
By the lemma, all conditions of Statement (ii) of Theorem 3.11 are satisfied. Thus
Statement (i) of that theorem is also satisfied, yielding the additive representation V.
LEMMA 3.21 V saiis/ies pointiwse continmtj/.
PROOF. Let / ' be uniformly bounded and converge to / pointwise. First assume, for
contradiction, that for a subsequence of the /•'s, the V value would always exceed V(/) + e
for a fixed positive e. Because of continuity, we can find a constant act i with V(/) <
V(z) < V(/) + e. Pointwise continuity of =^, and / ' :*= x for all /•* from the subsequence,
imply that / &= x, contradicting V(/) < V(x). Hence, no such subsequence can exist.
Similarly, no subsequence can exist for which the V value would always be below V(/) — e
for a fixed positive €. Hence, V(/ ') must converge to V(/) and V is pointwise continuous.
V
V is normalized by subtracting V^(0) from all functions V,», then dividing all those
functions by the positive scale factor K(l). In other words, it is assumed henceforth that
V^(0) = 0 for all events ^ and V(l) = 1. Define /x(i4) = V(U) for all A It was also
possible to take any other outcomes a > /?, and define an alternative //' by //' = ^°!)Iy(i?) •
The choice of a = 1 and /? = 0 was arbitrary.
LEMMA 3.22 For any ad / , /Xj(.4) = V(/ l^) (wi</i / U = /^0j is a
signed measure, /n porticti/ar, i^(A) = V(l^) is a countaMi/ additive measure
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PROOF, p^ is finitely additive because V is additive (hence, M/W = 0)- For countable
additivity, let (Aj)°i, be a sequence of disjoint events and let A be their union. Then
/l(_i" >t converges to / l ^ pointwise. The sequence is also uniformly bounded because /
is bounded. The V values of the sequence must converge, because of pointwise continuity
(Lemma 3.21). This means that £"=i M/(A)) converges to M/M). and countable additivity
holds. /* is a measure because pointwise monotonicity implies that it is noimegative. (Note
that also j«(S) = 1.) V
The following lemma immediately follows from strict monotonicity.
LEMMA 3.23 ^i(A) = 0 i/and on/y i/A is nu//. V
Because of this lemma, "null" event can equivalently refer to the preference definition
as well as to the measure /i. In the remainder of this proof, a.e. (almost everywhere) means
that a condition holds up to a null event.
We next turn to the most complicated part of the proof, the derivation of the state-
dependent utility £/„. On the basis of Lemma 3.23 and Observation 3.15(d), each ^ is
absolutely continuous with respect to p. According to the theorem of Radon-Nikodym, we
can define a density 5/, unique up to a null event, such that V^(/) = J^ 6/(s)d/x for all A.
First a brief preview of the proof. We will relate the definition of state-dependent utility
t/s(a) to the constant act a by defining C/j(a) = 6<>(s), for all 5,Q. It then remains to be
verified that also for the nonconstant acts / , 6/(s) = £/j(/(s)). That is, (5/ should satisfy
a kind of "separability" (~ sure-thing principle) in the sense that 6/(s) depends on / only
through /(s), and is independent of / on {s}*. That "state-wise" separability is ensured for
simple acts by the "event-wise" separability induced by the additive representation, as will
be demontrated in Lemma 3.25. An additional complication can arise for nonsimple acts.
This complication is illustrated in Example 3.24. Following the example, state-dependent
utilities are defined such that the complication is avoided. Only after that will the integral
representation be established, first for simple acts, then for general.
At this point an explanation of the previously mentioned complication is in order. Each
^/ is only defined a.e. Therefore, 6/ can be considered an equivalence class of functions
differing only on a null event. An appropriate representative from each such equivalence
class will have to be chosen with some care when nonsimple acts are involved.
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EXAMPLE 3.24
Assume that S = [0,1] and that £= maximizes expected value. For each real a a represen-
tative (5a (s) = Q has been chosen, with the only exception being that for each 0 ^ a ^ 1
we have 6Q(S) = 0 for S in the null event {a}. Then t/s(a) = 0 for a = s and the act
/(s) = s would be assigned the state-dependent expected utility value 0, even though / is
strictly preferred to the constant 0 act. Thus, state-dependent expected utility would not
represent preference. In addition, each [/, would not be strictly increasing. 7
For each real Q ^ /3 and each event A, /^<5a(s)d/z = V/i(a) ^ V (^/9) = /^ 6/j(s)<ip.,
hence
a 5s /? => M s ) ^ «/J(S) a-e. (3.7)
We first ensure that the implication in (3.7) holds everywhere. There are countably
many pairs of rational numbers, hence there is one null event (the union of countably many)
such that outside that event, (3.7) holds everywhere for all pairs of rational numbers. We
can therefore choose the <5pS for rational numbers p such that (3.7) holds everywhere for
the rational numbers. (E.g., we can redefine <5p(s) = />on the previously mentioned null
event.)
For each real number a, there is one null event (the union of countably many) such
that (3.7) holds outside the null event for all rational /?. Hence, we can choose each 6Q
such that (3.7) holds for all real a and rational /?. Similarly, we can let (3.7) hold for all
rational a and real /? as well. Given that for each real a > /3 we can find a rational number
between them, we conclude that (3.7) now holds everywhere for all real numbers a, /?.
For each s and outcome a, we define f/j(a) = £<>(*)• By (3.7) as just extended, this
function is nondecreasing in a for each s. We prove that the function is strictly increasing
a.e. by showing that a violation would translate into a violation of the same condition for
V,4 for a nonnull event A. V being nondecreasing is often used in the following reasonings.
To prove that (7^  is strictly increasing a.e., consider, for any rational p > p', J4 =
{s G S : £/,(p) = t/,(p')}- Then VU(p) = V^(p'), which implies that A must be null, V,,
being strictly increasing for each nonnull A. As there are only countably many pairs of
rational numbers p > p', C/j is strictly increasing in the rational numbers, hence in the real
numbers, a.e. We may assume that [/, is strictly increasing for all s.
LEMMA 3.25 I/g is simple, t/ien/or eac/i eueni A, V^(g) = J^
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P R O O F . For 5, A, there is a partition { A i , . . . , A,,} of A such that 3 I4 = £"=15j l / i j for
outcomes 3,. Now V (^s) = E^V^fo ) = £?=. L, M*)<^ = £?=, L, tf.(ft)<*/* =
X4 ^(ff)dA', which is what should be proved. V
Finally, consider a general act / . For each event A and simple act 5 that is pointwise
dominated by / ,
Because each (/, is strictly increasing and because of pointwise dominance, also
J^ [/s(<?(s))d/i. Reversed inequalities hold both for /^<5/(s)d/z and for
X» if 5 pointwise dominates / . Because of supnorm continuity of A/4, the upper
and lower bounds derived from pointwise dominating/dominated simple acts 3 are tight
and hence, for each event A, / „ t/j(/(s))d/x and J"^  (5/(s)d/x are bounded by the same upper
and lower bounds, i.e., they are identical. This implies that 6/(s) = t / j ( / (s ) ) a.e., that is,
«5/(s) = !/ ,(/(«)) can be chosen for all s, and V ( / ) = /,, C/,(/(s))d/x holds for all acts / .
Statement (i) has been proven.
Finally, the uniqueness results of the theorem are established. It is obvious that
(I/j)jgs,/* can be replaced by ({/*)„£$,/i* as described in the theorem. Let us now ex-
plain that no other substitutions are possible. Assume that (£/j)jgs and /i can be replaced
by (t/*)ags and /z*. Absolute continuity follows from the following lemma, which extends
Lemma 3.23 to general /i", not just the special ^ as constructed in this proof.
L E M M A 3.26 /J*(A) = 0 z /and onfy z/A is nui/.
P R O O F . If /i"(A) = 0 then A is null. Assume therefore that M * ( ^ ) > 0- It is shown that
A is nonnull. Take outcomes x > y. Because [/* must be strictly increasing for each s and
because of countable additivity, J^ {/,*(z)<2/i* > J^ {/'(y)d^* and A is nonnull. 7
Lemmas 3.23 and 3.26 imply that // and /** have the same null events and are, therefore,
absolutely continuous with respect to each other. Next we turn to the uniqueness result
regarding {/. Let 6 be the Radon-Nikodym density function of /i with respect to ^*. We
can replace /i* by /1 and divide I/* by 6(s), that is, it can be assumed that ^* = /z; note that
6 is zero only on a null set which can be ignored. The constant £/j(0) can be subtracted
from (/j(-) and the constant 67(0) from f/j*() for each s, i.e., it can be assumed that
t/ ,(0) = 0 = £/;(0) for all s. We can divide each £/, by the positive scale factor /^
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and each £/,' by the positive scale factor /^[/ ' ( l)d^, i.e., it can be assumed that these
positive scale factors are 1.
It suffices to show that t/j and {/* agree a.e. after the preceding modifications. Con-
sider, for any A such that both A and J4^ are nonnull, the two-dimensional set of acts
of the form i l ^ + y l ^ . Here, /^f/,(x)d/i + / ^ £/,(y)dji = VA(I) + Vx(y) provides an
additive and continuous representation of preference. Such a representation also results
with C/* instead of £/. Because the two representations have been renormalized to agree at
the constant 0 and 1 acts, they must agree by the common uniqueness results of additive
conjoint measurement (Karni &: Safra, 1998). Hence, the integrals of {/s and (/, over all
such events -4 agree. A similar conclusion holds for nonnull events A for which .4^ is null
(e.g., partition .4 into two nonnull events, etc.). It follows that f/^  and £7^* must coincide
a.e., which completes the proof of the theorem. D
The following lemma demonstrates that pointwise continuity is not overly restrictive
because continuity of each state-dependent utility implies pointwise continuity. Whether
the reversed implication holds, i.e., whether continuity of the functions t/j in Statement (i)
of Theorem 3.12 holds (after appropriate modification on null events), is an open question.
LEMMA 3.27 J?epZacing in ('•ii^  t/ie pointwise continuity o/t/ie inte^ra/ 6y continuity o/eacA
t/j imp/zes poiratiwse continuity o/ pre/enence (Wiic/i ts eouiwiZent to t/wt condition /or t/ie
inteora/J and, t/ius, a// o/ (%) and fit).
PROOF. Assume that i =^ /^(s) > y for all j and s and that /j(s) converges to /(s) for
all s. Then also £/*(/,(s)) converges to ^ ( / ( s ) ) for all s. £/,(x) and f/,(y) are integrable
upper and lower bounds, hence J^ l/,(/j-(s))d/i converges to /^ ^( / (s j jd / / by the dominated
convergence theorem of Lebesgue (Dunford &: Schwartz, 1958, Corollary I.III.6.1C). That
is, the representing integral satisfies a pointwise continuity condition that implies pointwise
continuity of £=. Q
3.14 Appendix C: Proof of Observation 3.15
(a) The proof of (ii) => (i) in Theorem 3.11 never used more of the sure-thing principle.
(b) This follows from the equality V^(/^) = V(/^0) - A; for the constant /c =
and from supnorm continuity of V.
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(c) With additivity of V only on F*, Statement (i) still implies Statement (ii), in par-
ticular because Statement (ii) requires the sure-thing principle only on F* (see (a)).
Statement (ii), in turn, implies all of Statement (i), in particular additivity of V
(mainly established in Lemma 3.10).
(d) Because of the sure-thing principle, the preference between 0,4/ and /1.4/ is the same
as the preference between 34O and /i^O. Because of boundedness of acts, we can
take outcomes x,y such that x ^ g(s) ^ y <*nd ^ ^ M^) ^  2/ for all s € A. Then
x^O =^ g^ O > 1/^ 0 and x^O =^ /i,tO =^ y^O, because of pointwise monotonicity. But
also X4O ~ y^O, because both acts are simple and therefore this indifference follows
from event A being null. It also follows that g^ O and /i^ O must be indifferent to
these two simple acts and hence to each other. This is likewise true of ,9,1/ and /1.4/,
because of the sure-thing principle.
(e) This follows from i^O >- y^O and the sure-thing principle.
(f) The proofs require no modifications for this result. (In particular, the proof of
Proposition 3.3 has been written so that it also applies to this case.)
(g) When the domain under consideration is a subset of F*, then the definition of the
various conditions such as the sure-thing principle are obviously restricted to the
domain under consideration. Note that, by (a) of Observation 3.15, the sure-thing
principle is only needed on F*. The proofs require no other modifications for this
case. D
3.15 Appendix D: Proof of Theorems 3.16 and 3.17
In this appendix, the proofs of the preceding results for connected topological outcome
spaces are presented.
PROOF OF THEOREM 3.16. The implication (i) => (ii) is straightforward, the existence
of certainty equivalents following from continuity and pointwise monotonicity of V, and
connectedness of the outcome set, as in the proof of Lemma 3.8 (x ^ = / =^ 1/ there follows
immediately from pointwise monotonicity of V). Next (ii) is assumed and (i) is derived.
This is demonstrated in a similar manner as the implication (ii) => (i) in Theorem 3.11
and goes through a number of steps.
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(STEP 1) Theorem 3.2 needs no modification. Note, however, that Debreu (1960) also
assumed topological separability of the outcome space. It was pointed out by Krantz et
al. (1971) that this assumption can be dropped (their proof was supplemented by Wakkcr,
1988) and by Wakker (1989b, Theorem III.6.6 and Remark A3.1)).
(STEP 2) In the case of Proposition 3.3 and the subsequent results, one difference is
that no natural 0 and 1 outcomes are given. The remedy is easy: take any outcomes
a X /?, then "normalize" V by setting V^(/?) = 0 for all ,4 and V(a) = 1. Subsequently, /?
plays the role of the 0-outcome, a the role of the l-outcome. Other than that, the results
in Section 3.5 need no modification.
(STEP 3) The result of Lemma 3.8 is now assumed explicitly, and Lemma 3.9 immedi-
ately follows from the similar assumption for preference.
(STEP 4) The proof of Lemma 3.10 requires a more elaborate revision, concerning
additivity of the functional W constructed there. We cannot invoke supnorm continuity
at this point, and instead must invoke simple-act denseness and the other assumptions.
Let / be a nonsimple act and {Ai, . . . , A,,} a partition of S. It is shown that W(/) =
5Zr=i W>4,(//»,)• Let 7 be a certainty equivalent of / . First, sequences a-', f of simple acts
are constructed such that (1) with VF the normalized version of V that satisfies W t^(/?) = 0
for all A and IV(Q) = 1, the result is
for all j , (2) / dominates each fr* pointwise, and (3) each a-* dominates / pointwise. The
construction of the a-'s is described in detail. If / is maximal, i.e., no act g is strictly
preferred to / (this case can occur for general connected topological outcome spaces),
then the certainty equivalent 7 of / must be a maximal outcome and we simply take each
a^  equal to 7. Note that this dominates / pointwise. If / is not maximal, then there exists
a strictly preferred act and the certainty equivalent thereof is also strictly preferred to /
and 7. Because of simple-continuity on .F* and connectedness, the W image of outcomes
is an interval. Hence, there must exist, for each j , a constant act tf which is between the
certainty equivalent strictly preferred to / , and 7, such that W(7) = W(/) < W(e') <
W(/) + 1/j. Now simple-act denseness is invoked, which implies the existence of a simple
act a> that dominates / pointwise and satisfies W(/) $ W(a>) s£ W V ) s£ W(/) + 1/j.
The acts fr' are constructed similarly. We have now achieved the same kind of enclosure
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of / between simple acts, from above and below, as under supnorm continuity for real
outcomes.
Taking limits for j —> oo, we get (explaining the equalities later)
establishing additivity of IV.
The first equality follows from the definition of the acts a-*, the second follows from
additivity of W on .F* (Lemma 3.5), the third is elementary because of boundedness, the
fourth follows from the definition of W^,, the fifth is explained later, and the sixth follows
from the definition of W ,^- For the fifth equality it is shown that lim_,_oc W(a-'^ ,y3) =
W(/,t,/3) for each i. This follows from the inequalities ^ J> W'(a^,/3) - W(/A, /9 ) ^ 0 for
all j , which is derived from the following inequalities, explained thereafter:
^ WV)
 V ) ( ) ^ ( * / ) ( V / ) ^ ( ^ , / ) ( / * , / ) ^ 0
J
for all j . First, note that all differences in the inequality are nonnegative because the
left act always dominates the right act pointwise. The first inequality follows from the
construction of the simple acts a-' and 6*, which both differ by less than r from / in IV
units. For the second inequality, we invoke the additive representation on .F* with respect
to the partition {Aj , . . . , A,,}. The term corresponding to event Ai is the same for the left-
and right-hand side, for all other events the terms for the left-hand side are nonnegative,
for the right-hand side they are 0. The third inequality follows because /^,/3 dominates
t'/t,/? pointwise. The fourth inequality follows because (a*^/?) dominates /^j/3 pointwise.
Thus, additivity of the functional W has been proven. Other than that, the proof needs
no adaptation.
(STEP 5) Next we turn to the completion of the proof of the implication (ii)=>(i) in
Theorem 3.16, by adapting the related proof in Theorem 3.11. Pointwise monotonicity
and simple-act densencss are equivalent for preferences and for V. Supnorm continuity is
not even defined now. This establishes the implication.
(STEP 6) The uniqueness results in Theorem 3.16 and the extensions provided in
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Observation 3.15 are proved in the same manner as in Theorem 3.11 (where again any
Q >- /? play the role of the outcomes 1 and 0). D
PROOF OF THEOREM 3.17. The implication (i) => (ii) is again straightforward, hence we
assume (ii) and derive (i). Pointwise continuity implies simple-continuity, hence we can
invoke Theorem 3.2 and Proposition 3.3. For the proof of the following lemma, it is crucial
that the outcome set is endowed with the order topology.
LEMMA 3.28 5i?7ip/e-ac< denseness /io/ds.
PROOF. Let y denote a countable dense subset of the outcome space; such a subset
exists because of topological separability. We may assume that it contains a maximal and
minimal outcome if such exist. For each act / we can construct dominating simple acts
a-* and dominated simple acts V', respectively, that converge to / pointwise, as follows.
Write V = {j/i, j/2i • • •}• Let zo € y satisfy zo fc= /(«) for all s. Such a zo exists because
/ is bounded and y contains a maximal outcome if such exists. Let {zi , . . . , z^} be a
reordering of {j/i,...,?/,} such that Zi > • • • ^ = z .^ Then a^  = J Z L o ^ ^ . where A, = {s€
5 : z, :>= /(s) >- z,+i} for alii ^ j - 1, Aj = {s€S : z., =^ / (s)}. Each a> dominates a>+'
pointwise and they all dominate / pointwise. They converge to / pointwise because for
each s and x V /(s), some j//t will come between i and /(*) implying i >- ?/* > c^(s) £= /(s)
for all j ^ /:. The fe's are denned similarly. Both sequences of simple acts are uniformly
bounded (the o-'s are bounded by zo and the lower bound of/) , hence pointwise convergence
implies preference-wise convergence due to pointwise continuity. That implies simple-act
denseness. V
The proof of Lemma 3.8 can now be adapted in a straightforward manner, using point-
wise continuity instead of supnorm continuity, and using Lemma 3.28. Thus, for every
act a certainty equivalent exists (possibly more). By pointwise continuity, the simple acts
that converge to an act pointwise also converge in preference. Hence, V (defined through
certainty equivalents as in the main text) inherits pointwise monotonicity for all acts from
pointwise monotonicity on the simple acts, i.e., Lemma 3.9 also holds. Now all conditions
in Statement (ii) of Theorem 3.16 hold, therefore Statement (i) there also holds. From this
point on, the proof of Theorem 3.12 from Lemma 3.21 onwards can be followed by fixing
any a >- /3 instead of 1 > 0, taking a countable dense subset y instead of the rational
numbers, and applying pointwise continuity instead of supnorm continuity. •
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3.16 Appendix E: Proof of Results in Section 3.8
PROOF OF THEOREM 3.13. If (i) holds, then for all Aj equal to 0, A_, is posterior-null. For
all positive Aj, the posterior preference relation conditional on Aj is represented by V^, i.e.,
it is identical to the prior preference relation conditional on A .^ Hence (i) implies (ii). Next
assume (ii). Assume that the posterior preference relation, satisfying all requirements of
Theorem 3.11, is represented by / i—• J3"_, W^^(/^J. We may assume that, for each event
A, ^ ( 0 ) = 0 and W,,(0) = 0. If Aj is posterior-null then U% = 0 and we set Aj = 0. Next
assume Aj is not posterior-null. In this case, the prior and posterior preference relation,
conditional on Aj, are the same. The crucial point in this proof is based on consideration
of this preference relation on its own, and applying Theorem 3.11 to it. Thus S' = Aj is
considered to be a state space. Note that it contains no atoms. The preference relation
satisfies all conditions in Theorem 3.11, and V,^  and H ^ are additive representations of it.
From the uniqueness result in Theorem 3.11 and the scaling 1^(0) = 0 and W^(0) = 0 for
all events A C Aj, it follows that there exists a positive factor A^  such that W^ = AjV^-O
PROOF OF THEOREM 3.14. Take any finite partition {Ai, . . . , An} containing at least two
nonnull events. Then the claim of the theorem, including expected utility representation,
holds for acts that are constant on each element of the partition, by Miyamoto & Wakker
(1996, Example l.c). If expected utility holds on every finite partition, then in the presence
of the other assumptions, it must hold for all acts (Wakker, 1993a, Corollary 2.14; Wakker's
assumption of truncation-continuity is vacuously satisfied in the present context where all
acts are bounded). D
Chapter 4
A Simple Axiomatization of
Rank-Dependent Utility and
Cumulative Prospect Theory with
Constant Proportional Risk Aversion
4.1 Introduction
This chapter provides a simple preference axiomatization of cumulative prospect theory
with a power utility function. Hopefully, this axiomatization will facilitate empirical in-
vestigations of cumulative prospect theory and, therefore, will make it better suited for
theoretical studies.
Prospect theory (Kahneman & Tversky 1979) was one of the first nonexpected utility
models and remains today the most-used model in empirical studies and applications. In
theoretical economic studies, however, prospect theory did not yet receive much attention,
possibly because it lacked a well-founded method for transforming probabilities. Such
a method was introduced by Quiggin (1981) in "rank-dependent utility." In theoretical
studies, rank-dependent utility is currently the most-used nonexpected utility model.
The empirical features of prospect theory and the theoretical advantages of rank-
"The results in this chapter were first formulated in Wakker &: Zank (1998b).
63
64 CHAPTER 4. A SIMPLE AX/OMATIZATION OF RDU AND CPT
dependent, utility were combined in cumulative prospect theory (Tversky & Kahneman
1992, Luce & Fishburn 1991, Starmer & Sugden 1989). The main feature added to rank-
dependent utility is a special role for a status quo outcome and thus a different treatment
of gains and losses. That different treatment, in particular loss aversion (losses weigh
more heavily than gains), is one of the main factors in human risk attitude. Much of the
empirically observed risk aversion is due to loss aversion. Throughout the last decades,
authors have emphasized the relevance of the status quo outcome in empirical decision
making (Markowitz 1952, Arrow 1953, Edwards 1954, Yaari 1965, Kahneman &: Tversky
1979, Luce & Fishburn 1991, Tversky & Kahneman 1991, Tversky & Kahneman 1992).
One of the main paradoxes in economics, the equity premium puzzle, has been explained
by loss aversion (Bateman et al. 1997, Gneezy & Potters 1997).
Two theoretical foundations of cumulative prospect theory, by means of preference ax-
ioms, have as yet been published (Tversky & Kahneman 1992, Wakker & Tversky 1993).
These axiomatizations are not easily accessible and hence cannot be easily used in experi-
mental investigations or theoretical studies. This chapter presents a considerably simplified
axiomatization. The simplification is achieved by the added assumption of power utility,
i.e., constant proportional risk aversion.' Constant proportional risk aversion has been
a useful tool in classical studies of risk (Tversky 1967, Keeney & Raiffa 1976, Wolf &
Pohlman 1983, Cass & Stiglitz 1972) and has served as a benchmark condition in many
empirical investigations (Cohn, Lewellen, Lease, & Schlarbaum 1975, Friend k Blume
1975, Binswanger 1981, Szpiro 1986, Levy 1994). It has also served as a useful tool in
modern nonexpected utility theories (Holthausen 1981, Hogarth & Einhorn 1990, Luce &
Fishburn 1991, Tversky &: Kahneman 1992, Kachelmeier & Shehata 1992, Luce, Mellers,
& Chang 1993, Benartzi & Thaler 1995, Tversky & Fox 1995, Wu & Gonzalez 1996, Fox
& Tversky 1996, Bernstein et al. 1997, Beetsma &; Schotman 1997, Donkers, Melenberg,
• &; van Soest 1998, Fennema & van Assen 1997, Thaler, Tversky, Kahneman, & Schwartz
1997, Safra <k Segal 1997). For applications to the measurement of inequality, see Atkinson
(1970), Sen (1973), Ben-Porath, Gilboa, & Schmeidler (1994, 1997), Chateauneuf (1996b),
and Safra & Segal (1997).
Tversky & Kahneman (1992) tested constant proportional risk aversion nonparamet-
rically, i.e., from binary preferences, and found it confirmed. The belonging power utility
family performed well in parametric tests. For example, it was preferred to other paramet-
ric families for its better fit and higher stability in (Camerer &: Ho 1994, footnote 22). Also
'Also known as constant relative risk aversion and first characterized by Pratt (1964).
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Fishburn & Kochenberger (1979), Krzysztofowicz & Koch (1989), and Chechile & Cooke
(1997) found that the power family fits best. Psychological explanations for the prevalence
of power perception functions have been provided by Stevens (1959) and by Fetherston-
haugh, Slovic, Johnson, & Friedrich (1997). Because of these findings, the power model
is generally assumed in parametric tests and provides the most-used nonexpected utility
form nowadays.
When outcomes are only gains (or only losses), then cumulative prospect theory natu-
rally reduces to rank-dependent utility. Thus, a characterization of rank-dependent utility
with power utility (Corollary 4.4) follows as a corollary of the main result of this chapter
(Theorem 4.2). It may seem surprising that the axiomatizations with constant propor-
tional risk aversion included are so much simpler than without it. Indeed, under the
common assumptions of weak ordering, continuity, and first stochastic dominance, the
natural "comonotonic" weakening of von Neumann-Morgenstern (1944) independence is
then sufficient to axiomatize cumulative prospect theory. The separation of utility and
decision weights thus comes by "free of charge," and does not need additional preference
conditions.
The preference axiomatizations for rank-dependent utility and cumulative prospect
theory, provided so far in the literature, did not incorporate constant proportional risk
aversion. They therefore had to invoke additional preference conditions, more complex
than comonotonic independence, to separate utilities from decision weights. Examples arc
Axiom 4 of Quiggin (1982), weak event commutativity (Chew 1989, Chew &; Karni 1994),
joint receipt (Luce & Fishburn 1991), comonotonic tradeoff consistency (Tversky & Kah-
neman 1992, Wakker & Tversky 1993, Wakker 1994), and weak multisymmetry (Nakamura
1990, 1992, see also Nakamura 1995, Axiom 5, and Gul 1992, Assumption 2). To date, one
axiomatization has succeeded in using only preference conditions that directly weaken von
Neumann-Morgenstern independence (Chateauneuf 1996). Its comonotonic mixture inde-
pendence axiom is still more complex than comonotonic independence. The special case
of rank-dependent utility with linear utility and a quadratic probability transformation
is characterized in Safra & Segal (1997, Theorem 3) by means of constant proportional
risk aversion plus constant absolute risk aversion and some other axioms. An interesting
aspect of that result is that it does not use the rank-ordering of outcomes as a primitive.
It is particularly remarkable that cumulative prospect theory, the sign-dependent gen-
eralization of rank-dependent utility, follows from the axioms presented here without re-
quiring any further preference condition to induce sign dependence. That is, the different
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treatment of gains and losses follows again "free of charge." The explanation for this nat-
ural fit of cumulative prospect theory and constant proportional risk aversion lies in the
special role of the status quo (zero) outcome in both.
It is remarkable that cumulative prospect theory, in spite of its empirical realism and
theoretical soundness, has not yet received much attention in the economics literature
(Wakker, 1998). By extending rank-dependent utility to incorporate loss aversion, which
is important for empirical realism and applications, and by simplifying cumulative prospect
theory so as to make it suited for theoretical analyses, increasing the interest of economists
in cumulative prospect theory is intended.
4.2 Definitions
The set of outcomes is ZR, the set of real numbers. A Zottery P = (pi, i i ; . . . ;?„ , !„) is a
finite probability distribution over the set of outcomes, assigning probability p., to outcome
i j , j = 1 , . . . , n. The probabilities Pj are nonnegative and sum to one. Lotteries are written
in a rank-ordered form, i.e., the above notation implicitly means that the outcomes are
rank-ordered (xi ^ • • • ^  £„).
Positive outcomes are gains and negative outcomes are fosses; the zero outcome is
the status guo. A lottery P can be decomposed into a gain-part P"*" and a Joss-part P" ,
where P"*" is the lottery P with all the negative outcomes replaced by 0 and P~ the lottery
with all positive outcomes replaced by 0. Luce & von Winterfeldt (1994) argued for the
psychological plausibility of the separation into a gain- and loss-part. Fishburn (1977) and
Holthausen (1981) interpreted P " as the risk part and P+ as the return part of the lottery,
using a "target outcome" in the role of status quo.
We assume a preference relation :>= over lotteries; the symbols >-, ~, =?! and -< are defined
as usual. V is a representing /unction or representation for > if V maps lotteries to the
reals such that P > Q <* ^ (P) ^ V'(Q). If a representing function exists then =^ is a u/eaA:
order, i.e., it is compete (P :>= Q or P =$ Q for all lotteries P, Q) and transitive.
Jfanifc-dependent utt/itt/ (fiDf/) holds if a representation exists of the form
n
C/(ij), (4.1)
explained next. [/, the uti/tty yiincfion. is a function from the outcomes to the reals. The
utility functions considered in this chapter will all be continuous and strictly increasing.
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The decision u;ei«//its axe defined as
where w is a profcaftito?/ trons/ormafion, i.e., it is strictly increasing from [0,1] to [0,1] and
satisfies io(0) = 0 and w(l) = 1. Continuity of u; is left optional in all theorems, hence is
not imposed in the definition.
Cumu/aiive prospect t/ieon/ (CPT) holds if the preference relation =^ can be represented
by a CPT functional, defined next. Consider a lottery P = (pi.zi;. • • iPn.^n) and let
z i ^ • • • ^ XAT ^ 0 > Zj t+ i ^ • • • > ! „ , ( 4 . 2 )
for some A; e {0,. . . ,n}. Then the CPT value of the lottery is again given by formula
(4.1), with the following modifications. [/ is again the utility function, but now
t/(0) = 0
is set. For the decision weights, we assume a probability transformation IO* for gains and
another one, UJ~, for losses. For j ^ fc (gains), ?TJ is defined as in rank-dependent utility
with respect to u;"*", i.e.,
7T, = lU+(pi + • • • + Pj) - W+(p, + • • • + P ; - l ) .
For j > A; (losses), 7TJ is derived from w" in a dual manner, i.e.,
"V = W~ (Pj + • • • + Pn) - ^"(Pj + 1 + • ' ' + Pn).
Thus, CPT can be written as the RDU value of the gain-part of the lottery with respect
to a probability transformation w+ plus a "dual," obviously negative, RDU value of its
loss-part with respect to a probability transformation w~. The latter is denned in a dual
manner by means of a "bottom-up" integration which would coincide with the regular
RDU value if the dual of u>~(p), defined by 1 — w~(l — p), were used instead of it>~.
Let us summarize. The CPT-formula is
*.-
)+ (4.3)
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Here
CPT(P) = CPT(P+) + CPT(F-) (4.4)
where both terms on the right-hand side are regular RDU forms.
In general expected utility models with ZR++ as outcome set, constant proportional
risk aversion can generate any utility function from the "log/power" family. In the present
model, however, utility must also be denned at zero, hence only the "positive power"
functions remain possible. A function £/ : ZR —* ZR is from the positive power /ami/?/ /or
(jains if
£/(x) = <r+ • z°, with <r+ > 0, a > 0, for all x ^ 0, (4.5)
and it is from the positive power /amity /or iosses if
t/(x) = - a " • |x|", with a" > 0, /? > 0, for all i ^ 0.
The scale factors <r+ and <r~ are positive so as to guarantee strict increasingness. We will
require {/(0) = 0, hence no location parameters have been added.
4.3 A Preference Characterization
The central property in this chapter is coiistant proportionai risfc aversion. It is imposed
when all outcomes are of the same sign and then requires invariance of preference with
respect to outcome-multiplication by a common positive factor. That is, for all positive
numbers /x,
( P l , Z i ; . . . ; P n , Z n ) * = ( P l , y i ; - - - ; P n , 3 / n ) = > ( P i , P " I l ! ••• I P n , J C l n ) * = ( P i , ^ ^ 1 1 ••• 5 P n , / ^ 2 / n )
whenever either all outcomes are gains or all outcomes are losses. Constant proportional
risk aversion is necessary for CPT with positive power utility, because then the CPT
functional is homogeneous of degree a for gain-lotteries and of degree /3 for loss-lotteries.
The next preference condition weakens von Neumann & Morgenstern independence
by bringing in a comonotonicity restriction. In fact, it weakens independence somewhat
further, by only considering maximal or minimal common outcomes. As a preparation, the
probabilistic mixing of lotteries is defined. Given two lotteries P = (pi, x i ; . . . ; Pn, in), Q =
(<7i, 2/i; • • •; 9m, S/m), and 7 € [0,1], the mixture 7 P + (1 - 7 ) ^ is the lottery*
•'For simplicity, we have not permuted the outcomes as would be required to maintain the rank-ordered
notation of lotteries.
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The preference relation satisfies to/ independence if for all lotteries P, <2, C, C and all
7 € (0,1) the following holds:
7P + ( 1 - 7 ) C * 7 Q + ( 1 - 7 ) C
« •
7 P + ( 1 - 7 ) C * 7Q+(1-7 )C ,
whenever either all outcomes in the lotteries C, C are above those of P, Q, or they are all
below. D
The condition, extended to nonsimple lotteries, was introduced by Green &: Jullien
(1988), who called it ordinal independence. Von Neumann & Morgenstern indepen-
dence is more restrictive because it, first, does not impose restrictions on the outcomes
of P, Q, C, C", and, second, it requires that the preferences should also agree with those
between the unmixed P and £?. Tail independence is implied by CPT, i.e., it is not af-
fected by rank and sign dependence. The proof is provided in the main text because it
may clarify the nature of the CPT form.
LEMMA 4.1 CPT imp/i&s £ai/ independence.
PROOF. We discuss the following formula for s = + and s = —, and with .s dropped. Note
that the s superscript and mixing are compatible, e.g., (7P+(1— 7)C)" = 7P* + (1 — 7)C*.
+ (1 - 7)C")
Both for s = + and for s = - , the outcomes of C* and C" are all rank-ordered above
those of P* and Q* or below, as they are without the superscript s. The above formula
holds true for s = + and s = - , CPT being an RDU form in both cases. (The (1 -7)C" and
(1 — 7)C" parts of the RDU values cancel in both differences.) By summation (Formula
4.4), the formula also holds true if the superscript s is dropped. That implies, in particular,
that the sign of the left-hand side is the same as of the right-hand side, from which tail
independence follows. D
=^ satisfies sioc/mstic dominance if (pi,xi;...;pn,z,,) >- (pi.yr,•• -;Pn,!/n) whenever
£j ^ 3/j for all j and Zj > y^  for at least one j with p^  > 0. On the domain of simple
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lotteries, the formulation used here, reminiscent of outcome monotonicity, is equivalent to
other common formulations in terms of distribution functions.
The continuity condition used here only relates to variations in outcomes and imposes
the common Euclidean continuity of ZR" on n-outcome lotteries, for all n. That is, =^
satisfies simp/e-contenuity if, for any lottery (pi .xj ; . . . ;pn,x,,), the sets
and
{( j / l . - - - , ! /n ) : (P l i ! / i ; - - - ;Pn , ! /n ) < (Pi, Zl! • • • IPn, *n)}
are closed subsets of iR". Continuity with respect to variation in probability is not required;
it will be characterized in Observation 4.3.
THEOREM 4.2 For t/ie pre/erence neZaiion > on t/ie se< o/ /otteries over ZR, t/ie /o//owin<7
two statements are
fij CPT no/ds, wit/i a positive power ufi/ity /or gains and a, possii/y dij^ ierent, positive
power uti/itt/ /or Zosses.
(lij T/ie pre/erence re/atton =^ satisfies t/ie /o//owinp conditions:
('i^ weai ordering,
^ stochastic dominance,
^5j simp/e continuity,
^ tai/ independence,
f5j constant proportional risA: aversion /or oains and /or /osses.
/ / (^ ij /io/(is t/ien t/ie proiafci/ity trans/ormations are uni^ue/j/ determined and utiiity is a
ratio scale, i. e., it is uniaue up to a positive scaie /actor. •
Let us next discuss uniqueness of utility in more detail and define loss aversion. Suppose
that the gains utility function is o^z" and the loss utility function is —<T~|I|^, for positive
ff+,0"-. We can freely multiply utility by a positive factor, which however must be the
same for gains and losses. Hence we could choose any utility /zo^x* for gains and — /icr~ |x|^
for losses. In particular, we can take // equal to l/<7+. Defining A = o^/a* we then get:
t/(x) = x° for gains;
1/(0) = 0;
f/(x) = -A|x|" for losses.
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The scaling of utility just described has been generally adopted in parametric studies
of CPT. It means setting £/(l) = 1 and scaling loss aversion as A = — C/( — l)/ t /( l) . The
scaling was used by Fishburn (1977) and Holthausen (1981) within the expected utility
framework and by Luce & Fishburn (1991, Equation 4) in their axiomatic derivation of
CPT. Empirical estimations have usually found high values of A ("loss aversion"), typically
exceeding 2. Tversky & Kahneman (1992) found A = 2.25; see also Holthausen (1981) and
the references therein, and Bernstein et al. (1997). These degrees of loss aversion have
been used in new explanations of the equity premium puzzle (Benartzi & Thaler 1995,
Thaler, Tversky, Kahneman, & Schwartz 1997, Gneezy & Potters 1997).
Next continuity of the probability transformations is characterized. > satisfies conti-
nuity in probabilities /or pains on ]0,1[ if, for all probabilities p and outcomes X > x > 0:
If (p, X; 1 - p, 0) V (1, i ) then there exists <j < p such that still (o, X; 1 - q, 0) >- (1, x),
(4.6)
and the same holds with the two preferences and the inequality reversed, i.e.,
If (p, X; 1 - p, 0) -< (l,x) then there exists <? > p such that still (g,X; 1 - g,0) -< (l,x).
(4.7)
£= satisfies continuity in pro&aftiftties /or pains at 1 if (4.6) holds for p = 1; =^ satisfies
continuity in pro&afti/ities /or pains at 0 if (4.7) holds for p = 0. Similar conditions can
be defined for losses instead of gains by assuming that X < x < 0 in (4.6) and (4.7) and
reversing the strict preferences. The next result is similar to Wakker (1994, Theorem 12)
for RDU.
OBSERVATION 4.3 Assume t/iat Statement fi,) tn T/ieorem ^.2 Zioids. 77ien continuity
conditions o/ tne pro6a6i/ity trans/ormattons apree wit/i t/ie re/ated continuity conditions o/
=^ in probability, unth ID* re/ated to pains pne/erence conditions and u;" to ioss pre/erence
conditions.
In the literature on decision under risk weak continuity is usually invoked, requiring
not only continuity in outcomes, as above, but also continuity in probability. There is,
however, empirical and theoretical interest in discontinuities of probability transformation
at 0 and 1 (Bell 1982, Cohen & Jaffray 1988, Prelec 1998).
Hence, the above more general result is presented. Next, the characterization of rank-
dependent utility is displayed as a corollary. The result is obtained by restricting the above
analysis to nonnegative outcomes.
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COROLLARY 4.4 For t/ie pTTe/erence ne/a<ion ^ on t/ie set o//ofteries over IR+, <Ae/o//ow-
mj tuio statements are e^wina/ent:
fi,) #.D£/ /io/ds, wtt/i a positive power uti/ity.
fitj > satis/ies t/ie /oMounno conditions:
fij weaA; orrferino,
(;2j stoc/iastic dominance,
^ simp/e continuity,
( ^ taii independence,
f5^ constant proportionai risfc aversion. D
4.4 Conclusion
Given the large impact of loss aversion on human decision making, the sign-dependent
generalization of rank-dependent utility, advanced by Tversky & Kahneman (1992) and
others, seems worthwhile. It has been used successfully in many empirical investigations,
but has not yet been studied extensively in theoretical analyses. The latter may be due
to its analytical complexity. The present chapter has presented a simplified analysis. It
is hoped that the simplification will make the model more accessible, and facilitate its
theoretical and empirical applications.
4.5 Appendix: Proofs to Chapter 4
First an auxiliary notation is introduced. For n € I7V and a probability tuple (pi, • • • ,Pn),
L(pi , . . . ,pn) denotes the set of all lotteries of the form (p i , i i ; . . . ;Pn,£n)- Recall that it
is implicitly understood in this notation that Xi ^ • • • ^  !„ and that the probabilities p,
axe nonnegative and sum to one.
LEMMA 4.5 For eacn/inite number o/sets Z/(<7},... ,<7nJ, • •., £(<?r\ • • • .<?£!„)> <«ere is one
set L(pi, . . . ,Pn) t/iat contains t/iem a//. In particu/ar, /or eac/i finite set o/lotteries, t/iere
is a set L(pi,. . . ,?„) t/iat contains t/iem aM.
PROOF. AS an example, L(l/2,1/2) and L(l/3,2/3) are contained in L(l/3,1/6,1/2). For
the general case, define the set of "cumulative probabilities," of = g^  -I h gf for all i, j ,
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take the set of all such ^ ' , and rank-order them from lowest to liighest. The differentials
between these levels of cumulative probabilities are the p_jS. O
PROOF OF THEOREM 4.2.First Statement (i) is assumed and (ii) is derived. Weak ordering
is immediate and stochastic dominance follows because both utility and the probability
transformations are strictly increasing. Simple continuity follows from continuity of utility.
Tail independence holds because of Lemina 4.1 and constant proportional risk aversion be-
cause of homogeneity of the CPT functional for gains and losses, (ii) has been established.
In the rest of this proof, Statement (ii) is assumed and Statement (i), as well as the
uniqueness results, are derived. In the first lemmas, up to Corollary 4.9, a CPT represen-
tation is derived on a fixed set L(pi, . . . ,£„)• This being a subset of the lottery domain,
the representation is, formally speaking, a restriction of a CPT representation. Similarly,
the probability transformation functions, only being defined on a finite number of prob-
abilities within the unit interval, are then restrictions of probability transformations. At
the end of the proof, the representation and the belonging functions are extended to the
whole domain.
LEMMA 4.6 WTienewer n ^ 3, and p i , . . . ,pn are positive, f/iere ezis< continuous strict/y
increasing /unctions Vi,. . . , K, suc/i t/ta< V (^0) = 0 /or a// j , ]C>=i ^ 0 ) = 1' <*"<*
n
(^) (4.8)
represents =^ on L(pi, . . . ,Pn). Tne V s^ are unigue/y determined.
PROOF. Define iRJ = {x e ZR" : x, ^ • • • ^ z,,}- It is identified with L(pi, . . . ,?„) in
the obvious manner. Thus the preference relation £= on Z,(pi,... ,p,.) induces one, denoted
by :>=', on 7R". £=' is a continous weak order that is monotonic, i.e., x >-' y whenever
Xj > yj for all j and x., > J/J for at least one jf. The latter follows from positiveness of the
probabilities and stochastic dominance.
Tail independence of =^ implies tai/ independence of £=', that is, if two elements of iR"
have the first i or the last j coordinates in common, then the preference between them
is independent of those common coordinates. To explain this, we compare the preference
between
( P l , Z i ; - - - ; P m , : C m ; P m + l , C m + i ; - - - ; P n , C n ) a n d ( p , , 7/i; . . . ; p™, y™; P m + l , Cm+l! . . . J P n . C n )
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with the preference between
(p i ,x i ; . . . ;pm,a:m;pm+i ,cJn+i ; . . . ;Pn,c 'n) and (pi , j / i ; . • • ;Pm,2/m;Pm+i,<4+i;• • ;Pn,c|,)-
Define Er - iP i = T .P=(^ . a : i ; - - - ; ^ -a :m) ,Q = (^,l/i;. ••;^.»m),E"=m+iP> = 1-7 ,
C = ( ^ , < W i ; . . . ; ^ , c » ) , and C = ( ^ , C + , ; . . . ; i ^ . c ' J . Then tail independence
of =^ implies that the two considered preferences are the same, i.e., tail independence holds
for *='.
Now the existence of the VJ functions follows from a generalization of Theorem 3.2
of Wakker (1993b) as described by Chateauneuf & Wakker (1993). The details of the
proof, unfortunately, have to combine several results from different papers and are de-
scribed briefly here. For n ^ 3 the condition "CI" of Wakker (1993b) (complete inde-
pendence of preferences from common coordinates, also called (con)joint independence or
strong separability or the sure-thing principle in the literature) has been weakened here
to tail independence. That additive representability, i.e., existence of functions V^  as in
the lemma, then still holds on the "'rank-ordered" set iR", follows from Corollary C.5
of Chateauneuf & Wakker (1993) and Gorman (1968): In Gorman's terminology, sepa-
rability of {1,. . . , i} and {i , . . . ,n} implies, within each box within .ZR", separability of
{ 1 , . . . , i — l , i + l , . . . , n } . This implies that every preference is independent of any single
common coordinate, i.e., Wakker's (1993b) CI holds within each box. This implies, by
Gorman (1968) or Debreu (1960), additive representability on each box within ZRJ, i.e.,
"local" additive representability. From that, global additive representability follows on our
rank-ordered domain by Theorem 2 and Chateauneuf & Wakker (1993, Lemma C.5), and
the absence of maximal and minimal elements.
The V^ s derived in the literature are usually unique up to a location and a common
scale. Our choices of their locations and scale uniquely determine the functions. V
LEMMA 4.7 For t/ie lotteries in L(pi,... ,Pn) wi£/i nonnegatoe outcomes, 2/ie representa-
tion in iemma .^6" is t/ie restriction 0/ a CPT/orm, urct/i (/ /rom </ie positive power/amity
and C/(0) = 0, £/(l) = 1. t/ is unique and so is t/ie ^restriction 0/ aj protafriiity trans/or-
maiton /unction «;"•" on its domain u>/iic/» consists 0/ a// ua/ues E>=i P>>' ~ *•> • • • > ™>
u>+ is s<r»ct/y increasing. . . . . - . .
PROOF. Let VI,.. . , K, be as in Lemma 4.6. We define =^' on 2R" as in the proof of Lemma
4.6 and restrict, attention to lotteries with nonnegative outcomes. If the representation
in Lemma 4.6 is a CPT form, then necessarily f/(/j) = E J L I ^ ( A O ^ *" nonnegative
/i. Hence we have to define £/ in that manner and derive CPT for that already uniquely
determined utility function. Note that t/(0) = 0 and 1/(1) = 1.
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Fix some 1 ^ ro < n. We restrict attention to n-tuples of nonnegative outcomes for
which the first m coordinates are identical, and so are the last n — m ones, and write
them as (ii.m^m+i.n) for xi,m ^ Zm+i,n ^ 0. =^' is represented on this two-dimensional
subset of n-tuples by Vi,™(zi,™) + Vm+i,n(:Em+i,n) where Vi.m(xi.m) = E^=i ^(*i,m) and
Vm+i,n(a:m+i,n) = 5I"=m+i ^(^m+i.n)- Because of constant proportional risk aversion, :?'
is invariant on this subset of lotteries under positive scalar-multiplication of outcomes.
Miyamoto & Wakker (1996, Theorem 2) consider only gains (> 0) and show that Vi,„, and
Vm+i,n are proportional when restricted to gains. Obviously, they also are proportional
when the zero outcome is included. Vi,™ and Kn+i,n must be proportional to their sum
Vi,m + Kn+i,n = £/, hence they are of the form
n+i,n = 7r^+!,„!/, (4.9)
for positive uniquely determined TTJ ^ and 7Tm+i,n that sum to one. Theorem 2 of Miyamoto
& Wakker (1996) also implies that for gains £/ is either from the positive power family, or
logarithmic, or from the negative power /amiiy; the latter is denned as in (4.5) but with
Q and <T negative. The logarithmic family and the negative power family are excluded
in our case because strict increasingness (or continuity) at zero would then imply that
yi,m(0) = —oo which is excluded because Vj,„,(()) = 0. We conclude that
£/ is a positive power function for nonnegative outcomes. (4-10)
Define 7Ti = 7Ti_i, TT^  = TTIJ — TTIJ_I for j = 2 , . . . ,n — 1, and fl^ = TT,,^  (= 1 —
7T] n-i). By definition, Vi_i = V] = TTI[/. Formula (4.9) now implies, inductively, that
V, = Vij - Vij_i = 7i\;£/ for j = 2 , . . . ,n - 1, and then also 1^  = 7r,£/ for j = n.
This and monotonicity imply that all TT,S are positive. They sum to one. We define
a (restriction of a) probability transformation function w* so as to properly transform
cumulative probabilities into cumulative decision weights; that is, u>"*"(5Zi=i P>) ~ S = i *"••
Note that •w"'" is strictly increasing on its domain.
It follows that the representation of Lemma 4.6 is the restriction of a CPT form with
respect to ID"*" and {/ on the set of lotteries in Z,(pi,... ,Pn) with nonnegative outcomes.
Uniqueness of [/ and the 7TJS was pointed out when they were defined. V
LEMMA 4.8 For i/ie /oiteries in L(pi, . . . ,p«) wi</i nonposiiive outcomes, t/ie repnesenio-
taon in lemma ^.6 is t/ie restriction o/ a CPT/orm, iwit/i [/ yrom </ie positive poiyer/ami/y
and (/(0) = 0. C/ is unigue and so is t/ie ('restriction o/ aj proftafei/ity trans/ormation
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/unction tu~ on its domain w/iicn corisists o/ </ie va/ues 5Z"=jPj,i = 1, . . . ,n; t/tere u>~ is
strict/y increasing.
PROOF. NOW we only consider lotteries with nonpositive outcomes. It can be demonstrated
by a reasoning, similar to the proof of Lemma 4.7, that the representation of Lemma 4.6
is again a restriction of a CPT form. To preserve the scaling convention £"=i Vj(l) =
1 = i/(l), we have no more liberty to choose the scale of utility for losses. It is uniquely
determined by f/(-l) = X™=i V^(-l) (which was defined as the loss aversion parameter A
in the main text). Other than that, the reasoning for nonnegative outcomes can entirely
be repeated. {/ is also a positive power function for losses, but may obviously have a
different exponent than for gains. The decision weights for losses are determined by iu~ (Pn),
W~(Pn + Pn-l) - W~(p,,), etc. V
COROLLARY 4.9 TVie representation in Lemma .^6" is (Wie restriction o/j a CPT repre-
sentation twt/i [/ /rom t/ie positive power/ami/y/or pains and a/so /or /osses, and C/(0) = 0
and [/(I) = 1. f/ is unique and so is t/ie ('restriction o/,) t/ie profcafci/itj/ trans/o77«ati<?n
/unction to* at t/ie va/ues 53>=i P> > * — 1, • • •, n aid UJ~ at tne «a/ues X!J=i P> > * = 1>•••i™-
PROOF. That the representation of Lemma 4.6 is a CPT form for nonnegative outcomes,
and also for nonpositive outcomes, was demonstrated in the preceding lemmas. Next
consider a "mixed" lottery P (one with both gain and loss outcomes). The additive
representation of Lemma 4.6 is a sum of its value at P+ and at P~. Hence the value of
the mixed lottery P is CPT(P+) + CPT(P"). By Formula (4.4), CPT follows. V
Next the CPT representation is extended to the set of all simple lotteries. The CPT
representations on two different sets of lotteries L(pi,. . . ,?„) and L(<h, •.. ,9m) coincide
in the sense that, the utility function £/ is the same for both sets and 10+ and u r agree on
common domain points: That follows from considering any set L( r j , . . . ,r«..) that contains
both sets of lotteries; the latter set always exists by Lemma 4.5. By considering all sets
£(Pi> • • • .Pn). w* and u;" are determined on the entire unit interval [0,1]. They are strictly
increasing by Lemmas 4.7 and 4.8.
We have now obtained one utility function [/, and probability transformation functions
ii'"*" and uT defined on the entire unit interval [0,1], such that for every pair of lotteries their
CPT value is determined. Every pair of lotteries is contained in some set L(pi,. . . ,Pn), on
this set CPT represents preference, hence CPT represents preference between every pair
of lotteries.
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We finally turn to uniqueness of the representation. For any other CPT representation
with t/*,io'*"*,«;~*, reconsideration of the above analysis shows that £/*(/z)/t/*(l) must
agree with £/, and next that the two probability transformations ID"*"* and w~* must agree
with to+ and w~. Conversely, for any positive T, £/ can be replaced by r t / . This completes
the proof of Theorem 4.2. D
PROOF OF OBSERVATION 4.3. The range of utility is an interval with 0 in its interior.
Hence the following facts follow from substitution and the fact that all probability trans-
formation functions are strictly increasing: Formula (4.6) implies that u>"*" cannot "jump
down" to the left of p, hence is left continuous at p. Formula (4.7) implies that w+ cannot
"jump up" to the right of p, hence is right continuous at p. Similar facts hold for u>~ and
losses. D
PROOF OF COROLLARY 4.4. This follows from restricting the proof of Theorem 4.2 to
nonnegative outcomes. In particular logarithmic and negative power utility is still excluded
because the zero outcome is present. If outcomes would have been restricted to ffi++,
utility could also have been logarithmic or a negative power. D

Chapter 5
Cumulative Prospect Theory for
Parametric and Multiattribute
Utilities
5.1 Introduction
Based on empirical grounds cumulative prospect theory (CPT) supports the distinction of
outcomes into gains and losses. The cumulative probabilities are transformed according
to this separation, and the utility function also reflects that distinction. Kahneman &
Tversky (1979) and Tversky & Kahneman (1992) proposed a utility function which is
concave for gains, convex for losses, and steeper for losses than for gains. From their
experiments, in which lotteries on monetary outcomes were valued, Tversky &: Kahneman
(1992) concluded that a two-sided power function is a good approximate for the utility
function. Different powers for gains than for losses were deduced.
The empirical analysis of Currim and Sarin (1989) confirms the properties of utility
and of the weighting functions in the cumulative prospect theory model. They fitted an
exponential form for utility, and found evidence for different decision weights for gains
than for losses. Smidts (1997) concluded from his data, that an exponential utility fits
better than a power utility. In a different experimental study Beetsma and Schotman
(1998) conclude that the exponential and the power utility perform equally well.
For decision under risk a complete axiomatization of cumulative prospect theory with
"The results in this chapter were first formulated in Zank (1998).
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a two-part power utility is presented in Wakker & Zank (1998b), (see also Chapter 4).
There, constant proportional risk aversion of the preference relation determines the nature
of utility, in the presence of the simple axioms: weak ordering, continuity, stochastic dom-
inance and tail independence, the latter being a weakening of the independence condition
of von Neumann & Morgenstern (1944).
However, as mentioned above, interest in a special form for utility is not limited to
constant proportional risk aversion. Linear /exponential, additive/multiplicative or mul-
tilinear utility families are also topic for many analytic studies (Currim & Sarin, 1989;
Smidts 1997; Beetsma & Schotman, 1998). Miyamoto & Wakker (1996) derived models
characterizing such families of utilities, assuming the additive representation for a pref-
erence relation on rank-ordered acts given beforehand. They point out that, when there
is interest in a specific form of utility, preference axioms need not immediately imply a
separation of probabilities and utilities in the representing function, but can be weakened
to imply only additive representability. Then, in the presence of constant proportional
(absolute) risk aversion or utility independence, probabilities and utilities can be identi-
fied. This feature will be captured in all our models. First additive representability is
established, and from that a cumulative prospect theory functional is derived.
Other parametric families of utilities, focusing on decreasing or increasing risk aver-
sion, were characterized by Farquhar & Nakamura (1987) and Bell (1988), the so called
"polynomial-exponential" utility functions, a family including the "sumex" utilities pre-
sented in Nakamura (1996). Saha (1993) proposed the "expo-power" utility, a form which
exhibits decreasing or increasing absolute risk aversion and decreasing or increasing pro-
portional risk aversion, depending on the values of the parameters involved. However, such
families will not be discussed here.
Tliis chapter deals with decision under uncertainty. For a finite set of states, we first
derive a CPT-model with linear or exponential utility. Here, the central property of the
preference relation is constant absolute risk aversion. This, in addition to weak ordering,
monotonicity, continuity and tail independence, constitutes necessary and sufficient, axioms
for the derivation of such a model.
Secondly, we concentrate on a CPT-model with utility as a power function, where
constant proportional risk averse preferences are considered.
Thirdly, for multiattribute outcomes, we focus on preferences satisfying mutual util-
ity independence or utility independence for attributes, deriving CPT-models with ad-
ditive/multiplicative or multilinear utility, respectively. Also here the additional axioms
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are weak ordering, monotonicity, continuity and tail independence, simple axioms, which
imply the existence of additive representing functions on rank-ordered sets.
Proofs are presented in the Appendix, except for Lemma 5.1.
5.2 Cumulative Prospect Theory with
Linear/Exponential or Power Utility
Throughout this chapter 5 = { l , . . . , n } , with n ^ 3, is a finite set of states, where exactly
one state is true and there is uncertainty about which is the true state; subsets of S are
events. An act / assigns to each state j € S an outcome / ( j ) , or /^ for short. In this
section the set of outcomes is the set of real numbers ZR, and thus, we view the set of
acts as the Cartesian product IR™. Positive outcomes are jains and negative outcomes
are /osses; they are separated by the zero outcome which is the stoius guo. Hence, an
act / consists of a gain-part /"*" and a loss-part / " , where /"*" is the act / with ail losses
replaced by the status quo, and / " i s the act / with all gains replaced by the status quo.
Sometimes we identify the constant act ( i , . . . , z) € 2R" with the outcome x € ZR.
An act / is ranfc-ordered if its outcomes are ordered as follows: /i ^ • • • ^ /„. For
each act there exists a permutation p of {1,.. . ,n} such that /,,(]) ^ • • • ^ /*>(TI)> i-e. the
outcomes are ranfc-ordered wit/i respect to p. For each permutation p of {1 , . . . ,n} the set
ZR" consists of those acts which are rank-ordered according to p. For example, if p = id
(i.e. p(i) = i for all i), then Z7?£, is the set of rank-ordered acts.
On the set of acts we assume a preference relation denoted by !?=. The symbols =^, >-
, ~, =<:, x, are denned in the usual way, i.e. / X o means [/ =^ o and not p ! > / ] , / > - p
means [/ > o and p > / ] , / =^  P means # > / , and / -< <? means p ^  /•
V is a nepresentznp /unction or representation for =^ if V assigns to each act a real value
such that / =^ <? <=> V(/) ^ ^(p). If such a representing function exists then > is a weaA
order, i.e. =^ is complete (/ £= g or # > / for all acts / , p) and transitive.
One of the best known representations is suftjectiiie eapected ufziiii/ (SEU). It holds
whenever the representing function has the following form:
The subjective probabilities p*, for t = 1 , . . . , n are uniquely determined; they are nonnega-
tive and their sum equals 1. The uti/ity function [/ maps from the set of outcomes into the
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reals. In this chapter we consider only continuous and strictly increasing utility functions.
In the above formula f/ is canfina/, i.e. unique up to a positive linear transformation. SEU
received much attention for several decades. The first complete axiomatic characterization
of SEU was provided by Savage (1954), and many after him formulated preference condi-
tions describing SEU (e.g. Anscombe & Aumann 1963, Wakker 1984, 1989, d 'Aspremont
& Gevers 1990, Gul 1992).
C/iogue< ei?>ec(ai uttttty (CEU) holds if the representing function has the following
form:
(/i /.)^^'W*1)- ^
1=1
Here, outcomes arc first rank-ordered and then they are valued by the representing func-
tion. £/ is again cardinal. The 7r,,j, for j = 1 , . . . , n are decision iuei<;/its defined as follows
. . ,p(i - 1)}),
where i/ : 2* -» [0,1] is a capacity, i.e. i/(0) = 0, J>(S) = 1 and i^(A(JB) ^ J/(A) for all
events A. £?. Under CEU the capacity is unique. Consequently, the decision weights are
uniquely determined, they are normegative and sum to one for each permutation p.
Capacities are nonadditive extensions of probability measures, thus, whenever i/ in
(5.1) is additive, CEU reduces to SEU above. CEU was introduced by Schmeidler (1989)
for decision under uncertainty (see also Gilboa 1987, Wakker 1989, Nakamura 1990, Chew
& Kami 1994).
In this chapter we focus on cumulative p7t>spec< i/ieon/ (CPT). The representing CPT-
function is defined next. Let / be an act such that for some A; € {0, . . . , n} and p we
have
0
where fc = 0 means that all outcomes are negative and A; = n means that all outcomes are
nonnegative. The CPT-function has the following form
(/i /„) - £
1=1
n
+ E *«• •
>=*+i
Here the continuous strictly increasing utility function f/ is required to satisfy [7(0) = 0,
and is a ra<»o scoie, i.e. £/ is unique up to multiplication by a positive real number. For
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the decision weights we have different uniquely determined capacities: i/+ for gains and
i/~ for losses. They are denned as follows. For i ^ /c (the gain-part of / ) we have similarly
to CEU
For j > fc (the loss-part of / ) we have
The CPT-value in (5.2) can be viewed as the sum of two CEU-values. The first sum is
the CEU-value of the gain-part /+ with respect to the capacity i/+, and the second sum is
the CEU-value of the loss-part / " with respect, to the dual of i/~ (recall that here t/(0) = 0).
The CEU-form for losses coincides with the original CEU-form, when in the definition of
the decision weights ^~({p(j), • • • ,p(^)}) is replaced by 1 - i/~(S\{p(l),. . . ,p(j - 1)}).
Moreover, we can write
CPT(/) = CPT(/+) + CPT( / - ) ,
in agreement with Tversky &: Kahneman (1992). Aggregating these two values results in
the final "worth" of the act. This feature is also exhibited in the proofs (see Appendix).
First CPT will be established for gains and then CPT for losses is derived. Then, both
parts merge into the general CPT-function.
In this section first preference axioms are formulated such that the utility function in
(5.2) becomes an increasing "linear/exponential" function. A function £/ : i7? —> IR is from
the incneasmg imear/exponenhai /ami/j/ for gains (losses) if one of the following holds for
all i ^ 0 (i ^ 0):
fij £/(x) = Q • x, with a > 0,
(ii,) £/(x) = a • e** + T, with a • A > 0 and T € IR.
Under CPT utility satisfies 1/(0) = 0. Therefore, in (i) we dropped the location pa-
rameter, and in (ii) the only possibility for the location parameter is r = —a. In the
above definition only the form of utility is described. Clearly the parameters a, /?, A can
be different for gains than for losses.
The central property for a preference relation ;>= to identify utility as a linear/exponential
function is constant absolute risfc aversion for gains and for losses. For gains (losses) it is
defined as follows
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whenever for all i = 1, . . . , n the outcomes / , , / , + £,ft,ft + e are gains (losses).
Before formulating the next preference condition some notation is introduced. For an
event / C 5 and / , ft € ZR" by /t// we denote the act which results from / by replacing /,
with /ii for each state i € /; for states we write ft,-/ instead of /i{j}/- We can now introduce
the independence property for =^.
DEFINITION The preference relation =^ on ZR" satisfies tat/ independence if the fol-
lowing holds:
whenever / = (p(l) , . . . , p(m)} or / = {p(/),... ,p(n)} for some m,/ € S, and all acts in
question are from the same set ZR£.
Tail independence requires that the preference between two acts is independent of
common outcomes if, first, the acts are rank-ordered with respect to the same permutation,
and second, if after rank-ordering those acts have their common outcomes placed in the first
m or last (r» - / + 1) consecutive states. Thus, tail independence not only restricts the sure
tiling principle of Savage (1954) to comonotonic acts (called comonotonic independence in
Chew &: Wakker, 1996), but in addition it further restricts comonotonic independence to
hold for states in which common outcomes are best or worst. Cumulative prospect theory
satisfies tail independence as is shown in the next lemma. In order to clarify the nature
of CPT the proof is added into the main text.
LEMMA 5.1 CPTimp/ies tat/ independence.
PROOF: Under CPT we have
/ H « CPT(/+) + CPT(/") ^ CPT(g+) + CPT(<T),
for all ac ts / , 3 € ZR".
Let / , 3 € ZR" for some permutation p of the states. The following is implied by the
above equivalence
1=1 i=fc+l «=1 i=lt+l
Assuming now that /,<; have common best outcomes, i.e. for some m € 5 we have
/*><•) = 3P<«) for all i = 1 , . . . . m, we conclude that the inequality is independent of the
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first m summands. Hence, for i € / := { 1 , . . . ,m}, we can replace /p(i)>#/>(«) by arbitrary
common outcomes /i^j without affecting this inequality. Therefore, we can choose /ip(t),
such that /ip(/)/,/ip(/)ff € iRp, implying
Because p and m arc arbitrarily chosen, independence of common best outcomes holds.
Similarly we can show that independence holds for common worst outcomes, which then
implies tail independence of :?=, and thus completes the proof. •
The preference relation :>= on iR™ satisfies monotonicity if / >- <? whenever /i ^ <?j for
all states i with a strict inequality for at least one state.
The continuity condition defined here is with respect to the Euclidean topology on ZR":
> satisfies contmmfy if for any act / the sets {a € ZR"|<7 =^ / } and {<? € •#?"!<? =$ / } are
closed subsets of iR".
THEOREM 5.2 Assume n ^ 3. For o pne/erence Tieiotion =^ on iR" i/ie /o//oi«n(/ too
statements are eyuiva/ent:
(^ CPJ" /io/ds, wi(/i a continuous strict/?/ increasing /mea7'/ezponentia/ uti/ity and posi-
tive decision
(^ ii^ ) T/ie pre/erenee re/aiion satis^es t/ie /oWowing conditions: u;eafc ordering, monotomc-
itu, continuity, tai/ independence, a7id constant absolute ris/c aversion /or oains and
/or Josses.
/ / (i,) ftoids traen t/ie capacities are uniguefy determined and t/ie uti/ity /unction is a ratio
scale. D
Next, we concentrate on the CPT-model with "power" utility. It is the most-used
nonexpected utility form nowadays. For references see Wakker and Zank (1998b), (or
Chapter 4). They provided an axiomatization of CPT with power utility for decision
under risk. Here an extension of their results to decision under uncertainty is given.
A function (7 : ZR —> iR is from the positive power /amity for gains if
l/(i) = Q+ • z**, with Q+, A+ > 0, for all z Si 0,
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and it is from the positive power /ami/j/ for losses if
t/(x) = - a " • |z|*~, with a~,A~ > 0, for all a: ^ 0.
Recall that under CPT we require strict increasingness and (7(0) = 0 for the utility
function. Hence, in the above definitions all parameters are positive and no location para-
meter is added.
The property of > which determines power utility is constant proportional risfc aversion
for gains and for losses. For gains (losses) it is defined as follows
( / i , • • - , / « ) > ( f f i , - - - , f l n ) = > ( £ - / i , - - - , e - / n ) * = ( £ • S i , • • • . £ • » ! • ) »
for all £ > 0 whenever all outcomes are gains (losses).
THEOREM 5.3 Assume n ^ 3. For a pre/erence re/ation ^ on iR" </ie /o/Zou>ino iwo
statements are e</tiit;a/ent:
^ CPT /io/ds, wit/i a positive power uti/ity /or gains and /or /osses, and positive decision
u>eia/its.
i^iy The pre/erence re/ation satis/ies t/ie /o//owin<? cozidiiions: weaA: orderiTi ,^ monotonic-
ity, continuity, tai/ independence, and constant proportional risfc aversion /or pains
and /or /osses.
/ / (jj /io/ds t/ien t/ie capacities are unique^/ determined, and t/ie uti/zty /unciio7j is a ratio
scaie. D
5.3 Cumulative Prospect Theory with Multilinear
and with Additive/Multiplicative Utility
Recall that in this chapter we consider a finite set of states, S = { 1 , . . . ,n} for a natural
number n ^ 3, where exactly one state is true and there is uncertainty about which is the
true state. An act / assigns to each state j an outcome / j . In this section we denote the
set of outcomes by X, and .V is the product of a finite number of nondegenerate intervals
Jf i , . . . ,Xr, r ^ 2, called attribute sets. An outcome x € X can be written as a tuple
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i = (a:',... ,£*•) with attribute x' e Xj. Again we can view the set of acts as the product
X". Sometimes we identify the constant act (x, . . . , x) € X" with the outcome x € X.
For simplicity, we assume that each attribute X( contains the zero value in its interior.
Therefore, X contains the zero outcome, which is the status <?uo. Actually any other
outcome in X can play the role of the status quo. However, by rescaling the values in each
attribute set we can ensure that the zero outcome becomes the status quo. Moreover, for
money, zero as status quo is widely accepted in empirical work (see Kahneman & Tversky,
1979).
On the set of acts X" we assume a preference relation denoted by >. The restriction
of =^ to the constant acts (and therefore to X) is also denoted by =^. Gains and losses are
now denned not only with respect to the status quo, but also depend on the preference
relation =^ on X. Outcomes x >- 0 are ^om.s and outcomes x -< 0 are /osses. Note that
here gains and losses can contain both positive and negative attributes. Therefore, the
"aggregated worth" of an outcome among its r attributes indicates if the outcome is a gain
or a loss or is indifferent to the status quo.
Rank-ordering is also defined with respect to the preference relation :?= on X: an act
/ = (/i. • • •. /n) is ranfc-ordered if /i *= • • • ^  /„. Similar to Section 5.2 we denote by X"
the set of acts that are rank-ordered according to p, where p is a permutation of the states
{ l , . . . , n } .
Weak ordering, continuity and tail-independence are defined analogously to Section 5.2.
The preference relation =^ on X" satisfies ou<co7»e-monotonicity if for all acts / , 3 € X",
/i > & for all states i implies / =^ 3, with a strict preference if for a state j we have
/ , >- <7j. The preference relation > on X" satisfies attrifmte-monotonicity if for all outcomes
x, ?/ € X, [x / y and x' ^ y' for all i = 1 , . . . , r] implies x >- y.
For a subset T of {1 , . . . ,r} and outcomes z,x € X we define z^x as the outcome
with attribute z' for £ € T and x' for t € 7*, where T* := { 1 , . . . , r} \7 \ We denote by
XT a /actor, which is defined as Xr := {Xj|< € T}. Instead of X{j} we use Xi. In this
section the central property is utility independence for factors restricted to rank-ordered
sets, defined next:
DEFINITION Let T C { l , . . . , r } . The factor X T is u<i/ift/ independent /or pains
(/osses) if
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holds, whenever all acts in question are contained in X£ for some />, and all outcomes are
gains (losses). n
This property determines the following family of utility functions ( Theorem 5.4). A
function (/ : X —• IR is multilinear if there exist functions [/( : Xt —• IR for t = 1, . . . ,r
and constants oV e JR for all T C {1 , . . . , r} such that £ / (x \ . . . .x^) = £ r c { i r} $r •
Utility independence is a central tool in Keeney & Raiffa's (1976) multiattribute utility
theory. We define the property not only according to the separation into gains and losses
but also restrict it to rank-ordered acts.
THEOREM 5.4 Assume n ^ 3. For a pre/erence relation :>= on X" the /ollowing two
statements are equivalent:
(ty CPT Ziolds, unt/i a continuous multilinear utility, strictly increasing in eac/i attribute,
and wit/i positive decision
(lij T/ie pre/erence relation satis/ies tne /olloiwny conditions: toeafc ordering, outcome-
monotonicity, attriftute-monotonicity, continuity, tail independence, and /or eac/i
/actor X|, t = 1 , . . . , r, utility independence /or gains and /or losses.
jy (ij nolds t/ien tne capacities arc um<?-ue/y determined and t/ie utility /unction is a ratio
scale. D
Mutual utility independence holds for gains (losses) whenever XT- is utility independent
for gains (losses) for all T C { l , . . . , r } . This property characterizes additive and/or
multiplicative utilities (Theorem 5.5). A function C/ : X —» iR is additive if l/(x*,... jX )^ =
£!=i tt(s') and ^ multiplicative if I7(x\ . . . ,x') = f ] ^ , f/t(i'). where f/< : X, — ZR for all
t = 1, . . . , r. A function is additive/multiplicative if it is either additive or multiplicative.
THEOREM 5.5 Assume n ^ 3. For a pre/erence relation £= on X" t/ie /olloiving two
statements are equivalent:
(t^  CPT Ziolds, unt/i a continuous additive/multiplicative utility, strictly increasing in
eacn attribute, and unt/i positive decision weights.
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Tne pne/crcnce reia&on saiis/jes tfse /oiloitfing conditions: u/eafc ondering, ou(come-
monotoniciiy, afirifeiiie-monoioniciiy, continuity, £ai/ independence, and mutua/ u£ii-
% independence /or ^aww and /or iosses.
7f fij holds f/ien ffte capacities are imiguefy dete77rwned and t/te utiiiiy /u^iction is u ratio
sca/e. D
The above theorem identifies the conditions that are needed for the existence of an
additive or multiplicative utility function £/. Conditions that distinguishes the additive
and the multiplicative representation were formulated by Miyamoto (1988), Miyamoto &
Wakker (1996) for acts from a two attribute set, and was extended in Bleichrodt & Quiggin
(1997) for acts from finite attribute sets. All these conditions are strengthenings of utility
independence for factors and are satisfied if and only if the additive utility form applies.
This is shown in Miyamoto (1988), Miyamoto & Wakker (1996) and Bleichrodt & Quiggin
(1997) for two-state spaces. Such a condition can be adapted here for any finite number
states for the distinction of additive and multiplicative utility representations. However,
this point is not elaborated here.
5.4 Appendix: Proofs to Chapter 5
PROOF OF THEOREM 5.2. First, Statement (i) is assumed, and Statement (ii) is con-
cluded: CPT holds for =^ on iR" with continuous increasing linear/exponential utility.
Weak ordering is immediate from the existence of the representing CPT-function for =^.
Monotonicity holds because utility is increasing and the decision weights are positive. Con-
tinuity of utility implies continuity of :?=. Tail independence holds by Lemma 5.1. Finally,
constant absolute risk aversion for gains and losses is implied by the nature of the utility
function. This completes the proof of Statement (ii).
Next, Statement (ii) is assumed, and Statement (i) is derived. The proof consists of
several intermediate results. First, it is shown that on the set of rank-ordered acts 2R£, the
preference relation is represented by the additive function described in Lemma 5.6. Then
(Lemma 5.7), it is shown that the additive function in Lemma 5.6, when restricted to rank-
ordered acts with nonnegative outcomes, agrees with the restriction of a CEU-function,
where utility is linear/exponential and the decision weights are positive. Similarly, in
Lemma 5.8 it is shown that the additive function of Lemma 5.6, when restricted to rank-
ordered acts with nonpositive outcomes, agrees with a CEU-restriction, where utility is
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linear/exponential and the decision weights are positive. In Lemma 5.7 similar results
are derived for > on IRJJ, for each permutation p of the states. Then, it is shown that
the different restrictions fit together into a general function, such that on IR" (the set of
acts with nonnegative outcomes) and on IR!!. (the set of acts with nonpositive outcomes)
Choquet expected utility holds, and thus on IR" CPT holds for =^. We complete the proof
of Statement (i) by deriving uniqueness results .
LEMMA 5.6 T/ie pTie/erence relation =^ on IR"j is nepnesented 6j/ t/ie additive /unction
wit/i continuous strictZy increasing /unctions Vi, . . . , VJ, : IR —» IR, w/iic/i are uniyue/u
determined satis/j/inp Vj(O) = 0 /or a// j and ^Z"_i V -^(l) = 1.
PROOF. The proof follows immediately from Lemma 7 in Wakker & Zank (1998b),
(see also Lemma 4.6). There, the statement is formulated for a preference relation on
a set of simple lotteries (i.e. finite probability distributions over IR) with rank-ordered
outcomes. However, they fix a finite probability distribution, such that only outcomes can
vary, which results in a set isomorphic to IR",,. Then our statement results. 7
LEMMA 5.7 Cm t/ie set o/runfc-ordered acts witA nonnegaiive outcomes i/ie representation
o/ Lemma 5.6 agrees wit/i t/ie /of/owing /unction
n
+ : ( / , , . . . , / „ ) ~ £ ir^. • I/*(/,), (5.3)
w/iere C/jd is a strict/u increasing /inear/eiponentia/ utiftty /unction, satis/j/inp t4j(0) = 0
and t/ij(l) = 1, and f/ie decision weisats 7r^, /or j = 1, . . . ,n, are a/Z positive. [/tiZitj/
and t/ie decision weig/its are unigueZy determined.
PROOF. We have given the preference relation =^ on IR"j, which is represented by the
function £^"_, V^  with the V}'s as described in Lemma 5.6. Moreover > satisfies constant
absolute risk aversion on IRIJ.+^, i.e. the set of rank-ordered acts with positive outcomes.
We define t/,d(x) = JZ"_, V>(x) for all nonnegative i . Therefore, by Lemma 5.6 £/„*
becomes unique satisfying t/id(O) = 0, {/^(l) = 1.
Let us fix some 1 ^ i < n. We restrict our analysis to acts with identical outcomes for
the first i states and for the last n — i states, i.e. to acts / with / , = i for j = 1 , . . . , i
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and /j = j / for j = i + 1,.. . ,n, for outcomes I , J / with i ^ y ^ 0. We denote these
acts by (x,?/)i. On this two-dimensional subset the preference relation is represented by
(i, j/)i >-<• Z,-(z) + W^(y), with Z, := ^ = i Vj and W, := E"=.+i Vr Constant absolute risk
aversion for gains implies that =^ on this subset is invariant w.r.t. addition of a common
constant to all outcomes (whenever the resulting acts remain in this subset). Considering
only gains (y > 0), Miyamoto & Wakker (1996, Theorem 1) show that Z, and Wi are
proportional, which obviously remains valid when the zero outcome is included. Moreover,
Z< and Wi are proportional to their sum, which is £/«;. Therefore, by Miyamoto & Wakker,
they are of the form Z; = TT^ , • t/^ and W< = TTJV, • C/^ , for positive uniquely determined
""ZiiTWii which sum to one. Further, Miyamoto & Wakker concluded that the utility
function [4* is from the increasing linear/exponential family for gains. This analysis holds
for any fixed 1 < i < n.
We define now TT+ , := TT^ , , TT+^ := TT .^ - TT^_, for j = 2 , . . . , n - 1, and TT,^  „ := TT^_, .
Monotonicity implies that all the TT^'S are positive. By their definition they are uniquely
determined and sum to one. Then, we can compute Vi = Zi = 7r^ j • t/,j, and inductively
1/ = Z, - Z,-_, = 7T+, • t/a for j = 2 , . . . , n - 1, and K = H^_, = ir+ „ • (/„.
Finally, from this analysis, we conclude that on .K" ^ the representation of Lemma 5.6
agrees with the function in (5.3). This concludes the proof of Lemma 5.7. 7
LEMMA 5.8 On £/ie se< o/ ranfc-oniened acts wii/i nonposiiive outcomes </ie representaton
o/ Lemma 5.6 agrees OT£/I t/te /oi/owiny /uncfion
n
- , • !/*(£), (5.4)
w/iere f/^  is a sthcWj/ increasing /inear/exponeniia/ uti/i<j/ ywnc<ion, sa<i5/j/inj t/jj(O) = 0,
and i/ie decision wei^/iis ^id j> /<"" j = 1; •••,"> «"£ <^ ^ positive. Wiii<y and i/ie decision
are umgue/j/ determined.
PROOF. The proof is similar to the one of Lemma 5.7. We can view the "problem"
{5,7R2,a, &=, E"=i VI-(-)} as an equivalent problem {S", 2RJ^, > ' , - £ ] . „ V,(-(-))}. Now
5 ' := {n, . . . , 1}, an act ( / i , . . . , /„) € iTT^ corresponds to an act ( - / „ , . . . , - / 0 6 ZR^  ^ ,
and the preference relation =^* is defined as follows:
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Therefore £=* is a continuous monotonic weak order satisfying tail independence and con-
stant absolute risk aversion for gains. Moreover, !?=* is represented by
with the VJ's as described in Lemma 5.6. It can now be demonstrated, following the lines
in the proof of Lemma 5.7, that similar results as in Lemma 5.7 hold here. Reformulation
in terms of the problem {5, ZR" ,^ , fc=, £"=i Vi(")} gives exactly the statement of Lemma
5.8. This completes the proof. V
LEMMA 5.9 For eac/j ^e7rrm<a<ion p o/ { l , . . . , n} t/ie pre/erence re/ation fc= on ZRJJ is
represented 6j/ an addi<iue /unction
wit/i continuous 5trict/i/ increasing /unctions V/ \ . . . , Vjf : ZR —• ZR, w/iich are uni^ue/t/
determined sa<ts/j/zns V/(0) = 0 /or a/Z j ana" XZ"=i ^"(1) = 1- TAe additoe
described a6ove agrees on 2R"_p tw</j </ie /o//owin<; /unction
and on IR" u«t/i </ie /unction
^ (5.6)
T/ie uitiity /wnction L^ is /rom t/ie increasing /inear/eayonentiai /ami/y /or 6ot/i gains
and /osses, satis/ying (/p(0) = 0 and t/p(l) = 1, and t/ie decision weig/its TT^, 7r~^ , /or
j = 1, . . . ,n, are a// positive. £/<iii<3/ and tAe decision weig/iis are unigue/j/ determined.
PROOF. Take any permutation p o f { l , . . . , n } . The preference relation =^ on iR^ is a
continuous monotonic weak order, satisfying tail independence and constant absolute risk
aversion for gains and for losses. The proofs of Lemma 5.6, 5.7 and 5.8 can be adapted,
considering instead of S the "reordered" set of states Sp := {p~'(l) , . . . , p~'(n)}. V
We have now obtained representations for =^ on each set iR", which, on 2R+ ^ and -ff?!^ p
agree with restrictions of CEU-functions as described in Lemma 5.9. The next step in the
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proof of Theorem 5.2 is to show that the different functions have identical utility. We show
this only for gains. A similar result can be proved for losses.
Let p be a permutation of the states { 1 , . . . , n}, such that the set iR" ^  f| iR" ,^  contains
nonconstant acts. Then, C£[ /^ and CEt/^j jointly represent the preference relation )j= on
the intersection iR^pD #£!.,«*• However, any additive representation of > on iR",pH
7R^.jj, because cardinal (see for instance Chateauneuf &: Wakker, 1993), becomes unique
by fixing scale and location. Moreover, by reasonings similar to Lemma 5.9, uniquely
determined utility and decision weights can be derived for such a representation. Thus,
the representation for =^ on ZR^P) iR" ,^, with unique utility and decision weights, is a
restriction of both the representation for £= on ZR" ^ and the representation for fc= on iR" , j .
Consequently, the utilities for both extensions are identical and we conclude that [/,, = [7^
on iR, whenever iR" ^ p| iR" ^ contains nonconstant acts.
Now let p be a permutation of { 1 , . . . , n}, such that the set iR"p |"| ^+,id contains
only constant acts. Then, using the fact that n ^ 3, one can easily construct a sequence
of permutations P1.P2.P3 of the states such that all sets iR" ^  f]-^".p, --^".p, D-^+.pj.
iR!}. ^  P| iR+^3, ^ R+,p3 Pi ^+,id contain nonconstant acts. Hence, by the analysis before,
we conclude that the utilities for C.EC/* and CEC/^ j are identical.
Therefore, we conclude that the different functions derived in Lemma 5.9, have the
same utility function £/, and hence assign the same value to constant acts, i.e. the acts
which are commonly contained in all sets iR£. Using this result, the following holds:
LEMMA 5.10 For eac/i act / € iR" or iR" </iere eiists a certainty e i^m;a/en<, i.e. a
constant act x/ twt/t / ~ 1/.
PROOF, (only for the case / € iR!J.) Take any act / 6 iR^,p- Let z be the maximal and
2/ the minimal outcome of / . Monotonicity of > implies z fc= / fc= y. Thus, the following
equivalence holds
and, by continuity of (/, there exists x/ e iR+, with CEl/^( /) = t/(x/). By monotonicity,
£/ is unique. Hence, the constant act 1/ is indifferent to / . V
Now we show the existence of a representing CEU-function for =^ on ZR!J.. Take any
acts / , o € iR^. Let be / € iR",p,5 € iR",,,- and CEt/+,CEt/^ the representations for
£= on iR+,p, iR+y, respectively, derived in Lemma 5.9. Then, by Lemma 5.10 we have
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/ ^ 9 <^> / > Zj «. CEf/+(/) ^ CEt/+(ij). Further, because utility is the same for
all CEU-forms, it follows that CE£//(x,) = t/(x,) = C E t / ^ ( i J = C££/^(s). Thus, we
conclude
By setting / = 3, this implies that CEi/+ agrees with CEf/^ on common domain, i.e. on
27£J. P| iR" p,. Thus, they can be considered restrictions of one function. Because / and
3 were arbitrary, we conclude the existence of a general function, denoted CEf/"*", which
represents £= on iR", and agrees with CEL^" on iR" ^ for any permutation p of the states.
Recall that the act 1/0 assigns outcome 1 to the states in / and outcome 0 elsewhere.
Now define i/+(/) := CEt/+(l/0) for all / C {1 , . . . ,n}. Obviously, 1/+ is a capacity on 5.
Moreover the following holds
< ; = " X I ) , • • • ,/>0')) - "+(P(1). • • • -PO - 1)).
for j = 1, . . . , n and any permutations p of the states. Because the decision weights are
uniquely determined, by the above definition the capacity j/+ is unique.
Let us summarize: The preference relation !?= on iR" is represented by the function
C^t/"'' which is a Choquet expected utility function as described in (5.1). Further the
utility function (/ is uniquely determined from the increasing linear/exponential family for
gains, satisfying 1/(0) = 0,£/(l) = 1, and the capacity iA on 5 generates positive decision
weights.
Similarly, for the preference relation =^ on /R™, we can derive representability by a
Choquet expected utility function, now denoted CEC/~. The utility function [/ is from
the increasing linear/exponential for losses, it is again unique and satisfies f/(0) = 0. The
capacity J/~, now defined by ^"(/) := CEC/~(-l/0)/C/(-l) for all / C {1 , . . . ,n} is again
unique, and it generates positive decision weights. Moreover the following holds for i/~
w + 1), • • • >P(«)),
for j = 1, . . . . n and any permutations p of the states.
Now let / be an act containing both gains and losses. Suppose / € ZRJJ for a permu-
tation p of {1, . . . ,n}. There exists a fc 6 {1, . . . ,n} with
0 > /p(lt+l) ^ • • • ^ /p(n)-
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Then, with /+ the gain part of / , / " the loss part of / , and the V f^'s from Lemma 5.9,
the following holds
which, by the results above, is equivalent to
Therefore, the additive representations for =^ on iR^ described in Lemma 5.9 can be con-
sidered as restrictions of a common function, defined by / >-» CEf/"•"(/"*•) + CE(/~(/~).
Obviously, this function represents the preference relation :?= on the entire set of acts iR",
and it is a CPT-function as described in (5.2), with a increasing linear/exponential utility
function for gains and for losses f/, which satisfies t/(0) = 0 and [/(I) = 1. Utility and the
capacities »/"•",«/~ are uniquely determined by the analysis made separately for gains and
for losses.
Note that in the derivation of the representation above we have always fixed scale
and location. Let now [/',/i+,/i~ describe a CPT-function representing £= on ZR", with
£/*(0) = 0. Thus, only location is fixed for £/' but not scale. Then, also f/V^*(l).M*.M~
describes a CPT-function representing > on ZR". Consequently, by the results before,
[/•/[/•(I) = £/, and /i+ = " \ M ~ = "~ follows. Further, if I/,i/+,i>- describe a CPT-
representation for :?= on ZR", then also 7 • (/, i>+, i/~ describe a CPT-representation for =^
on ZR" for any positive 7. This shows that (7 is a ratio scale, and that the capacities are
uniquely determined. Moreover all generated decision weights are positive. Thus the proof
of Statement (ii) is complete.
Hence, we have completed the proof of Theorem 5.2. D
PROOF OF THEOREM 5.3. That Statement (i) implies (ii) is immediate. The proof
of (i) from (ii) is analogous to that in the proof of Theorem 5.2. The difference is that
for the preference relation here constant absolute risk aversion is replaced by constant
proportional risk aversion. In Lemma 5.6 this is not yet relevant, therefore Lemma 5.6
holds here. Constant absolute risk aversion was relevant in Lemma 5.7. Considering
constant proportional risk aversion instead, Lemma 5.7 remains valid if we replace "J7^ is
a strictly increasing linear/exponential utility function" by "(/^ is from the positive power
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family". Then, in the proof we have to use Theorem 2 of Miyamoto &: Wakker (1996)
instead of their Theorem 1. Other than that, the proof can entirely be adapted with a
positive power utility [/^ instead of a linear exponential one.
Similarly, the Lemmas 5.8 and 5.9 remain valid with power utility instead of lin-
ear/exponential utility. Moreover, the analysis following the proof of Lemma 5.9 can
entirely be repeated here, concluding Statement (i) in Theorem 5.3. This completes the
proof. D
PROOF OF THEOREM 5.4. Statement (i) is assumed, and we conclude Statement (ii).
Suppose that CPT holds for > on X", with a continuous multilinear utility, strictly increas-
ing in each attribute, and with positive decision weights. Weak ordering of =^ is immediate
from the existence of the representing CPT-function for >. Outcome-monotonicity holds
because the decision weights are positive. Attribute-monotonicity follows because utility is
strictly increasing in each attribute, and because the decision weights are positive. Conti-
nuity of utility implies continuity of =^. Tail independence is given by Lemma 5.1. Finally,
on each set X^ utility independence for each factor Xj, t = 1 , . . . , r, for gains and losses is
implied by the nature of the utility function. This completes the proof of Statement (ii).
Now we prove that Statement (ii) implies Statement (i). The proof hereof mainly
follows the lines indicated in the proof of Statement (i) from (ii) of Theorem 5.2. I point
out differences here, and whenever possible I refer to that proof.
The first difference consists in the existence of "extreme acts". An outcome i € A' is
t7iaximai if for no other outcome y € X, we have y > - i , and i is minima/ if for no other
outcome y £ X, we have y -< x. An act assigning to each state a maximal outcome or to
each state a minimal outcome is an er^ Tieme act. Wakker (1993b) pointed out difficulties
for additive representability on rank-ordered sets, in the presence of extreme acts. They
had to be excluded in order to derive additive representability. Under proportionality
of the functions in the additive representation on the set of nonminimal and nonmaximal
outcomes, as will be derived here, extensions to extreme acts were possible (see Proposition
3.5 in Wakker, 1993b).
LEMMA 5.11 T/ie pre/enence re/afion > on X,^\{extreme acts} is represented 6y </ie ad-
ditive /unction
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continuous /unctaons Vj, . . . , V,, : X —» JR, w/iic^ preserve </ie ordering o/ outcomes,
are umgue/y determined satis/yini? Vj-(O) = 0 /or a// j and 5Z"=i ^(*") ~ 1 A"" some
/ized w >- 0.
PROOF. The proof follows by similar reasonings to those used in the proof of Lemma 7
of Wakker & Zaiik (1998b), (see also Lemma 4.6). There it is described how tail indepen-
dence implies, first locally then globally, the additivity axioms required in Chateauneuf &:
Wakker (1993). Then by Corollary C.5 of Chateauneuf & Wakker additive representability
follows. V
For z € X and £ = 1 , . . . , r we define the sets
*,,+ (*) := {*' € X,|x« > z*} and *,,_(*) := {x* € X,|z' ^ z'}.
Now take 2 G int(X), i.e. the interior of X, with 2 ~ 0. We restrict our analysis to
rank-ordered acts from X"(2)\{extreme acts}, where AV(z) := pfi,+ (z)] x • • • x [Xr,+ (z)].
Note that by attribute monotonicity the outcomes in X+(z) are all gains except for 2,
which by its choice is indifferent to the status quo.
LEMMA 5.12 On Me se< X" ,j(2)\{extreme acts} Me representation 0/Lemma 5.ii agrees
t/ie /o//ownp /unction
C M / ^ : ( / „ . . . , / „ ) - ^ < , , , • ^ ( / , ) , (5.7)
7 = 1
/,^  is a mu/ti/mear utiiiiy /unction, preserving t/ie ordering on A', and increasing in
eac/i attribute. {/£, satis^es f/^,(r) = 0, and t/ie decision tuei^/its TTJ ^  ^ /or j = 1 , . . . , n are
aiZ positive, f/ti/ity and t/ie decision u/eio/its are unigue/w determined.
PROOF. We have given the preference relation > on X" ^(2)\{extrcmc acts}, which is
represented by the function 53"=i VJ with the Vj's as described in Lemma 5.11. Moreover
%= satisfies attribute monotonicity and for each attribute set Xj+(z) utility independence
for gains on X^^(z)\{extreme acts}.
We define t/?,(z) = E"=i^;(^) for all 1 € X+(2). Therefore, by Lemma 5.11, C/£
becomes unique and satisfies t/?,(2) = 0.
Now the reasonings are similar to those in the proof of Lemma 5.7. Instead of 1 ^ y ^ 0
we have a; =^ y ^ 2, instead of Theorem 1 of Miyamoto & Wakker (1996) we use Theorem
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5, and monotonicity is replaced by outcome-monotonicity. Except for these changes the
proof of Lemma 5.7 can entirely be repeated here.
We conclude that on X" ,<,(z)\{extreme acts} the representation of Lemma 5.11 agrees
with the function in (5.7). This concludes the proof of Lemma 5.12. V
Let now z, z G int(X) with £ ~ z ~ 0 be any distinct outcomes. (Such outcomes exist
because r ^ 2, and because on X the preference relation ^ is a continuous weak order,
satisfying attribute-monotonicity.) Then, the outcome y, denned by j / ' := max{z',z'} for
all t = 1, . . . , r, is contained in int(X), and by attribute monotonicity satisfies y >- 0.
A similar analysis as in the proof of Lemma 5.12 can be made here, such that we can
conclude that on X" ^(y)\{extreme acts} the additive function in Lemma 5.11 agrees with
^ : (/i,..-,/,) - £ T£J., • W J ) , (5-8)
with uniquely determined multilinear utility function C/^ , increasing in each attribute, and
positive decision weights w ^ ^ for j = 1,. . . ,n.
Now, both X"^(£) and X"^(z) contain X"^(y) , and the latter contains an open
subset where C££/^^ and C£t /^ j both represent the same preference. By the uniqueness
of the function in (5.8), we conclude that the utilities and the decision weights in C E £ / ^
and CEf/^j are identical, i.e. t/^ = t/^ and w ^ ^ = ""id,),, for all j = 1, . . . ,n. Moreover,
because z and z were arbitrarily chosen from int(X), we conclude that the function in
(5.7) is independent of z, and thus we can suppress the index z in (5.7).
Recall, that we restricted the above analysis to z e int(X) such that z ~ 0. Doing
so, the outcomes where [/id is not yet denned are boundary outcomes (gains or outcomes
indifferent to the status quo) of X. But for these boundary outcomes, viewed as constant
acts, the function 5Zj=i ^j ^ defined (except for the extreme acts), and thus, we can
continuously extend t/,d to those outcomes by C/^  := 5Z"_j V,-, preserving multilinearity.
In Lemma 5.11 we excluded the extreme acts. However, later in the analysis, we
concluded that the V/s in Lemma 5.11 are proportional. Then, by Proposition 3.5 of
Wakker (1993b), we can extend 5Z>=i ^ > *° the extreme acts which are gains, and thus,
C/jd to the entire set X+, which is defined to be the union of the set of gains and the set of
outcomes indifferent, to the status quo. Finally we conclude the following:
LEMMA 5.13 On t/ie set X " ^ £Ae pre/eraice re/otion > is repn&senied 6y t/ie /oi/ouhni?
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(5.9)
tufcere 14J is a ??iulfi?mea?^  aftfeft/ ^jncton. preserving ffte orricnn^ on X+, an«E increasing
in ascA ottriimte; £/«t saiis/ies £4/(0) = 0, £4*{ttO = 1; tfte decision loei^ Ais TT^ are positive
/or o/i j = 1 , . . . , n. Mi/t£$? amf ifee decision weig/ite are «nsg«eiy deferminai. V
A similar analysis as the one following the proof of Lemma 5.11 can be made for acts
from X" ^, where X_ is the union of the set of losses and the set of outcomes indifferent
to the status quo, concluding the following:
LEMMA 5.14 OR £/ie se£ A'*^ ZAe pre/erence relation =^ is represented % tne
lu/iere i/jj is a muZhZinear uhZi^ /unction, preserving Me ordering on X_, and increasing
in eac/i attriiuie; C4* satis^es ^id(O) = 0; </ie decision weig/iis 7r^^ are positive /or a/Z
j = 1,. . . ,n. {/ti/iij/ and t/«e decision weig/its are uni^ ueZj/ determined. V
Now the rest of the proof of Statement (i) follows the line of the proof of Statement
(i) in Theorem 5.2. The reasonings are similar, and therefore, we briefly indicate the next
steps.
First, for each permutation p of the states, on the set X" ^ (X" )^ we can derive
representability of fc= by a function CEC/* (CEt/^") similar to the one in (5.9) where
utility is fixed 0 at 0 € X and 1 at ID € X. Secondly, we can show that the functions
C££/+ (CEf/p") are restrictions of a general CEU-function C£[/+ (CEt/") , with unique
multilinear utility and unique capacity, representing =^ on A"" (X"). Third, we can derive
CPT for =^ on X". Finally, we can prove the uniqueness results.
This completes the proof of Theorem 5.4. •
PROOF OF THEOREM 5.5. That Statement (i) implies (ii) is immediate. The proof of
(i) from (ii) is analogous to that in the proof of Theorem 5.4. The difference is that for
the preference relation utility independence for attribute sets is replaced by mutual utility
independence. In Lemma 5.11 this is not yet relevant, therefore Lemma 5.11 holds here.
Utility independence for attribute sets was relevant in Lemma 5.12. Considering mutual
utility independence instead, Lemma 5.12 remains valid if we replace "£/^ is a multilinear
100 CHAPTER 5. CPT FOR PARAMETRIC AJVD MULTIATTRIBUTE UTILITY
utility function" by "t/,^ is additive/multiplicative utility function". Then in the proof
we have to use Theorem 4 of Miyamoto & Wakker (1996) instead of their Theorem 5.
Other than that, the proof can entirely be adapted with a additive/multiplicative utility
£/*, instead of a multilinear one.
Similarly, Lemma 5.13 remains valid with additive/multiplicative utility instead of
multilinear utility. Further, the analysis following the proof of Lemma 5.13 can entirely
be repeated here, concluding Statement (i) in Theorem 5.5. This completes the proof. •
Chapter 6
A Class of Methods for Evaluating
Multiattribute Utilities for Health
States
6.1 Introduction
In an empirical study that was conducted among hearing impaired individuals numerical
information regarding their health, or rather, hearing states was collected. These hearing
states were composed of levels ('bad', 'reasonable' or "good") of five different attributes
(ability to listen to the news on the radio, to follow a conversation at a party, and the
like). After some numerical operations a collection of numbers between zero and one for all
(3^ = 243) health states was obtained. The number zero corresponds to the state where
all attributes are at their minimal level, and the number one to the combination of all
attributes at the maximal level.
In this situation one question that arises is the following: What is the corUriftixteon of
each of the (3 • 5 = 15) levels to reaching the perfect, maximal hearing state?
An answer to this question, i.e. a method to evaluate such contributions, can be of great
practical value. It tells us on which level of which attribute we should concentrate a possible
medical intervention program if we wish to achieve maximal perceived improvement in a
person's health (i.e. hearing) state, given a limited financial budget. To be more specific,
suppose such a method results in numerical values for the contributions of the different
"The results in this chapter were first formulated in Peters &: Zank (1999).
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attribute levels to health improvement, over a population of hearing impaired persons.
Suppose moreover that data on the costs of specific interventions are available. Then one
may be able to calculate the most cost effective improvement, and direct the intervention
program to that improvement. But even if such detailed cost data are not available or
very specific interventions not feasible, then numerical values for the contributions of the
attribute levels that make up the individual health states, can still support medical decision
making in a qualitative way.
The class of methods that will be developed in this chapter may in fact be applied to
a wide range of multiattribute numerical data. Therefore, an abstract notation is used
to describe situations, states, attributes and levels. However, sometimes health states are
used to illustrate the concepts and assumptions.
Important inspiration comes from some concepts and results in the theory of coopera-
tive games. In particular, from the work of Dubey (1975) and Einy (1988) because they
(also) restrict attention to classes of simple and/or monotonic games; and from Weber
(1988) for the study of the concept of marginalism in Section 4 below. More detailed
references will be given at the appropriate places. This work is also formally related to
the work on multichoice games (Hsiao and Raghavan, 1993, and Faigle and Kern, 1992),
and the methods developed in this chapter could be applied to such games as well.
In Section 6.2 of this chapter the main concepts that play a role in the sequel, are in-
troduced. The class of contribution methods that is considered is characterized in Section
6.3. This means that a justification is provided on the basis of more elementary assump-
tions. These assumptions implicitly entail the idea of marptna/ contributions, a point that
is elaborated in Section 6.4. In Section 6.5, one specific method, the so called egalitarian
valuation, is studied in detail. Section 6.6 concludes the main part of the chapter. In the
Appendix all mathematical proofs are collected.
6.2 Main Concepts
Throughout the collection of attributes AT = {1,2,. . . ,n} and the collection of /eweis A/ =
{0,1,2,.. . , m} (m ^ 1) are fixed. A state is a map u> : AT —• M. So a state attaches a
level to each attribute. Observe that we assume implicitly that each attribute has the same
number of levels, namely m + 1. This is just for convenience: also without this assumption
an accurate description of the 'right' levels may be a tricky problem in practical situations.
The set of all states is denoted by fi. In mathematical notation: f2 =
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On the set. ft there is a natural ordering. Identifying w € ft with the vector
(u;(l),w(2),... ,w(n)) of the levels of the n attributes, we write w ^ u/ for u , u ' 6 ! l if this
inequality holds for each coordinate, i.e. if w(i) ^ w'(i) for all t 6 TV. This means that the
level of every attribute is at least as high in o> as it is in u/.
A sifatahcm /j is a collection of numerical values for all possible ((m + 1)") states
satisfying a few additional properties. Formally, it is a map / i : ft —» iR satisfying
(i) /i(0,0,...,0) = 0,
(ii) for all w,w' € ft, w ^ u/ implies /i(u;) ^ /i(u/).
Property (i) normalizes the value of the worst possible state to zero. Tliis is in ac-
cordance with common practice in health science'. Property (ii) states that the assigned
values should be monotonic; this is certainly a natural assumption if utilities for health
states are concerned. Let / / denote the collection of all situations (in symbols: // = ZR").
Observe that (i) and (ii) imply that /i(w) ^ 0 for all /i € / / and w € ft.
We wish to say something about the impact or importance of each level of each attribute
for any given situation /i € // . Formally this means that we will study maps y> : // —»
2ftnx(m+i)^  j g ^ maps that assign to each situation a collection of numbers, one for each
level of each attribute. For a situation /i, an attribute z and a level j , the number y>,^ (/i)
expresses the importance or contribution of level j of attribute i in situation /t. Specifically,
when health situations are concerned, this number v'tjCO should tell us something about
what it is worth to reach level j of attribute i on the way to the perfect health state
(m,m,. . . ,m).
In order to be justified in attaching this interpretation to such a map y? we need to
make some assumptions. The first assumption says that the values assigned by <p should
indeed be a distribution of the value of the perfect state.
Distribution (D) For all fteif, ]C.ew, jeM VijCO = M™> m, . . . , m).
The next assumption captures to some extent the idea of 'contribution'. Suppose that in
a certain situation lowering level j of attribute t to level j — 1 never makes any difference:
the value of /i does not change. Then it is only natural to attach a value of zero to the
'In cooperative game theory this corresponds to the convention of setting the worth of the empty
coalition equal to 0.
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original level j . Formally, this leads to the following condition.
Zero Contribution (ZC) For all /i € tf,t € JV, j € M, if ft(w) = ft(w') for all w, w' € ft
with w(i) = j , w'(z) = j• - 1 and w(lfc) = w'(fc) for all Jfc 6 N, fc / i, then <^ >^ (/i) = 0.
Observe that, trivially, this condition implies that <^oC0 = 0 for all ft € / / and i € AT.
In health situations the value of the perfect state is often scaled to one. If this is not
the case, we would want our contribution measure <^  to be independent of the value of
the perfect state, so that we can always scale it to one. This is expressed by the follow-
ing property, where we use the notations (aft)(w) := aft(w) and ay>(ft) := (a^,j(ft))tj for
/i € H and a e IR+.
Homogeneity (H) For all ft € # and all a e .ZR with o ^ O w e have </;(aft) = a<p(ft).
In many practical situations we obtain the numerical values of /i by measurement. In
health situations for instance, these numbers are often obtained by interviewing individ-
uals. Clearly, individuals or interviewers may make mistakes and, moreover, sharp-cut
individual values may simply fail to exist. Suppose now that we have obtained two sets
of values ft and ft' of the same population. An obvious way to estimate the 'true' values
would be to take the (state-wise) average of ft and ft'. A corresponding natural condition
on y> would be to require that it should not make a difference whether v? is applied to
this average or whether the average of the v>values is calculated. Moreover, the former
calculation is generally speaking easier to perform than the latter. In symbols, we would
require
ft + ft' y(ft) +
*< — > = 2
Under homogeneity, this implies
p(A + ft') = v(ft) + y?(/i').
A consequence of this condition would be that it does not make a difference whether we cal-
culate the ^-values either for ft and ft' and then add, or for the new situations arising from
taking (state-wise) minima of ft and ft' and (state-wise) maxima of ft and ft', respectively,
and then add. It is this weaker condition that will be imposed.^ In order to formalize this,
define for ft, ft' € # the new situations ft V ft' and ft A ft' by ft V ft'(w) := max{ft(w), ft'(w)}
reason for this is partly technical. It allows us to use representations of situations on the basis of
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and ft A ft'(w) := min{ft(w), ft'(w)} for all w 6 ft.
Transfer Proper ty (TP) For all ft, ft' € //,
V ft') + y>(ft A ft') =
The name Transfer Property (cf. Dubey, 1975) comes from the observation that ft V ft' and
ft A ft' arise from ft and ft' by transferring maximal and minimal values between these two.
A map < £ : # - » 2R"*(">+i) satisfying the Transfer Property is called a va/uatzon.^ The
remainder of the chapter is concerned with studying valuations satisfying the properties
of Distribution, Homogeneity, and Zero Contribution.
6.3 A Characterization of Valuations
In order to characterize valuations we consider their values on a specific subclass of situ-
ations. This subclass should be large enough so as to determine a valuation on the whole
class H. It should consist of situations that are transparent enough so as to reveal the
implicit assumptions that are made if we choose values for a valuation in those situa-
tions. A subclass of situations satisfying both requirements is the class of so called simple
situations. For every w € fi, w ^ (0,0, . . . , 0) define the simpie situation ft^ by
/ 1 iiV^w
w ) = <
I 0 otherwise.
Such a simple situation is characterized by a fixed state that has value one. All states with
at least one level below this given state have zero value, all other states have value equal
to one. The collection of all simple situations is denoted by S.*
An individual reporting a health situation of the form ft^ would probably be a rare
event, because such an individual would only be interested in reaching a certain minimal
level in any attribute. The point, however, is that these situations seem very well suited
to fix a valuation.
so called simple situations, using only positive coefficients. See the Appendix for the details, in particular
Lemma 6.9.
"*The term valuation comes from the theory of lattices, see for instance Topkis (1998). See also Einy
(1988, page 5).
Simple situations correspond to unanimity games in cooperative game theory.
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It turns out that the Transfer Property of a valuation is sufficient to extend it uniquely
from simple situations to all situations if we additionally impose Homogeneity. The proof
of this result, like all other proofs, is given in the Appendix.
THEOREM 6.1 Let v?' : 5 —» 2R"*("*+ .^ Then there zs a umgue /lomogeneous va/iiation v?
coincides twth I/J' on S. D
This theorem is of central importance. It tells us that, in order to define a homogeneous
valuation, it is sufficient to choose its values on the class of simple situations. The next
theorem tells us how this choice is restricted by the conditions of Distribution and Zero
Contribution and, moreover, that it is possible to do so.
THEOREM 6.2 Let v> 6e a homogeneous voiwotion. 77ien y> satis/ies Zero Contribution i/,
and on/y i/, /or every nonzero w € fi, tue have
J u/(c) ^ y or y = 0,
and y> satis/ies />istri6ution i/, and on/y i/, /or every nonzero a> € f2, we have
By combining these two Theorems we see that a valuation with the three additional
properties of Homogeneity, Distribution, and Zero Contribution is completely determined
by distributing, for every nonzero state, the total of one over the nonzero levels of that
state. There arc obviously still many ways to do this. A common requirement should be
that the values assigned by a valuation are independent of the order in which the attributes
are placed. To formalize this we need some notation. For a permutation cr of JV, a state
w € f 2 and a situation h e / / define crw e ft by o-w(rr(i)) := w(i) for every i € AT and
<jh € / / by <rh(<Tu/) := h(w') for every u/ € Q. So ah arises from h by interchanging
attributes according to cr.
Attr ibute Symmetry (AS) For every permutation <r of AT, every attribute i £ A', every
level _/ € A/ and every situation h e / / , y,j(h) = ^(i) j(o'h).
In order to obtain an attribute symmetric homogeneous valuation it is sufficient to satisfy
this property on simple situations, as the following theorem shows.
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THEOREM 6.3 Xef y? te a /lomogeneou.'s t»a/tiaiion. 77icn <p is attribute .w/mmetrie t/, and
oniy t/, /or every permutation <7 o/JV, et/ej-y attn7>«ie i € AT, every ieuef j € M and every
w € 0, Vi j (M = ^ ( O J C W ) - O
In the remainder of this section we focus on some examples of how values on simple
situations can be chosen consistently with Zero Contribution, Distribution, and Attribute
Symmetry.
In the first and in this chapter most important example we argue as follows. For a
nonzero state w each of the nonzero levels of w has to be reached in /i^ in order to improve
from zero to one. Thus, each of these levels is equally important and should be assigned the
same value by 97. Another argument in favor of this approach is that in practical situations
we would want our valuation to be robust against imperfections in the description of levels
— think in particular of health situations. Thus, it should not matter too much whether
a particular level of an attribute ends up as a high or a low level. A formal description
is given below, in Definition 6.4. Moreover, the resulting egalitarian valuation is studied
extensively in Section 6.5.
A second more or less opposite example is obtained if we take into account the number
of states for which a particular level of an attribute is pivoia/. To be specific, suppose
w € H we have w(i) > 0. Then, we could require V'i.wfoCO to be proportional to the
number of states u/ ^ w with w'(i) = w(i) because these are exactly the states whose value
in the simple situation ft^ would decrease from one to zero if the level u/(z) is decreased
by one to level w(i) — 1. If we think of applying this idea to health states in a population
of individuals, the implicit assumption is that all states are equally likely to occur. Here,
we will restrict our attention to this symmetric case.'' A little reflection shows that this
method favors high levels because the number of states for which these levels are pivotal
is relatively bigger.
As an intermediate example one can choose the contribution of each level w(i) in a
simple situation «„ to be proportional to the height of the level.
Formally, we have the following three valuations.
DEFINITION 6.4
• The ega/itarian ua/uaiion is the homogeneous valuation, denoted by e, with for all
the case of asymmetric distributions the method should be adapted.
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nonzero w € H, all i € Af and all j e M:
[ 0 otherwise,
where n(w) denotes the number of nonzero levels of w.
The pit/ota/ va/uateon is the homogeneous valuation, denoted by p, with for all
nonzero w € fi, ali i € AT and all j € M:
=—„ *'— ,. . ' , . if w(t) = 7 and 7 ^ 0i
0 otherwise.
The proportional no/uation is the homogeneous valuation, denoted by 7r, with for all
nonzero w € f2, all i € A^  and all j € M:
otherwise.
This definition describes the examples above formally for simple situations. The general
form is given in Lemma 6.12 in the Appendix.
In Section 6.5 we will focus on the egalitarian valuation. The reason is that, particularly
in health situations, there are good reasons (mentioned above) to treat levels in a symmetric
way. Moreover, we do not see any compelling reason for an asymmetric treatment. The
pivotal valuation for instance is based on the assumption that every way to reach a certain
health state is equally probable, but for health situations this does not seem likely.^  In
Section 6.5 we will actually show that imposing a condition of "Level Symmetry" singles
out the egalitarian valuation.
In the next section we show that every homogeneous valuation having the Zero Con-
tribution property satisfies a property of marginalism: its values depend only on marginal
contributions. This leads to alternative formulations of such valuations, and in particular
of the egalitarian, pivotal, and proportional valuations.
6.4 Marginalism
As explained in the Introduction the idea underlying valuations is that they should repre-
sent the contribution of each level to reaching the "perfect" state. The following property
"In a game-theoretic context such an argument may be more convincing. See Faigle and Kern (1992)
who develop a method based on the number of paths by which a certain 'state' can be reached.
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gives this idea a precise meaning. It says that the value assigned to each level of each
attribute should only depend on the marginal contributions of that level and not on any
other aspects of a situation.'
Marginalism (M) For all /i, /i' € tf, i € TV, j € M, if /i(w) - ft(w') = /i'(w) - /t'(w') for all
u/,u/ 6 fiwithw(fc) = w'(fc) for all fc ^  i, w(i) = j , andw'(i) = j - 1 ,
Zero Contribution is in fact a weak form of Marginalism. It turns out that Zero Con-
tribution implies Marginalism for a homogeneous valuation and that, moreover, such a
valuation is an additive function of marginal contributions. For w 6 O denote by u; + e,
[resp. u> — e,] the state arising by increasing [resp. decreasing] the level of attribute i by
one (if possible).
THEOREM 6.5 Let </? 6e a Aomoceneous va/uation saiis/i/tni? Zero Contribution. 77ien y>
satisfies Marginalism and /or eiien/ i e / V and j € M, jf / 0 t/iere is a co//ection o/ rea/
numbers {p^ : u> S fi wit/t u>(i) = j — 1} suc/»
/or a i /A6/ f .
7/, aa"rfi<iona//j/, i(7 sahs/ie* Z?i5<ri6u<ion t/ien t/iese numbers p ,^ sum /o one. D
This theorem imphes that also the egalitarian valuation e, the pivotal valuation p,
and the proportional valuation 7r have an additive representation on the basis of marginal
contributions. The result can be seen as the analogon of similar results for cooperative
games in Weber (1988).
For attribute symmetric valuations we have the following result. To avoid confusion
we will sometimes use a notation like p ,^ instead of p^ as was used in Theorem 6.5.
THEOREM 6.6 Lei ^ 6e a Ziomo^eneous ua/uahon sa<is/t/in<7 Zero ConfnTmtoon and A<-
<ri6uie 5j/mmeirj/, and te( /or z € TV and 0 ^ j € M i/ie weighs p^ be as determined m
T/ieorem 6.5. Let a 6e a permutation o/ JV. T/ien /or every w unt/i w(i) = j — 1 we have
'In Young (1985) this idea was exploited to characterize the Shapley value (Shapley, 1953) for cooper-
ative games.
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Theorem 6.6 implies that under Attribute Symmetry the weights p^ depend only on
the level and not on the particular attribute to which that level is assigned. Again, this
theorem applies to the egalitarian, pivotal, and proportional valuations.
6.5 The Egalitarian Valuation
In this section we focus on one particular method, the egalitarian valuation, as described
in Definition 6.4. The main result will be an axiomatic characterization of this valuation.
Let i e iV be an attribute, /i € / / a situation, and let /,/' € M\{0} be distinct levels.
We call / and J' sj/mmetoc in attribute i for the situation /i if for all a;,w' 6 Q with
u>(z) = J,u/(z) = /' and w(Jfc) = w'(fc) for fc / i the following holds:
a(w) - /i(w - e.) = h(w') - /i(u/ - e,).
In words, two levels of an attribute are symmetric if decreasing them by one has the same
effect on the value of a state. It seems only natural that to such levels a method that is
intended to measure contributions should assign the same value. Formally, this leads to
the following condition for a valuation y> on H.
Level Symmetry (LS) For any /i € //, i € TV we have ¥> ,^(n) = ¥>,,;< (h) for all
/,/' G A/\{0} that are symmetric in attribute i for the situation /i.
We now have the following characterization of the egalitarian valuation.
THEOREM 6.7 y? : if —> |R"* ("*+') is a homogeneous va/uahon satis/j/Mi<7 Zero Con<ri6u-
<ion anrf Z>«<n6u<ion, A^riiufe 5j/mT7iei7^ / and iet;e/ Si/mmetn/ i/, and on/y i/. <^  is <Ae
ejaiiiarian ua/uation. D
Observe that the pivotal and proportional valuations satisfy all the conditions in this
theorem except Level Symmetry."
We conclude this section with some remarks on computation. One way to compute the
egalitarian valuation (and for that matter, the pivotal and proportional valuations) for a
given situation /i 6 / / is to first compute the representation of ft on simple situations «„
* If we take m = 1 and drop Level Symmetry, which has no bite anyway in that case, then basically
the Theorem characterizes the Shapley value (Shapley, 1953). Therefore the class of methods satisfying
all the conditions in the Theorem but not necessarily Level Symmetry, extends the Shapley value.
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(see Lemma 6.9 and formulas (6.1) and (6.2)) and then compute the valuation according
to Lemma 6.12. Alternatively, one may determine the weights p^ as in Theorem 6.5 and
then use the expression in Theorem 6.5 to calculate the egalitarian (and in principle also
the pivotal and proportional) evaluation of /i. These weights p^ are derived in Lemmas
6.7 and 6.13: They are related to the values assigned to specific situations by the linear
extension of a valuation to the class of nonmonotonic situations. For the egalitarian
valuation these values can be determined from Theorem 6.8 describing the values assigned
by the egalitarian valuation to the situations «„ € /f, where / / is the set of situations
with the monotonicity condition dropped. These values are of interest because they give
the weights p« in Theorem 6.5 through the relation p^ = -<Pij(«w) (cf- Lemmas 6.7 and
6.13 and their proofs).
Henceforth, assume m ^ 2, n ^ 2 to avoid trivial or special cases. Let A: € {0, . . . , n -1}
and j 6 { 1 , . . . , m}. Define the state u/jtj € fl as follows
/t n - J c - l
The following theorem is formulated for states w*j. Similarly, the result holds for states
o-(u;jfcj), for any permutation a of N, because the egalitarian valuation satisfies Attribute
Symmetry. However, to avoid tedious notation, in what follows we suppress a.
THEOREM 6.8 Lei e : / / -> 7R""('"+i) 6e i/ie ejaiitanan va/uotion. 77ien,
/ioZd /or K ^ j :
(%) 1/ fc = 0 and j = m, t/ien
1 i / s = l , . . . , n and < = m
fii^ ) 1/ fc > 0 and j = m, t/ien
!
A; — n / o r s = 1 , . . . , A: and t = 1
fc /or s = fc + 1, . . . , n and t = m
0 oi/terwise.
r=u
frnj // j 6 { 1 , . . . ,m - 1}, t/ien
!
1 /or s = A: + 1 and t = j
- 1 /or s = fc + 1 and t = j + 1
0 oi/ienwse.r=0
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ftvj Fino//t/, 1/ a state ai /ias at /east two Zeve/s in {1 , . . . , m — 1}, t/ien £J,I(KW) = 0 /or
a// 5 = 1, . . . , n and t = 1, . . . , m. D
As observed before (see footnote 8) every homogeneous valuation satisfying Zero Contri-
bution, Distribution, and Attribute Symmetry extends the Shapley value of cooperative
game theory (Shapley, 1953). The egalitarian valuation does this in a even more special
way, as we will demonstrate now. Let /t 6 i / be any situation. Theorem 6.5 implies:
According to the last two statements in Theorem 6.8, the weight p^ (= — £tj(*O) is equal
to 0 if there exists an attribute 5 ^ i for which w(s) g {0, m}. This follows from Statement
(iii) if j = 1, and from Statement (iv) if j > 1. Consequently, the egalitarian valuation
takes marginal contributions in attribute i into account only when the levels of all other
attributes are either 0 or m, ignoring contributions elsewhere. Hence, in the formula above
summation over the set {u> € ft : w(i) = j - 1} can be reduced to summation over the set
C : = { u £ f i : u/(i) = j - l,w(s) € {0,m} for all s / i"}.
Let us take a closer look at the states in this set. Obviously, each u> € C can be written
as a(w/fcj_i) for a permutation <rof iV , and a state w*j_i as defined before Theorem
6.8. By Attribute Symmetry (Theorem 6.6) we know that p j , ^ ^ = pi£J_,, and by the
definition of the weights p^ (see the proofs of Lemmas 6.7 and 6.13) we have
If j € {2, . . . , m} Statement (iii) of Theorem 6.8 implies
A;!
)
n («-»•)
r=0
which can be rewritten as
_ fe!(n - 1 - fc)!
^ • " ' ~ n! '
If j = 1, Statement (ii) of Theorem 6.8 implies
ft!(jfc + 1 - n)
ft(n-r) '
r=0
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which after rearranging yields
_ ib!(n - 1 - fc)!
Hence, for all j = 1, . . . , m the weights p^^_, = *^"~'~ • depend only on the number of
levels that are equal to 0.
To compare this with the Shapley value in cooperative game theory note that attributes
can be viewed as players, and consider the marginal contribution /i(u.'t,j) - /i(w*j_i). This
contribution can be seen as the result of player fc + 1 increasing his level from j - 1 to j in
a coalition consisting of n - (fc + 1) players already there at full strength (that is, players
fc + 2 , . . . , n at their maximum level TO) and the remaining players not (yet) there (that is,
players 1, . . . ,fc at level 0). In the egalitarian valuation this contribution is weighted by
Pwi,_i = *^"~l~**'i which is exactly the coefficient in the Shapley value that weights the
contribution of a player joining a coalition of size fc or of size n - fc - 1 in random order
(See for instance Weber, 1988, page 118).
6.6 Concluding Remarks
In this chapter a class of methods to evaluate the contributions of different attribute levels
in (health) situations is developed. This class is characterized by properties that are quite
natural in this context: Distribution, Zero Contribution, Homogeneity, and the Transfer
Property. It turns out that these properties imply the property of Marginalism, again
a natural condition in this framework. By imposing the symmetry conditions Attribute
Symmetry and Level Symmetry we have obtained a characterization of the egalitarian
valuation.
The focus of this chapter is mainly theoretical, and indeed there is scope for further
theoretical development, like characterizations of alternative valuations. From the practical
point of view, an application to the health situation of hearing impaired individuals as
mentioned in the Introduction to this chapter will be described in a forthcoming paper.
6.7 Appendix: Proofs to Chapter 6
For /i € / / and a S iR+ (the set of nonnegative real numbers) denote by ft(a, /i) the set
of minimal states with value a under /i, i.e. , , . .
ft(a, /i) := {w € ft : /i(u>) = Q and /i(w') < a for all u/ G ft with w ^ u/, w ^  u/}.
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As before, let V denote the maximum operator.
LEMMA 6.9 Le*/i € # , iwtfi ran^e /i(ft) = {0,Qi,...,Qp}. Then
r
/ i = y v <**- ^.i)
PROOF. Take 0 ^ a/ € fi arbitrary, and suppose /i(w') = a, for some i € {1 , . . . , r } .
Note that, by the monotonicity of /i (property (ii) in the definition of a situation) and the
assumption that the zero state always has value zero (property (i)), the range of /i can
only contain nonnegative numbers. For the right hand side of (6.1) we obtain
r
\ / \ / a.Mw') ^ ^ .
t=lu/Sfi(a,,h)
Suppose this inequality were strict. Then there would be a A; e { l , . . . , r } and an
w" € fi(a*,/i) with w" ^ w' and a*/i,y'(w') > a., in particular /i(w") = Q* > Q^ = /i(w').
Because w" ^ w' this contradicts the monotonicity of ft. D
It can be shown that the representation in (6.1) of /i € / / is in fact unique among represen-
tations of this form. This fact, however, will not be used in the sequel. For our purposes,
it is sufficient to note that every A € / / has a representation of the form
on the collection of simple situations, where / is some finite index set.
As before, let A denote the minimum operator. The following lemma expresses the
valuation of a maximum of a collection of situations in terms of their minima.
LEMMA 6.10 Le< v> ^  a w/uafion and tet /ii, A2,..., /ir € i / .
PROOF. Straightforward, using the Transfer Property, by induction on r. •
Also the proof of the following lemma is straightforward and left to the reader (cf. also
Einy, 1988, Lemma 11).
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LEMMA 6.11 Lef Q,/3 € 5?+ ondu.u ' e 0. ITien
CY/J.^  A # / I ^ = (a A
in particular, a/i^ ,, A /.%„,< is a/ f/ie / o m 7/1^ /or some 7 € /R+ and u>" e fi. D
The next lemma gives an expression for homogeneous valuations on if with the aid of
simple situations in S c W . It follows from Lemmas 6.10 and 6.11.
LEMMA 6.12 ie i tp fee a homogeneous valuation, ana" Jet /i € H Aave Jfce 7t
itft / = { 1 , . . . , r} . T/ien
PROOF OF THEOREM 6.1. Follows from Lemmas 6.12 and 6.11. •
PROOF OF THEOREM 6.2. The only-if part is left to the reader.
Let </? be a homogeneous valuation satisfying (i) and (ii) in the theorem for every
nonzero o> € fi. We first show ZC of y>. Let i, j , /i be as in the formulation of ZC. Let
A = Vfcg/afc/i^ t as in (6.2). Because every a* is positive, it follows that the condition in
ZC holds for every /i^*, and hence iftj(/^0 = 0 for every A; € / by (i). Using Lemmas
6.11, 6.12, (i) and induction, it is sufficient to prove that, for all fc,^ € / and u/,w' as
in the definition of ZC we have: / i^vi^M - ^w*vw<(w') = 0. If / i ^ v ^ ^ ) = 0 then
also ^*vu/(w') = 0 because u/ ^ w. If /i^tvo/(w) = 1 then w ^ w* and u> ^ u/, hence
/i^»(u;) = 1 and /i^'(w) = 1. This implies that also /i^*(u/) = 1 and /i^(w') = 1 because
both situations satisfy the condition in ZC. Therefore, /i^vw'C'*'') = li which completes
the proof.
In order to prove Z? for </?, we use induction on r, with r as in Lemma 6.12. For r = 1,
Z) follows from homogeneity of y> and (ii). For arbitrary r and repeatedly applying (ii),
Lemma 6.12 implies (with notation as there)
A ; . ,
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To prove D, we have to prove that the right hand side of this equality is equal to
ft(m,m,... ,m), hence to V ^ a * . This can be proved by induction on r, and is left
to the reader. D
PROOF OF THEOREM 6.3. For the proof of the only-if part it is sufficient to check (left to
the reader) that for every u; € fi and every permutation (7 of AT it holds that cr/i^ = ft^.
For the if-part, it is sufficient to check that equation (6.2) implies
<T/l = Y Oiftw
•67
for every permutation a of ,/V. D
In order to prepare for the proof of Theorem 6.5 we first extend the set of situations //
to the larger set // by dropping the monotonicity requirement (ii) in the definition of a
situation. With the operations (/i + ft')(w) = ft(u>) + ft(w') and (aft)(w) = aft(w) for all
ft, ft' 6 H, u; € fi, and a € iR, the set II is a linear space with the collection of simple
situations as a basis. It is easily seen that the restriction of any map £>: 7/ —• IR"*('™+I)
that is Linear, i.e.
£(aft + 6ft') = a£(ft) + 6£(ft') for all a, 6 € Z7? and ft, ft' G H,
to H is a homogeneous valuation (i.e., satisfying the transfer property) <p on If, uniquely
determined by its values on simple situations. Hence there is a one-to-one correspondence
between homogeneous valuations on H and their linear extensions on 7/. So we can derive
properties of a homogeneous valuation ^ o n / / from properties of its linear extension £> on
/f.
As a first step we prove the following lemma.
Let < £ : £ - • /R"*("'+D be a linear map. Let i 6 AT and j € M. Then there exists a
collection of constants {a.^  : u> € fi}, such that for any ft € II
PROOF. For wef l ,u i / (0 , . . . ,0)we define the situation K^ , € II as follows:
f 1, ifw = w
Ku(w) : = <
I 0, otherwise.
&F. .4FFENOIX: PR(7<7FS TO CR4PTKR ft" 11?
Obviously* Uie set {«^,:« € Ji.w ^ (0, •,. »0)} is also a basis fur #• Every A 6 ^ can be
uniquely written as
and linearity of ^ implies
«€OM(0,...,0)}
Therefore, with a.^ , := V>,J(KW) for w € ft\{(0,... ,0}} and n^ o Q) arbitrary, we obtain
This completes the proof of the lemma. •
In the following two lemmas we include the properties of Zero Contribution and Distribu-
tion, the definitions of which are extended in the obvious way to maps y?: / / —• /7?"*("*"•"*'.
LEMMA 6.13 Le* y? : ^ -» jfRnxf^ +i) &e Zineor and safw/y Zero Confri&utaon. Let i € /V
and j € M\{(0, . . . ,0)}. T/ien i/iere exists a co/Zection o/ constant {p^ , : w 6 fi, w(i) =
J — 1}, suc/i </ia< /or any /i € / /
weft: w(«)=J-l
PROOF. Supposes € fi is a state withw(i) ^ {j, j - 1}. As in the proof of Lemma 6.7
define a^ := ¥'ij( 'O- Observe that /Cyp) = /c^ (tZ; + e,) = 0 for all J> € fi with d>(i) = j - 1 .
Therefore, by Zero Contribution, we have yi , j(^) = 0, hence a^ , = 0.
Let /i € W. Then, by Lemma 6.7 and the preceding argument,
wgfl: w(i)=j-l
We will show by induction that a^+,., = —a^ , for all w £ fi with w(i) = j — 1.
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Suppose u) € fi with J}(i) = j — 1, then /i^(a; + e,) = /ii(a>) for every u> € f2 with
'•'(O = J ~ 1- Therefore Zero Contribution implies
^jCta) = 0. (6.3)
Let now w be such that w(i) = _/ — 1 and <!>(£) = m for all fc € AT, A: ^ i. Then
Also, <ftj(/iw) = 0 by (6.3), so that
Next let w be arbitrary with w(i) = j - 1, and suppose as induction hypothesis that for
all u/ > d>, with w' 7^  w and w' = j — 1 we have
Then
u/gfl: u(t)=J-l
where the last equality follows by the induction hypothesis. Hence, with y>jj(/to) = 0 by
(6.3), we have
a^+j, = -ao.
Therefore, by induction,
a<i+c, = -a<i
for all u) € f2 with <D(i) = j — 1. Hence we can write
The proof of the lemma is complete by taking p ,^ := -a^ and observing that these weights
are independent of the situation /i € H. D
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LEMMA 6.14 Let y? as m Lemma 6\i.i? addt<iona//y sa(ts/y Z>J5<ri6uhon. TTien t/te
p ,^ as in Lemma 6.25 sum to one.
PROOF. Let J> = (0,0,. . . ,0) + je,, then by Lemma 6.13
well: w(t)=j-l
Distribution implies
and Zero Contribution implies ^ ( / i * ) = 0 if fc ^  i and ^ , i ( ^ ) = 0 if / ^ w(i) = j . Hence
*c=l (=1 u/€fl: w(t)=J-I
This completes the proof of the lemma. D
PROOF OF THEOREM 6.5. The Theorem follows from Lemmas 6.13 and 6.14 and the
remarks about the extension of homogeneous valuations to / / preceding Lemma 6.7. •
We proceed with proving Theorem 6.6. Like Theorem 6.5 we will prove Theorem 6.6 for
the more general case of a linear map y> : / j —• ,ZR"*('"+i). More specifically, the theorem
is implied by the following lemma, in which the condition of Attribute Symmetry is the
obvious extension to this more general case.
In the proof of Lemma 6.15 we use the following definition. Call two attributes i.lkGJV
symmetric w /i G / / if for the permutation <r : ./V —+ ,/V with <r(i) = /c, <r(fc) = i, and
<r(f) = / for all Z ^ i, fc, we have /i(w) = a/i(w) for all w € O.
LEMMA 6.15 Le< </? : ^ —• 7R""('"+i) 6e /inear and sa/is/j/ >l«n6uie 5ymme<n/ and Zero
Contniufion. Lei /urt/ier p ,^ 6e </ie weig/iis determined in Lemma 6./3. 7Vien, /or even/
permutation a o/ TV,
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PROOF. Lemma 6.13 implies that for every i e JV and j € M, j ^ 0 there is a collection
of real numbers {p^ : u; € ft with w(i) = j - 1} with
for all A e # .
Suppose that attributes 1,2 € iV are symmetric in /i € H. Hence, for the permutation
cr : AT -> AT, with rr(l) = 2,<r(2) = 1 and <r(i) = i if i ^ 1,2, we have A(w) = o7i(w) for all
u; 6 ft. Then Attribute Symmetry implies
for all j = 1, . . . , m. Substituting the expression above we obtain
where p^ = p ,^ and p ,^ = p | . Because <r/i = /t this implies
0 = 5 3 p«[/i(u> + e , ) - / i ( w ) ] -
u<efJ: u/(l)=j-l li
and using o-/i(<rw') = /I(J /) we obtain
0 = 53 B-[Mw + c i ) -AM]- 53
W€tl: w ( l ) = j - l l ietl: <Ir(2)=J-l
53 Pw[M^ + e i ) - / i M ] -
w€O: w ( l ) = j - l u>€
53 A»Ww + e i ) -AM]-
53 (h(w + ei)-A(w)].
Let a/ € ft such that u/ = (j - l,Z,w'(3),... ,w'(n)) for some « € M\{0}. We define the
situation /i by
Then the attributes 1 and 2 are symmetric in /i. For w € Q with w(l) = j - 1 we have
1, if w = u/ and / ^  j - 1
= ^ 2, if w = u/ and Z = jf - 1
0, otherwise.
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Therefore
0 = V IWw + c)-fcMl
\ P^' - Paw'. otherwise,
or equivalently p ^ = j iw. Because the choice of i, j 6 M\{0} was arbitrary we conclude
that p^ = p ^ for any w € ft.
The proof for any pair of symmetric attributes i, & € TV is similar, so that the theorem
follows from the fact that every permutation can be written as a sequence of 2-attribut.e
exchanges. D
We proceed with the proof of Theorem 6.7, the characterization of the egalitarian evalua-
tion.
PROOF OF THEOREM 6.7. The proof of the if-part of the theorem is left to the reader.
For the only-if part, let (^  be a homogeneous valuation satisfying Zero Contribution,
Distribution, Attribute Symmetry and Level Symmetry. By Theorem 6.1 it is sufficient to
prove that y> coincides with the egalitarian valuation on all simple situations.
Let fc € {0,. . . ,n - 1} be arbitrary, and let O C N be any collection of & distinct
attributes. Consider u; € ft with w(z) = 0 for all i € 0 and w(i) > 0 for all i €
Distribution implies
I = 1 j=0
and Zero Contribution implies v'tjCO = 0 for all z € O and v?i,>Ciw) = 0 for all i €
if j ^ u>(i). Substitution into the above equation gives
We show by induction, that </>i,w(i)CO = */ (" ~ ^) ^ ^H i € 7V\O. Let ^ := max {w(i)}.
If for all i 6 N\O we have w(i) = /, then we conclude by Attribute Symmetry that
Vi^(o(M = l / ( " - < 0 fa" all these i.
Let there exist an s € JV\O such that w(s) < /. Assume that for all <I> € f) with
u)(z) = 0 for all i € O and w(i) > 0 for all i € N\O, such that
|{ i € AT\O : w(t) = / } | > |{t
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we have ^^)(/ i^,) = l/(ra - fc).
Take any s € /V\O such that w(s) < /. Define a/ as follows
/,.., f *> ifi = s
« ( t ) = {
I oi(i), otherwise,
and define the situation /i := /i^ + /i^. Then, it is easy to show that the levels u/(s) and
i arc symmetric for s in /i. Hence, by Level Symmetry we have ¥>s (^.,)(/i) = y?si(/i)- With
the Transfer Property this implies that
Note also that by Zero Contribution (and the fact that u/(s) ^ / = w'(s)) we have
= 0 so that
By the induction assumption <p,,/(/iu,') = l/(n-fc) for all i € 7V\O. Therefore Vj,w(«)C»w) =
l/(n - A;). By induction it follows that v?i,w(i)CO = l/(n - fc) for all i € A^\O such that
w(i) < /.
Recall now that by Distribution and Zero Contribution
which by the above findings is equivalent to
Using Attribute Symmetry in the second sum we find that Vi^oCO = l/(« ~ *0 for U^
i € N\O. Hence, (p = e for this case.
Because 0 was an arbitrary selection of fc distinct attributes, and i t e { 0 , . . . , n - l }
was arbitrary too, we have <p = e on the set of simple situations S. This concludes the
proof of the theorem. •
We conclude this Appendix with the proof of Theorem 6.8 describing the values assigned
by the egalitarian valuation to the situations «:„ € .ff.
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PROOF OF THEOREM 6.8. In this proof we identify the egalitarian valuation with its linear
extension on # , the set of situations which do not necessarily satisfy the monotoiucity
requirement. First we prove Statement (iv) of Theorem 6.8. For w € f2\{(0,..., 0)} define
the situation ft^ := /i^ - K^. Let /i,i2 € { 1 , . . . ,m - 1} and w := (/i,/2,m,... ,m). Then,
Therefore, by the definition of the egalitarian valuation and linearity, we conclude f (A ,^) =
£(/»*). Hence, by linearity of £ and A* = /i* - K^, we find e ( ^ ) = 0,,x(m+i) (here 0«x(m+i)
denotes the n x (m + 1) matrix with all entries zero).
Assume now that for w = (2i,Z2,w(3),... ,w(n)) with Z1./2 € {1 , . . . ,m - 1} we have
e(*J = 0nx(m+i) if w ^ w but w ^ w.
We show c(Ki) = 0nx(m+i)- We decompose /i^ as follows
Then, by Unearity of e, the definition of e for simple situations, and the assumption
above we find e(/ii) = e(/ij,). Therefore, by Unearity of e and /i^ = A^  — «i, we find
e(Ki,) = 0nx(m+i>- Hence, by induction Statement (iv) of the theorem follows.
In order to prove Statement (i) assume fc = 0 and j = m. Then wtj = u>o,m =
(m, . . . ,m) . Hence K ^ ^ = «„,„ = fy™ „,) and, by Definition 6.4 of the egalitarian
valuation, the proof of the statement follows.
Now we prove Statement (iii) for fc = 0: Let j e { l , . . . , m - l } . Recall that woj =
(j, m, . . . ,m). We use the representation K ^ ^ = /i^^ — /L,<,.,+I> additivity of e, and the
definition of e(/i^u^) and e( / i^^, ) to conclude:
{ 1, for s = 1 and < = j ,- 1 , for s = 1 and t = j + 1,0, elsewhere.
Next we prove Statements (ii) and (iii) by induction. Let fc = 1. To prove Statement
(ii) note that wi,m = (0,m, . . . ,m) and /£„, „ = /i^,,^ - / i j , , , with wo,i = (l,m, . . . ,m) .
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Hence, by additivity of e and the definition of £(/iw,,,J and £( find
n - 1
0
0
0
0
0--
0--
0--
! • •
•0
•0
•0
• 1
\
/
/
1
n
\
1 0---0 \
0 0 - 0
0 0 - 0
0 l - l y
1
n • (n - 1)
1 - n 0 • • • 0
0 0---0
0 0 - - 0
0 l - l
which implies Statement (ii) for A; = 1.
To prove Statement (iii) for A; = 1, note that for j € {1 , . . . ,m - 1} we focus on
K(0j,m,.. ,m)- We can decompose K(0j,m,...,m) as follows
— "(Oj.m,..., ,m,...,m)~ / t ( l j + l,m,...,m) •
Using the results for Statement (iv) derived above, and additivity of e we get
,m m)) =
Attribute Symmetry and the results for Statement (iii) if A; = 0 determine the value
e(«(mj,m,...,m))- Moreover, by Definition 6.4, we know e(/i(0j,m,...,m)) and e(/i(oj+i,m,..,m))-
Substitution in the formula above then gives
1, for s = 2 and ( = j
- 1 , for 5 = 2 and t = j + 1
n(n - 1)
0. elsewhere.
Hence we proved Statement, (iv), Statement (i), and the Statements (ii) and (iii) for
A: < 1. Let now A : € { 2 , . . . , n - 1 } , and assume that the Statements (ii) and (iii) hold for
all A;' < A;. We first show that Statement (ii) holds for A;.
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Note that w*,™ = (0,. . . ,0 ,m, . . . ,m). It is easy to see that Zero Contribution and
Attribute Symmetry imply
{ o, for s = l,...,fc if < = 16, fors = fc+l,...,nift = m (6.4)
0, otherwise,
for some a, 6 6 IR. Moreover, Distribution implies fc • a + (n — /c) • 6 = 0. It is therefore
sufficient to determine a (or 6).
The following decomposition holds for K^, ^ :
m m
/C(^t. *^ii)fc '*Ujl. 1 I • . . . ^ Kfli j , , (1 w* yyi\ , 10.01
«,TT» * .m "•«— 1,1 ^ _ _ ^ / ^ \'Jc"i*«-li«r"*p"'i"'/ ' ^ '
.1=0 ik-i=0
with 5Zi=i if > 0 (so that ( i j , . . . , z*_i, 0, m , . . . , m) f^  Wfc,m)- The states in the above sum
can be separated into collections of states according to the Statements (ii)-(iv).
For L C { 1 , . . . , / : — 1} we define the state o/*,£ by
with <r = 0 for all r € L and (r = wi elsewhere, and for / = 0 , . . . , A: - 2 we define the
collection of states
I /,|=i
Note that for each / = 1, . . . , A: - 2, if w e fi*,i we know £,,I(K^,) by Statement (ii) and the
induction assumption.
F o r u = l , . . . , f c - 1, <„ = l , . . . , m - 1 and L(«) C {l, . . . ,Jfc- 1}\{W} we define the
states wjt,j,(u) by
with <„ = 0 for all v € L(u) and <„ = m elsewhere if v ^  u, and for / = 0 , . . . , fc — 2 we
define the collection of states
m - l
U
Note that for any u = 1, . . . , A- - 1 and any / = 1, . . . , fc — 2, if w € ft/t,z,u we know £,,((K^)
by Statement (iii) and the induction assumption. Further if u> = ( i i , . . . , i*.i, 0, m , . . . , m)
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and u> £ f2/t,j,u U ft*,;, then we know £s,((/Cu,) by Statement (iv). Hence, applying e to
equation (6.5), linearity of e, and Statement (iv) we find
* - l * - 2 m - l * - 2
) » \ * -v * \ ^ — \ » \
^ * - i , l ' ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ / / ^
• ' " ' • ' * •• u > ( u ) = l
Recall that according to equation (6.4) we have a = £1,1 ( K ^ „) . By Definition 6.4 we have
e \ i (hm „ ) = £i,i(frwt_,,) = 0. For a fixed u e { l , . . . , f c - l } , by the induction assumption
and Attribute Symmetry, we find for the value of e(/c^) with u> € fit,(,u:
!
1, for s = u and t = w(u)
— 1, for s = u and t = w(u) + 1
0, elsewhere,
r=u
so that with the cardinality |fifc,i,u| = (*7 )^ ^ ° ^ ^
, i, tor s = u and t = 1
- 1 , for s = it and t = m
" * " * • ' • « !!("-'•) 0, elsewhere,
w(u)=l r=0
and
t_2 m-i f 1> for s = u and < = 1
/ ^ £,,i(»iu) = Q • < — 1 , for s = u and < = m
i=ou€fijj,, ^ Q^  elsewhere,
with
fc-2
n ( n -
r=0
Therefore we conclude that for s = 1 and 1 = 1 we have
fc-lt-2 m-lE E E ei.iK,) = <*.
u=l ls0
Again we use the induction assumption and Attribute Symmetry to compute ei,
J" / + 1 - n, for t = 1 if w(s) = 0
' / + 1, for t = m if w(s) = m ,-
| | (n — r) I 0, elsewhere.
r=0
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Therefore if I = 0 we have
1 - n , for s = £ and l « l
1, for *• # fc and i = m
0, elsewhere,
implying £I,J(K") = 0 for all a; 6 Qt,o- And if 0 < I < fc - 1 ws
I] (n - r)
r=0
Here (*j'} = |JJt,i| and (*7*) equals the number of states w € Htj for which Si,i(««) « 0,
Hence, we find
J=0 f | I
r=0
fc-2
r=0
(* + !)!
I! ( n - r
r=0
= -Q + -/fc-1
r = 0
Summarizing, we find
a = O + O - Q + a -
t-i
r=0
Substitution into fc • a + (n - fc) • 6 = 0, gives
(fc-1)!
6 =
" n
r=0
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Therefore we conclude Statement (ii) for fc.
Next we prove Statement (iii) for fc. Let j € { 1 , . . . , m - 1} be arbitrarily chosen. Note
that u/jtj = (0 , . . . , 0, j , m, . . . , m). We can write K ^ ^ in the following way:
m m
*"*j = ^*j ~ ^t.j+i~ E ' " E (^u.-.<*J.™ "•)•
ti=0 u=0
with X)*=i *« > 0 (such that ( i i , . . . , i* , j ,m, . . . ,m) ^ w*j).
For u = fc + 1 and L(ifc + l )C{ l , . . . , f c} recall the definition the state W*,L(*+I) by
where („ = 0 for all w € L(A: + 1) and <„ = m elsewhere. Now, with u/(fc + 1) = j fixed, for
Z = 0 , . . . , fc — 1 we define the collection of states
*.' •= U
Now we apply £ to /c^^^ in equation (6.6), and conclude by linearity and Statement (iv),
that
fc-i
Substitution of £(/i,^ J , £(/iwt,+ ,) (which are known by Definition 6.4) and of £(/c^ ,) for
w € fijt.i (which are known by the induction assumption and Attribute Symmetry) implies
k_i ( 1. for s = fc + 1 and t = j
£t,j(*w) = [ r~ E ( ; ) '""/ i { ~^' for s = fc + 1 and i = j + 1
71 — /C \ / T^ / I
11 ("• ~ '"J i. 0, elsewhere,
r=0
where (*) = |fifc,,|. Define
c :=
n - f c ^ V / / JL
1 1
r=0
Then we find
c =
1 A fc! 1
n - f c ~ ^ (fc-Z 1)! ' - '
r=0
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• {8 <"-->-£'TO S <"-
r=0
A-!
n («-
r=0
Hence we get Statement (iii) of the theorem for fc.
Summarizing, we conclude the validity of the Statements (ii) and (iii) for A;, and by
induction for all 0 ^ /c < n. This concludes the proof of Theorem 6.8. D
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Samenvatting
Dit proefechrift levert een bijdrage zowel aan de klassieke verwacht-nutstheorie als aan de
moderne beslissingsmodellen, in het bijzonder cumulatieve prospecttheorie. In het inlei-
dende hoofdstuk wordt het onderzoek gemotiveerd en gelijktijdig wordt de basis voor de
mathematische modellering van individueel beslissingsgedrag onder risico en ondcr onzek-
erheid uitgelegd. Zo werden de begrippen (objectief) verwacht nut voor beslissen onder
risico en subjectief verwacht nut voor beslissen onder onzekerheid geintroduceerd met, de
bijbehorende basiselementen: objectieve kansen, prijzen en loterijen (voor risico), toes-
tanden, uitkomsten en acts (voor onzekerheid), en preferenties en nutsfuncties. Aanslui-
tend daarop worden die modellen geformuleerd die afwijken van het klassieke concept van
de rationele economische agent: voor risico Quiggin's (1982) rangafhankelijk-nutstheorie,
voor onzekerheid Schmeidler's (1989) Choquet-verwacht-nutstheorie en voor zowel risico
als onzekerheid Tversky & Kahneman's (1992) cumulatieve prospect theorie.
In hoofdstuk 2 staat cardinaal nut centraal. Met cardinaliteit wordt bedoeld dat er
een ordening van nutsverschillen over uitkomsten bestaat, die onafhankelijk is van de toe-
stand waar het nutsverschil is gemeten. De conditie die deze eigenschap voor preferenties
beschrijft heet tradeoff-consistentie en is geintroduceerd in Wakker (1984) om subjectief
verwacht nut af te leiden.
Andere karakteriseringen voor verwacht nut worden gegeven in de modellen van Ram-
sey (1931), de Finetti (1931, 1937), von Neumann & Morgenstern (1944) en Anscombe &
Aumann (1963). De preferentiecondities in deze modellen verschillen nogal van elkaar en
een directe samenhang ertussen is niet te zien. Toch zijn bij de genoemde groep karak-
teriseringen de axioma's gericht op de nutsfunctie.
In hoofdstuk 2 worden alternatieve bewijzen voor al deze modellen gegeven, gebaseerd
op het principe van cardinaal nut. Eerst wordt bewezen dat de axioma's tradeoff- con-
sistentie inhouden, en daarna wordt de modelspecifieke vorm van de nutsfunctie bepaald.
Dus de gegeven alternatieve bewijzen laten zien dat deze modellen via het principe van
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caxdinaal nut te verenigen.
Hoofdstuk 3 legt een verband tussen twee standaardresultaten van de individuele
beslissingstheorie. Het additive-conjoint-measurementmodel van Debreu (1960) is gefor-
muleerd voor eindige toestanden en de nutsfunctie is toestandsafhankelijk. De subjectieve
verwacht- nutstheorie van Savage (1954) is geformuleerd voor oneindige toestanden en de
nutsfunctie is onafhankelijk van de toestanden.
In de literatuur van individueel beslissen onder risico/onzekerheid zijn vele voorbeelden
beschreven waar uitkomsten afhankelijk zijn van de toestand waaraan ze zijn verbonden
(Karni 1985, Dreze 1987). Ook zijn theoretische modellen ontwikkeld voor toepassingen
in dergelijke situaties. Toch overtuigen deze theorieen niet, meestal omdat preferentiecon-
dities voorondersteld zijn die indirect een kansmaat voor de toestanden impliceren. Dit
kan onder andere verklaard worden door de neiging om de functionaal, die de preferentie
representeert, in een bekendc vorm te schrijven, namelijk als integraal. Verder is in de
literatuur geen algemenere vorm voor de functionaal gedefmieerd, hetgeen deze neiging
versterkt.
De manier waarop in hoofdstuk 3 de modellen van Savage en van Debreu zijn gegener-
aliseerd noodzaakt tot het definieren van een nieuwe functionaal, die op natuurlijke wijze
een uitbreiding is van de klassieke Lebesgue integraal. Nadat de problemen zijn beschreven
die een rol spelen bij de uitbreiding van Debreu's (1960) theorie naar oneindige toestanden,
worden de nodige preferentieaxioma's geformuleerd voor ree'le getallen als uitkomsten, en
wordt de nieuwe functionaal gedefinieerd. Daarna worden toepassingen van het nieuwe
beslissingsmodel op risicogedrag en op Bayesiaanse analyse beschreven, en preferentiecon-
dities gegeven met een uitbreiding van het model naar algemene uitkomsten.
Kahneman & Tversky (1979) hebben experimenten uitgevoerd om de geldigheid van
verwacht nutsmaximalisatie te testen. Daarin is vastgesteld dat mensen gedifFerentieerd
gedrag tonen voor winsten en voor verliezcn. Verder bleek uit deze experimenten dat
kansen niet objectief worden verwerkt in de beslissingen, maar worden vervormd. Om deze
resultatcn te verwerken hebben zij prospect theorie ontwikkeld. Later hebben Tversky &
Kahneman (1992) met cumulatieve prospect theorie (CPT) de formele onvolledigheden
van prospect theorie gecorrigeerd en het meest algemene model voor individueel beslissen
onder risico/onzekerheid tot stand gebracht. • •• ;
De preferentie eigenschappen die bij de karakterisering van CPT een rol spelen zijn
deels van technische aard en empirisch niet of moeilijk vaststelbaar. Hierdoor wordt de
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populariteit van deze theorie op empirisch onderzoek niet overgedragcn. In hoofdstuk 4
en hoofdstuk 5 zijn modellen ontwikkeld om dit aspect te verbeteren. Er wordt. uitgegaan
van een bepaalde risicoafkeer van de individuen. In hoofdstuk 4 wordt een CPT-model
voor beslissen onder risico gekarakteriseerd en wordt constante proportionele risicoafkeer
voorondersteld. Deze eigenschap is empirisch meetbaar. Verder heeft, deze eigenschap
veel overlap met precies die technische condities in de andere karakteriseringen die niet
empirisch meetbaar zijn. Vooral de axioma's die voor de identificatie van de cumulatieve
gewichten verantwoordelijk zijn hoeven niet meer te worden voorondersteld. Het effect
van constante proportionele risicoafkeer is dan ook te zien aan de vorm van de nutsfunctie.
Deze blijkt een power-functie te zijn waarbij de exponent voor winst kan verschillen van
de exponent voor verlies. Dit verschil geldt ook voor de bijbehorende gewichten, hetgeen
- typisch voor cumulatieve prospect theorie - een gedifferentieerd gedrag voor winst en
verlies toelaat.
In hoofdstuk 5 worden de resultaten van hoofdstuk 4 uitgebreid voor individueel beslis-
sen onder onzekerheid . Naast constante proportionele risicoafkeer wordt een model gefor-
muleerd waar constante absolute risicoafkeer de centrale eigenschap is. Deze eigenschap
impliceert een lineaire of exponentiele nutsfunctie. Verder wordt cumulatieve prospect
theorie voor modellen met muitiattribuut nut toegepast, en worden karakteriseringen van
additieve of multiplicatieve nutsfuncties en multilineaire nutsfuncties afgeleid. De resul-
taten zijn belangrijk voor empirisch onderzoek, waar meestal een specifieke vorm voor de
nutsfuncties wordt voorondersteld.
Hoofdstuk 6 kan worden gezien als een toepassing van concepten uit de coOperatieve
speltheorie op muitiattribuut nutstheorie. Eigenschappen die bekend zijn in de klassieke
speltheorie worden uitgebreid voor multi-keuze spelen zodanig dat een hele nieuwe klasse
van verdelingsconcepten verkregen wordt. Deze oplossingen bieden hulp bij het meten
van nutswinsten uit medische interventies en het toekennen van deze winst aan het bijbe-
horende attribuut.
De bijdrage geleverd door dit proefsclirift verrijkt de theorie van individueel besliss-
ingsgedrag en ook van de speltheorie. De resultaten bieden mogelijkheden voor verder
onderzoek in de individuele beslissingstheorie, de welvaartstheorie en de onderhandelings-
theorie.
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